

Nicolae Titulescu

***ROMANIA'S
FOREIGN POLICY – 1937***

THE ROMANIAN MINISTERIAL CRISIS OF AUGUST 1936

On August 29, 1936, without previous warning or communication of any kind from the Romanian Government, I ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was suddenly removed from ministerial activities which I had carried on for almost twenty years¹.

I have often wondered if, in view of the manner in which I was treated, it would not be preferable to maintain complete silence with regard to my departure² from M. G. Tataresco's³ Government.

I must confess that I should have preferred to remain silent.

There are some men with whom one does not discuss, and some matters of which one does not speak.

But, having thought the question over, I cannot fail to realise that this is not a personal matter with which I can deal as an ordinary private individual according to the dictates of my personal pride. It is a matter which concerns at the same time international public opinion and national public opinion.

In what way?

Could I possibly allow those who have known me abroad, those who have placed in me such trust that, because of it, I have been able to serve my country and work in the general interest of peace, to let their imaginations run riot as to the cause of my departure?

Could I, on the other hand, allow thousands of Romanians to explain my departure according to the dictates of partial insinuations, after the sympathy they showed me during my grave illness⁴, which acquainted me with human kindness⁵ to an undreamt-of extent and gave me a new lease of life?

¹ Minister of Finances (July 10, 1917–January 28, 1918; June 13, 1920–December 16, 1921). Minister for Foreign Affairs (July 6, 1927–November 23, 1927; November 24, 1927–November 9, 1928; October 20, 1932–January 13, 1933; January 14, 1933–November 13, 1933; November 14, 1933–December 29, 1933; December 30, 1933–January 2, 1934; January 10, 1934–October 1, 1934; October 10, 1934–August 29, 1936.

² On August 29, 1936, in wake of actions perpetrated by hostile domestic and foreign forces, Carol II decided, in collusion with Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu, to eliminate Nicolae Titulescu from Romania's political life. This was achieved by resorting to a political manoeuvre – “the homogenisation of the Government”. Political and diplomatic circles, the Press and public opinion, both in Romania and abroad, in Europe and on other continents interpreted this act as Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal. Opinions on the reasons of this decision, and particularly on its consequences, differed widely, being often antipodal.

³ Gheorghe Tătărescu.

⁴ Nicolae Titulescu's health condition worsened permanently in the second half of August and early September 1936. The emotional shock suffered by him due to his dismissal from the Government would destabilise even more his precarious health. The second half of September would witness a dramatic moment in his existence, physicians discovering that they had to handle a strange case, whose ethiology could not be established with precision.

⁵ Expressions of sympathy in those difficult moments, addressed to Nicolae Titulescu, were various and in great numbers: messages from the League of Nations Assembly and Council, cables, phone calls and letters from numerous heads of state and of governments, ministers, diplomats from various countries, messages

No, such a course is unthinkable.

As long as I did not return to public life, there was a reason for silence. Today, that reason no longer exists.

Those who live on the other side of the frontiers must know that, if I left, my departure was not due to any misdemeanour on my part.

And those who live within the country must know that, if I refuse to be a Minister again under the same conditions as during latter years, it was not because my country had become foreign to me, that the interest of my nation was less dear to me today than yesterday, that my devotion to the Romanian people acknowledged today limits which I did not know yesterday; but rather that my experience – a statement of which may be heard by anybody who likes to listen – has shown me that the ministerial chair in Romania today is a chair placed upon a trap-door which cannot be sat upon with confidence, because of the secret machinery worked by discreet hands which ejects you from it just at the moment when you think yourself most securely installed.

The compromise between my personal tendency towards silence and the political necessity to speak in order to enlighten public opinion leads me to give a simple statement of the facts as they arise from the written documents, without attacking anybody.

As a matter of fact, these facts are so eloquent that the conclusion will appear evident to everyone.

If other tactics are used in answer to this, I naturally reserve the right to change mine and to use all weapons in my possession.

In order to confirm my statement to this method, I should like, at the outset, to make the following declaration: His Majesty the King being above all such questions, President Georges Tataresco has afforded me opportunity of owing him a great debt of gratitude.

Thanks to him, I have recovered something very precious which I had lost for the past twenty years, the most precious thing of all, which one does not readily surrender when one has tasted it again: Freedom.

And now let us deal with the facts.

On June 27th and 30th, 1936, I sent President Tataresco two telegrams showing that the international situation of Romania was not such as that country deserved.

The idea of harming the Government of which I was a member was so far from my mind that I take the liberty of quoting the following passage from the telegram of June 30th:

“And when I think that the responsibility for the new situation does not fall on us, on those who govern, but on those who, in order to take our place, are making use of foreign policy as a weapon for purposes of internal policy, my sorrow is still greater.”

This did not prevent M. Georges G. Tataresco from wiring to me on June 30th on a tone of accusation, in order to make me responsible for the state of international public opinion with regard to Romania, because of the lack of propaganda, and from giving me detailed instructions, even including punctuation, as to the course of action to be taken –

from a great many international societies and various national unions of journalists; messages from Romanian organisations and political parties, academic establishments and universities, cultural societies, professional associations, urban and rural communities.

a thing which has never happened to me in any other ministry of which I had been a member: those of John I.C. Bratiano¹, Marshal Averesco², Vintila Bratiano³, I. Maniu⁴, A. Vaida⁵ and I.Gh. Duca⁶.

I immediately replied to M. Tataresco:

“I have communicated to the Government of which I am a member the sorrow I felt on hearing the erroneous conclusions drawn in foreign countries from certain facts relating to Romania. If, when I exercise my rights to communicate to my colleagues what is happening as well as what I myself feel, *instead of deducing therefrom that there should be a cessation of our internal strife, which is the sole reason for alarming news abroad*, I am told, even including punctuation, how I should act, and if it is thought that there is no special body defending us in the foreign Press, when... your telegram number... presents to me conclusions which I understand and which I do not in any way refuse to draw.”

This time, M. Tataresco wired to me on July 3rd in a more friendly way, saying he was very sorry to learn how I had interpreted his telegram, but again referring to the lack of any organisation to react against the ravings of the foreign Press.

Propaganda with regard to Romania?

Events in Romania are immediately known by all foreign correspondents in Bucharest, who telegraph without delay to their papers.

Is it not a fact that, for more than a year, M. G. Tataresco's Government has been managing foreign propaganda through people other than myself? I should very much like to know what article, unfriendly to Romania, the Romanian Government has succeeded in suppressing in the foreign Press once the latter had decided upon its publication?

Faced with the state of affairs outlined above, I decided to take my stand on the grounds of facts, and, on July 9th, 1936, I left the Montreux Conference⁷.

On July 11th at 2 p.m., I arrived in Bucharest by the Orient Express.

Since M. Tataresco telephoned to me that he could not see me between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. – at which time His Majesty the King had granted me an audience – I sent my resignation to M. Tataresco by a trusty messenger and handed to His Majesty the King not, as has been said, my resignation, but a copy of the letter of resignation which I had sent to M. Tataresco.

Here is a copy of the letter of resignation:

“Bucharest, July 11th, 1936

Mr. Prime Minister,

It will soon be three years since I gave my collaboration as Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Government formed from the ranks of the Liberal Party, first under the presidency of the unforgettable I.G. Duca and later under your presidency.

¹ Ion (Ionel) I.C. Brătianu.

² Alexandru Averescu.

³ Vintilă I.C. Brătianu.

⁴ Iuliu Maniu.

⁵ Alexandru Vaida-Voevod.

⁶ Ion Gheorghe Duca.

⁷ Montreux hosted, over June 22–July 20, 1936, the International Conference for the Black Sea Straits Régime.

I would not presume to pass judgement on the value or on the result of that collaboration, but I feel psychologically entitled to call it loyal and most friendly.

As a matter of fact, the very dear memories of my co-operation with the Liberal Party are intimately mixed with the greater part of my political life.

All the same, I would like to point out that, for some time past, various internal circumstances have shown me very clearly that I could not remain responsible for the development of our external policy on the basis of its essential principle, i.e. a good understanding with all nations, without distinction. On the contrary, they have shown me that I could not even assume the responsibility of maintaining the results obtained hitherto.

I do not claim that others should share this view, but the fact that I hold it is sufficient to make it impossible for me to remain Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I would like to make quite clear *what is not covered by the above-mentioned internal circumstances.*

I am a Romanian, born of Romanian parents, brought up in the school of Take Ionescu¹ and Vintila Bratiano and therefore I hold Romanian nationalism as a dogma² both inside the country and outside.

I therefore ask that no one from outside the country should interfere with our internal affairs and that the guiding principles of our internal policy be purely Romanian.

During my term of office I was not only preoccupied with remaining faithful to our treaties of alliance but also with establishing the best possible relationship with all our neighbours, although naturally maintaining our territorial integrity and national interests.

¹ Dumitru (Take) Ionescu.

² The whole ideology of the 1848 revolutionaries, of the Union generation, of those who had laid down their lives for Independence, for making the Romanian unitary nation-state, casts light on the truth that the concept of nation, the concern for its salvation, for strengthening its cohesion and identity for the conquest of its autonomy and its sovereign assertion formed the line of force of Romanian thinking in the 19th and 20th centuries, fully consonant with all the Romanian people's aspirations, and the values which started imposing themselves at a European level, which issued in the birth and progress of nation-states. The Nation and the Motherland have been for the Romanian thinkers and politicians of the modern and contemporary age complementary, even identical values, patriotism and nationalism expressing the need for self-expression, in a word torn by numerous contradictions, opposed interests, by the conquering ambitions of the great empires of the time. "Nationalism" represented for the inhabitants of the Romanian space, a Latin island in a sea of Slavs, a chance of survival, the liant, the sole able to impart durability and strength to the small and newly born states, measured at the scale of history. The advocates and promoters of Romanian nationalism – be they Bărnăușiu, Bălcescu, Kogălniceanu, Hasdeu, Brătianu, Iorga or Titulescu – never fell a prey to exclusivist, and so much the more, xenophobic feelings. This is attested to by their entire work, their concept on the organisation of Romanian society, their realistic and democratic views on the rights and duties of all the inhabitants of this country, irrespective of their ethnic origins or religious faith, their wish to cooperate with all the nations in the world, under the sign of peace, mutual security and progress. Any attempts of altering this sense – by trying guilty devaluation of the initial meaning of the term – cannot annul the cardinal value of this term, its deeply democratic, progressive and humanist substance. The excesses of past or present extremist groupings cannot query this feeling. Attempts at discrediting, or condemning indiscriminately, whenever that may have happened, in whatever socio-political framework or geopolitical context, have nothing to do with the scientific approaches, expressing – even under a dissimulated form – marked political interests, for which the virtues of the independent and sovereign nation-state have always represented an obstacle.

I take this opportunity of reiterating what I have already said, i.e. that I have not concluded a treaty¹ of assistance with the U.S.S.R. *and that I have never given an undertaking concerning the passage of Soviet armies through Romanian territory*², such a question never having even been discussed.

I thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for all the kindness you have shown me during the period of our collaboration and I have the honour to hand in my resignation as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Delegate of Romania to the League of Nations, being confident that I have maintained the independence and prestige of the external policy of Romania.

I am, etc.

(signed) N. Titulesco”

M. Tataresco, M. Inculetz³, and more particularly M. Victor Antonesco, insisted that I should withdraw my resignation.

I answered that we did not agree on external policy.

When, after a long discussion, we finally agreed on the main line of our external policy, on the basis of which I had as a matter of fact worked for the last four years, I asked that minutes of this conversation should be drawn up and signed by MM. Tataresco, Inculetz, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, V. Antonesco and myself.

Here is the text of these minutes, bearing the date of July 14th, 1936.

1) Meeting of the Cabinet and resolution adopted.

2) Single pact of alliance between France and the Little Entente against any aggressor whatsoever.

3) In view of the signature of the Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., already authorised by the Government last July⁴ and which the Soviets now refuse to conclude, a relaxation of the existing tension should be sought with regard to the Soviets on the basis of the following principles:

a) Cessation of Press attacks on the U.S.S.R., retaining only the internal fight against communism, of which no member of the Government is a partisan.

¹ On the grounds of full powers given by the Romanian Government, on July 12 and 14, 1935, reconfirmed on July 14, 1936, following the Montreux negotiations Nicolae Titulescu initialed with Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov, on July 21, 1936, a Protocol containing the principles that had to form the basis of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Romania and the Soviet Union. The Protocol had four items. The two foreign ministers agreed on items 1, 3, and 4. Litvinov said that he could not accept item 2, and Titulescu stressed that he could not sign the Treaty without it. Negotiations had to be resumed in September 1936, at Geneva, when the Treaty was supposed to be signed.

² Item 3 of the Protocol, containing the principles likely to form the basis of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Romania and the Soviet Union stated that the Soviet and Romanian troops may never cross the Dniester into Romania and, respectively, into the U.S.S.R. without a formal request from the Romanian Government, and, respectively, the Soviet Government.

³ Ion Inculeț.

⁴ The general political evolutions in 1935 and the signature of the French-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties constituted decisive reasons in Nicolae Titulescu's plea for the conclusion of a Romanian-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and thus, on July 12 and 14, 1935, he was for the first time fully authorised to negotiate and sign such a treaty.

b) Press articles favouring the rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. from the point of view of external relations, showing that we cannot keep the existing alliances with France¹, Czechoslovakia² and Turkey³ if we do not agree with the U.S.S.R., or still more if we become her enemies when she is the ally of our allies.

c) *Speeches in public meetings of the Liberal Party on the necessity for an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on questions of foreign policy* on the basis of following discrimination: from the point of view of internal policy we are against communism and resolved to lead our country along purely Romanian lines; but in the sphere of foreign policy we favour an agreement with the U.S.S.R., ally of our allies, France,⁴ Czechoslovakia⁵ and Turkey,⁶ because such an agreement is the only way to give real value to these alliances. We cannot at the same time be the ally of France and the enemy of Russia, France's ally.

4) *Continuation of full powers for the conclusion of a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., which full powers have already been given to M. Titulesco long ago.*

5) Cessation of attacks made in our Press against all foreign States and more particularly against the political régime of such States, even if their foreign policy does not follow the same line as ours, such attacks being only capable of weakening the external position of Romania.

6) *Keeping a watch on all Legations, without exception, who interfere with our internal life, and communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of police reports drawn up for that purpose, as well as taking all necessary steps to ensure that no foreign Legation should in the future exceed its diplomatic functions or continue its interference with our internal political life, either by personal propaganda or by intervention in the Press.*⁷

¹ On June 10, 1926, the Treaty of Friendship between Romania and France was signed in Paris. It was ratified by Romania on September 30, 1926 and by France on September 11, 1926. On June 10, 1926, in Paris again, there was signed a Convention between Romania and France for the peaceful settlement of differences, enforced on November 8, 1926.

² The Romanian-Czechoslovak Convention of Defensive Alliance was signed in Bucharest on April 23, 1921. It came into force on May 27, 1921. It was prolonged on May 7, 1923, June 13, 1926, May 21, 1929 and under Art. 1 of the Little Entente Pact (signed at Geneva on February 16, 1933) it was extended indefinitely.

³ The Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression, Arbitration and Conciliation between Romania and Turkey was signed, in Ankara, on October 17, 1933.

⁴ Following the failure of the Oriental Pact project, France and the U.S.S.R. sign, in Paris, on May 2, 1935, a five-year Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

⁵ Prague saw, on May 16, 1935, the signature of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, conditioned by the implementation of the French-Soviet Treaty of May 2, 1935.

⁶ On December 17, 1925, in Paris, G.V. Chicherin and Tewfik Rüstü Aras signed the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey. It came into force on April 29, 1926. Initially concluded for a three-year term, after two three-year prolongations, it was again extended on October 1931 (for five years) and on November 7, 1935 (for ten years).

⁷ Nicolae Titulescu's express request for having such a provision introduced in the minutes, signed on July 14, 1936, was prompted by the continual subversive action carried for over two years by the personnel of the Polish Legation in Bucharest, at head with minister Miroslaw Arciszewski and chargé d'affaires Alfred Poninski, when the former was absent. The Polish Foreign Ministry went to the Polish Legation in

7) *Complete solidarity of the Ministry in its relations with those of the foreign Ministers who have resolutely tried to sever the Minister for Foreign Affairs from his colleagues in the Cabinet and represented him as carrying out a purely personal policy, whereas, in reality, he only expresses the views of the Government, of Parliament and of the Country*¹.

*

It was not owing to any lack of confidence that I asked for minutes to be drawn up and signed. But it is so difficult to discuss questions of vital importance to the country when one is thousands of miles away, that the main lines of a policy should be drawn up on both sides carefully, in detail and in writing.

It was on this basis that I worked with Vintila Bratiano. For instance, in connection with the negotiations for the consolidation of our war debt to England² and the United States³, M. Vintila Bratiano, on my request, signed instructions which we had previously discussed together; yet, no one could deny that I had the most complete confidence in Vintila Bratiano.

Allow me to read these minutes of July 14th, 1936, which bear the signatures of MM. Tataresco, Inculetz, Victor Antonesco and myself.

The first point is drafted as follows:

"Meeting of the Cabinet and resolution adopted."

Since it was alleged that there was a difference between the text given out to the Press and that which had been signed, here is the text of this communiqué entirely written by the hand of M. Tataresco and signed by MM. Tataresco, Inculetz, Victor Antonesco, as well as a facsimile of the issue dated November 25th, 1936, of the newspaper "Epoca"⁴ in which M. Grégoire Filipescu quotes the above-mentioned communiqué in his speech to the Romanian Senate. No difference can be found between the two texts.

The text of the communiqué is as follows:

"The unanimous Cabinet:

Taking note of the statement made by M. N. Titulesco, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Bucharest a huge propaganda material, meant to emphasize "the harm" caused to the Romanian people, to Romania's foreign policy and to her relations with other states, by the fact that Nicolae Titulescu was at the head of Romanian diplomacy. The démarches of the Polish diplomats in Bucharest, especially of the two persons mentioned above, took various forms such as frequent talks with the King, the Prime Minister, other members of the Cabinet, the leaders of the opposition parties, prominent personalities of the Army or the Church, with businessmen, or even public events, conferences, interviews, press articles, in which insinuation and defamation had almost always been associated to attacks against Nicolae Titulescu.

¹ A methodical, consistent and virulent campaign against Nicolae Titulescu was carried by the political-diplomatic chanceries of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, but also, at a given moment, due to reorientation of foreign policy lines, or to passion, vainglory or jealousy shown by some of their leaders, by those of Poland and Yugoslavia.

² The Convention on the Consolidation of Romania's war indemnities due to Great Britain, worth £18,448,200, was signed in London, on October 19, 1925.

³ The Convention on the Consolidation of Romania's war indemnities due to the United States, worth \$44,590,000, was signed in Washington, on December 4, 1925.

⁴ "Epoca" – the press organ of the Conservative Party – was founded in November 1885, its first director and owner being Nicolae Filipescu.

Fully approves and adopts as its own the foreign policy as explained by M. Titulesco and carried out by him.

The Cabinet has taken all necessary steps to ensure strict execution of that policy, which is the policy of the Government and of the country.

Takes this opportunity of conveying to M. N. Titulesco its deep gratitude for the work successfully accomplished by him as well as its complete confidence in him in the exercise of his duties.

(signed) Tataresco
Inculetz
Victor Antonesco”

This communiqué, which was unanimously approved by the Cabinet at its meeting of July 15th, 1936, was not only written by M. Tataresco’s own hand but obviously drafted by him; for such a communiqué strangely resembles inscriptions on photographs, which are never dictated by the recipient.

I now come to point 2) of the minutes of July 14th, 1936, which runs as follows:

“Single pact of alliance between France and the Little Entente against any aggressor whatsoever.”

At the meetings of the Heads of States¹ of the Little Entente on June 6th and 7th, 1936, it had been decided to open negotiations with France for the conclusion of a single pact with the Little Entente. Therefore, in point 2) of the minute, the Romanian Government merely acted in conformity with that decision of the Heads of States.

But what did M. Victor Antonesco, Foreign Minister of Romania and signatory of the above-mentioned protocol, say to M. Stanislas de la Rochefoucauld at the Belgrade Conference² of April 2nd, 1937?

“Now we have to consider a widening of the basis of the Little Entente, a general pact of mutual assistance between the States. *This is a problem which needs much thought...*”

And M. Victor Antonesco added:

“At present we have only a treaty of friendship with France. *The strengthening of our diplomatic connections is also a problem for the future.*”

What does this mean?

On July 14th, 1936, the alliance between the Little Entente and France constituted for M. V. Antonesco such an immediate problem that he gave me full powers to conclude it.

On February 2nd, 1937, the alliance between the Little Entente and France became a problem for the future which needed much thought³.

¹ The Conference of the Heads of State of the Little Entente member-countries gathered in Bucharest, over June 6–8, 1936, President Edvard Beneš of Czechoslovakia, Prince-Regent Paul of Yugoslavia and King Carol II of Romania. The three heads of state pronounced for the conclusion of a Single pact of Alliance between France and the Little Entente, against any aggressor and the creation of a united Commandment of the three armies.

² The Permanent Council of the Little Entente approached, in its Belgrade session of April 1–2, 1937, the question of concluding a Treaty of Assistance between the Little Entente and France. Czechoslovakia (who had advanced in this sense a draft to the French Government on November 21, 1936) was the sole country which fully backed the idea. Romania agreed to sign a bilateral Pact with France, while Yugoslavia expressed her categorical disapproval. Victor Antonescu and Milan Stojadinović asked Czechoslovakia to settle her relations with Germany as a precondition for negotiations with France.

³ In fact it was April 2, 1937, which is confirmed also by Nicolae Titulescu’s prior mention.

Anyone who can manage satisfactorily to reconcile these two statements certainly deserves a medal for cleverness.

Let us, however, continue the reading of points 3) and 4) of the minutes of July 14th, 1936, which are as follows:

“3) In view of the signature of the Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., already authorised by the Government last July and which the Soviets now refuse to conclude¹, a relaxation of the existing tension should be sought with regard to the Soviets on the basis of the following principles:

a) Cessation of Press attacks on the U.S.S.R., retaining only the internal fight against communism of which no member of the Government is partisan.

b) Press articles favouring the rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. from the point of view of external relations, showing that we cannot keep the existing alliances with France, Czechoslovakia and Turkey if we do not agree with the U.S.S.R., or still more if we become her enemies when she is the ally of our allies.

c) *Speeches in public meetings of the Liberal Party on the necessity for an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on questions of foreign policy on the basis of the following discrimination: from the point of view of internal policy we are against communism and resolved to lead our country along purely Romanian lines; but in the sphere of foreign policy we favour an agreement with the U.S.S.R., ally of our allies, France, Czechoslovakia and Turkey, because such an agreement is the only way to give real value to these alliances. We cannot at the same time be the ally of France and the enemy of Russia, France's ally.*

4) *Continuation of full powers for the conclusion of a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., which full powers have already been given to M. Titulesco long ago.”*

This time I had therefore obtained a written renewal of the full powers given to me on July 12th, 1935, for the signature of a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R.

As you will see later on, I was not able to carry this out because of the delay imposed by the U.S.S.R.

This did not prevent M.V. Antonesco from stating in the Romanian Parliament on February 6th, 1937:

“M. Titulesco has stated in connection with the past and I declare for the present: We have no Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., *nor do we intend to negotiate such a pact.*”

What does this mean? M.V. Antonesco gives me full powers to conclude a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. and a few months later he no longer has even the intention of negotiating such a pact.

M. V. Antonesco is just as inscrutable as the Sphinx.

¹ In his political report sent to Carol II on March 9, 1940, on Romanian-Soviet relations, Nicolae Titulescu refers to the exploratory talks carried in September 1935 with M.M. Litvinov, Foreign Commissar of the U.S.S.R., who was not responsive to the Romanian diplomatic initiative, regarding the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance. A negative attitude, on the same line, was expressed by M.M. Litvinov in March and June 1936.

I now come to point 5).

“Cessation of attacks made in our Press against all foreign States and more particularly against the political régime of such States, even if their foreign policy does not follow the same line as ours, such attacks being only capable of weakening the external position of Romania.”

You will see that I had the same preoccupation concerning all political régimes and that I desired to protect them against any attacks in the Romanian Press, without considering whether their external policy was conducted along the same lines as that of Romania or not.

I now pass to point 6).

“Keeping a watch on all Legations, without exception, who interfere with our internal life, and communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of police reports drawn up for that purpose, as well as taking all necessary steps to ensure that no foreign Legation should in the future exceed its diplomatic functions or continue its interference with our internal political life, either by personal propaganda or by intervention in the Press.”

I therefore drew the attention of the Romanian Government to this fact: the external policy of Romania is influenced by various foreigners who represent their countries in Romania.

The Romanian Government Cabinet recognised this, since they signed the above provision.

What was the use of all this?

None whatever, since the Romanian Government did nothing to remedy the evil.

And when, later, the evil increased in such a way as to strike everybody, the Romanian Government began by speaking very high and mightily and in the end climbed down.

I left Romania on July 18th to return to the Montreux Conference and then to spend my holidays at the Cap Martin.

In the interval I only received friendly telegrams asking for my advice on various international problems.

Even on August 29th, 1936, the day on which I was dismissed, the Romanian Government asked my advice on the question of non-intervention in Spain¹. All this, most probably, to mislead me as to the decisions taken concerning me.

On the evening of August 29th various journalists telephoned me from Bucharest that I was no longer Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹ On August 18, 1936, the Romanian Government sends to France's chargé d'affaires in Bucharest, a note of adhesion to the Statement of the French Government on non-immixture in Spanish Affairs, of August 15. The Romanian Government stipulates a reserve, i.e. that adhesion to the non-immixture statement in Spanish affairs is given under exceptional circumstances, that it constitutes a particular case which cannot create a precedent and it does not imply for the Romanian Government the obligation to recognise the principle that a legal government cannot obtain, on its request, support from another government against rebellion.” On August 28, 1936, Nicolae Titulescu proposes to the Romanian Government to proceed to the immediate enforcement of the measures contained by the Romanian Government's adhesion of August 18, 1936, to the Statement of the French Government of non-immixture in Spanish affairs, issued on August 15, 1936.

I replied that it was not true. And I ask everyone to believe that I said this in perfect good faith, for I could not credit the fact that anyone could act in such a manner towards me.

Cap Martin is only a small village in which the post office is closed at 8 p.m. It was only on the morning of August 30th that I received M. Tataresco's telegram sent from Bucharest on August 29th at 6.30 p.m.

This is the facsimile of the telegram¹.

The English translation is as follows:

"In order to be able to finish our last period in office, I have found it necessary to contemplate an important reshuffling of the Cabinet. Events which have taken place in the country have made it necessary to proceed with this reshuffling a little earlier than I had anticipated and to this effect I have today handed in the resignation of the Cabinet² to His Majesty the King, who has accepted it. I have been asked to form the new Cabinet³. In view of the great difficulties which we have to overcome, and on the request of my colleagues, I am obliged to form a Ministry taken solely from the party which I represent, thus ensuring its unanimity and homogeneity. I would like to convey to you my deep gratitude for the invaluable services you have rendered to the country and to the Government during the period of your collaboration and for the personal friendship which you have shown us so often. *As a matter of fact I am convinced that, in another form we will find a fresh opportunity of uniting our efforts in order to continue our external action within the framework of the policy which you have carried out until today in the name of the country and which we will continue without alteration.* Believe me, etc.

(signed) Tataresco"

*

I may be permitted a few comments:

a) M. Tataresco finds it necessary to contemplate an important reshuffling of the Cabinet.

If I were vain I might say that the mere fact of my leaving the Cabinet already constitutes an *important reshuffling* of the Cabinet. However, as I am not vain, I wonder who are the persons who left the Cabinet and whose departure justifies the term *important*⁴ used in connection with the reshuffling of the Cabinet.

b) M. Tataresco tells me that events which have taken place in the country made it necessary to proceed with this reshuffling a little earlier than he had anticipated, and, in order to carry this out, the very day on which he wired to me he handed the resignation of the Cabinet to His Majesty the King, who accepted it.

¹ Not inserted in the manuscript available to us.

² The resignation of the Cabinet was accepted under Royal Decree No. 2005, Sinaia, August 29, 1936.

³ The new Cabinet, formed the same day, was confirmed under Royal Decree, No. 2006, Sinaia, August 26, 1936.

⁴ The "important" government reshuffling confined itself to Nicolae Titulescu's removal. All the other portfolio holders of the old Cabinet remained in office, the exchange of portfolios being of no special consequence.

Could a Cabinet of which I was a member hand in its resignation without my being consulted or even informed?

My colleagues had the honour of being summoned¹ to a Cabinet meeting during which they were informed of decisions already taken. *I, after 20 years of ministerial responsibility, was not even honoured with a warning.*

c) M. Tataresco tells me that my departure from the Cabinet was made necessary by difficulties which the Government had to overcome.

What does this mean?

Since when am I only fit for easy things when, in the recent past, there was no difficulty in which I was not called upon to give my assistance?

d) M. Tataresco also tells me that, on request of his colleagues, he reformed his Ministry without me.

Would it be too indiscreet to ask the names of these colleagues?

e) M. Tataresco adds that, thanks to my departure, he has been able to ensure the unity and homogeneity of the party.

I believe that the question should be put in another way: either we are all agreed on foreign policy and the Government is homogeneous, or, under cover of the word “non-homogeneity” is hidden a divergence of opinion on foreign policy.

Do you know who it was who destroyed the rule of homogeneity in the Romanian Government by giving the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to a man who did not belong to any Party? It was the great John I.C. Brătianu, leader of the National Liberal Party, who, in July 1927, introduced me to the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the following terms:

“I have been Minister for Foreign Affairs² for a few days only, but during that time I have done the most important thing I could do: I have brought you Titulescu for your Chief.”

f) M. Tataresco thanks me, not only for services rendered to the country and to the Government during the period of our collaboration, but also for the personal friendship I have shown to him on many occasions.

I hope that such words, coming from him, will destroy once and for all the legend, recently invented, to the effect that our collaboration was nothing but a continuous quarrel.

As far as I am concerned, I shall retain a more pleasant memory of my collaboration with M. Tataresco: that of good relations within the framework of cordial friendship, even if that friendship was only outward.³

g) Finally, M. Tataresco declares his conviction that, in another form, we will find a fresh opportunity to unite our effort towards continuing our external action within the

¹ Over August 25–29, 1936, Gheorghe Tătărescu was received in audience by King Carol II at Sinaia, three times (August 25, 27, 29), having at the same time numerous interviews with political personalities, members of the National Liberal Party. After the audience of August 29, back to Bucharest, Gheorghe Tătărescu summons urgently a Cabinet meeting, in which he announces that he tendered to King Carol II the resignation of the Cabinet and that he was asked to form a new Government.

² Ion I.C. Brătianu was Minister for Foreign Affairs between June 22, 1927 and July 5, 1927.

³ The Nicolae Titulescu-Gheorghe Tătărescu collaboration crossed several moments of crisis, due to differing points of view in matters of domestic and foreign policy and to some conflicts of competencies. Nicolae Titulescu reproached to the Romanian premier a series of political and diplomatic initiatives which altered the unity of action in the promotion of this country's foreign policy.

framework of the policy I have carried out in the name of the country – *a policy which M. Tataresco has undertaken to continue without alteration*¹.

In what could this new form of collaboration consist?

The Legation in London and the Permanent Delegation accredited to the League of Nations?

I wish it to be noted that neither of these posts has been offered to me. If one had been, I should not necessarily have accepted it.

But what is important is that I have received no offer of collaboration in any shape or form destined to unite our efforts within the framework of the policy I have carried out in the name of the country, and which M. Tataresco undertook to continue without alteration, as stated in his telegram.

And let it not be said that any gesture on my part has made such an offer impossible.²

In September 1936, when I could not leave my bed, the agreement of the British Government was asked to the appointment of M. Stoica³, then Minister in Sofia, as Minister in London. Shortly afterwards there was a change of opinion, and agreement was asked to the appointment of M. Grigorcea⁴, who, as a matter of fact, was finally accepted.

¹ Immediately upon investiture, Gheorghe Tătărescu gave, on the night of August 29/30, 1936, an ample statement to the press in which he made, *inter alia*, a brief account of the foreign policy programme of the “new” government: “The Government will continue the same foreign policy of all the governments of Greater Romania and whose implementer was, of late, Mr. Nicolae Titulescu, to whom I take this opportunity to express my whole gratitude for the great services he has done, all along our collaboration, to the country and the Government.//The policies which we have made so many times is neither a policy of a personal nature, nor a circumstantial or improvisation one. It is neither the policy of one man, nor of one party, but the policy of a whole nation, it is a national policy, its permanent goals being the defence of the frontiers and the defence of peace.//Closer and closer and more active links with our allies from the Little Entente, from the Balkan Entente, with Poland, Great Britain, and, especially with France, to which we are indissolubly linked by all our people’s interests and ideals; relations of friendship with all states, with the Republic of the Soviets and with all our neighbours, these will be the permanent targets of our foreign action.//Strengthening existing alliances, active collaboration to the consolidation of the League of Nations, active collaboration to all initiatives for the organisation of the united and indivisible front of peace and collective security, these are the immutable grounds of our foreign policy. We shall carry out unhesitatingly this policy.” Only a couple of days after his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Gheorghe Tătărescu Cabinet, that is on September 2, 1936, Victor Antonescu makes, in front of the representatives of the domestic and foreign press in Romania’s capital city, an ample statement of foreign policy which, essentially, reiterates the decision of the Romanian Government to promote the same foreign policy lines.

² Deliberately, the governing circles of Bucharest greatly publicized in the press the inexistent intentions to further use Nicolae Titulescu as representative of Romania’s interests abroad (either as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in one of the states with which Romania has established relations, or at the Permanent Court of International Justice). All elements we dispose of now, concur in demonstrating that the Government – in spite of all publicly fanned information, either from official or press sources – had never had any real intention to collaborate under one form or the other with Nicolae Titulescu. We know today that the succeeding Bucharest governments not only lacked any real wish to collaborate with Nicolae Titulescu, but even directly intervened at various diplomatic chanceries to block any opportunity Titulescu might have had to assert himself on the international political arena.

³ Vasile Stoica.

⁴ Vasile Grigorcea.

During the month of October, while I was still laid up in bed, a Councillor of Legation¹ was appointed Permanent Delegate of Romania accredited to the League of Nations, to replace M. Antoniad².

But, as will be seen later, it was I who was Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, and not M. Antoniad, who was Romanian Minister in Geneva.

As far as M. Antoniad is concerned, by a letter dated July 1928, signed by me in my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and addressed to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, I declared that the functions of Romanian Minister in Geneva also implied those of Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations. M. Antoniad was therefore the substitute of the Permanent Delegate – that is to say, my own substitute.

*

It would not be the truth if I pretended that the blow dealt on me on August 29th, 1936 did not cause me much suffering.

But my shoulders are broad enough to carry the whole weight of the truth.

Indeed, I have suffered. And why?

Above all, because of the way I was treated; but also because the blow was dealt by the Liberal Party.

I apologise to my good friends of the Peasant National Party³, but I must make certain confessions which all arise from the fact that I knew the Liberal Party ten years before the Peasant Party and the National Party, which have now amalgamated and form the National Peasant Party.

I wanted to be a Member of Parliament as a member of the Liberal Party⁴ even before I had finished my studies at the University.

John I.C. Brătianu gave me every possible help. The heads of the local organisations, on the contrary, beset my path with difficulties.

I was offered, by way of compensation, the post of legal adviser to a Credit Institution – a fact which hurt me very much, because a purely idealistic aspiration on my part thus met with a mercenary answer.

So I went to Paris to finish my studies.

When I returned to Romania, I found Take Ionescu at the head of the Conservative Democratic Party, which had already been organised¹.

¹ Gheorghe Crutzescu.

² Constantin Antoniad.

³ The Peasant National Party appeared in Romania's political life in the third decade of the 20th century, resulting from the merger of the Romanian National Party of Transylvania (a political grouping created in 1881, by the merger of the Romanians in the Banate and Hungary with the National Party of the Romanians of Transylvania – both founded in 1869) with the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom and Bessarabia (founded in December 1918). Their complete merger was ratified on October 10, 1926 at the Extraordinary Congress of the Peasant National Party. In 1930, a grouping led by Constantin Stere, detached itself from the Peasant National Party, forming the Peasant Democratic Party. In 1932, another grouping, led by Grigore Iunian, separated from the Peasant National Party, forming the Peasant Radical Party.

⁴ The National Liberal Party formed as a party in the last quarter of the 19th century, by the merger of various liberally minded political groupings. Its leaders were Ion Brătianu, Dumitru Brătianu, D. A. Sturza, Ion I.C. Brătianu, Vintilă I.C. Brătianu, Ion G. Duca, Constantin (Dinu) I.C. Brătianu. In 1930, the "young liberals" grouping, led by Gheorghe Brătianu, breaks away from the National Liberal Party and forms the National-Liberal Party–Gheorghe Brătianu.

He said in substance:

“We, who are not aristocrats, can only hope for a limited amount of promotion in this country. Romania is strangely like colonial armies, in which coloured men can only serve in the lower ranks, the higher command being reserved for white men.”

The injustice done to Take Ionesco seemed to me, on a large scale, similar to my own smaller misfortune.

And since Take Ionesco was appealing to all the free consciences in the country, I sent him the following telegram from Ploiești Station: “If you still need a free conscience, mine is at your disposal.”

And that was how I became a democratic-conservative.

But our opposition to the National Liberal Party was not destined to last.

The culminating point of my attacks against this Party was reached when I spoke on the reform of administrative justice in a manner inspired by the famous apostrophes addressed to Catiline²:

“How far will the audacity go of the Government of Little Bratiano?”³

With these words, I thought to have destroyed John I.C. Bratiano for ever.

In 1910, however, the collaboration between the National Liberal Party and the Democratic-Conservative Party had already been established⁴.

In 1912, we waged the Balkan War⁵ together: we, the Democratic-Conservatives and Die-Hard Conservatives in office, and the Liberals, who were in agreement with us, forming the Opposition.

We also fought the Great War together, but this time the National Liberal Party and the Democratic-Conservative Party with me as Minister of Finances were both in power.

From this collaboration was born a very great friendship, never to be forgotten by me, and binding me to Vintila Bratiano, John I.C. Bratiano, I.G. Duca.

After the death of Take Ionesco, I remained piously devoted to his memory, but my leanings were towards Vintila Bratiano, John I.C. Bratiano, I.G. Duca, Iuliu Maniu, John Mihalake, Dr. Lupu⁶ and many others.

I remained outside political parties, and served my country as a non-partisan who had, none the less, collaborated with all Parties.

¹ The Conservative Party was born in 1908 after the separation from the Conservative Party of a grouping led by Take Ionescu. In 1916, it turned into the Nationalist Conservative Party, and in 1919 into the Unionist Democratic Conservative Party (which will be dismembered in 1922).

² Lucius Sergius Catilina.

³ Ion I. C. Brătianu.

⁴ In the interval mentioned by Nicolae Titulescu, Romania had governments led by P.P. Carp (1910–1912) and Titu Maiorescu (1912–1914).

⁵ On October 9, 1912, the First Balkan War breaks out between the Balkan Entente (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro) and the Ottoman Empire. Romania declared her neutrality with reserves. The War ended with the victory of the anti-Ottoman coalition (May 30, 1913). On June 29, 1913, starts the Second Balkan War between the former allies (Greece, Serbia and Montenegro), joined by Romania and Turkey, against Bulgaria. The Treaty signed at the end of the Peace Conference of Bucharest (July 29–August 1913), attended by Romania, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria, attributed southern Dobruja to Romania (the counties Durostor and Caliacra, forming the “Quadrilateral” up to the Türk-Smil-Ekrené line.

⁶ Nicolae L. Lupu.

As a matter of fact, did I wish to establish a list of services rendered to my country, I should have to open wide the book of the Democratic-Conservative Party, together with those of the National Liberal Party, Marshal Averesco's People's Party¹, and the Peasant National Party.

With the exception, however, of the book of the Democratic-Conservative Party, the book of the National Liberal Party takes first place, since my collaboration with the Party dates from 1910.

In 1927, I accepted the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs with John Bratiano, because both he and King Ferdinand, on his deathbed², had asked me to do so.

The violation of the rule of homogeneity was not an accident as far as John Bratiano, Vintila Bratiano or I.G. Duca were concerned. It was the continuation, in another form, of my constant collaboration with the Liberal Party – a collaboration which was already of many years' standing.

In July 1928, I asked Vintila Bratiano to give me back the office of Minister in London; this request was actuated by certain circumstances which need not be recalled here.

When, in October 1928, the Regency³ asked me to constitute a concentration government, I indicated that the best solution was to appoint M. Iuliu Maniu President of the Council⁴, since the Liberals did not wish to remain in office.

As a matter of fact, M. Iuliu Maniu was good enough to express his thanks to me in the Senate for the attitude adopted by me at the time.

But directly he had been entrusted with the formation of the Ministry, M. Iuliu Maniu came to offer me the portfolio of Foreign Affairs⁵. My answer to him was:

"I should have accepted this portfolio with pleasure, but there is something which prevents me from doing so. I had not foreseen that the fall of the Vintila Bratiano Ministry would follow so soon on my return to London as Minister. If, then, I accepted today to become Minister for Foreign Affairs in your Cabinet, people might say: Titulescu left Vintila Bratiano's Government because he had come to an understanding with Iuliu Maniu. You alone, M. Maniu, know that there is no understanding of any kind between us on this point. Vintila Bratiano, however, might think that there was. Nothing would induce me to place my loyalty to Vintila Bratiano under suspicion, and that is the reason of my refusal."

If I were asked what is the greatest service I have done my country, I should answer: My refusal to form a Ministry in November 1928, when it would have been easy for me, if I had set aside the objections of M. Iuliu Maniu, and, instead of forming my own Government, the fact that I sought to promote the normal coming into power of the Peasant National Party in 1928.

¹ The People's Party appeared in Romania's political life on April 15, 1920, following the decision made by the Congress of the People's League (founded on April 3, 1918) to turn this grouping into a political party. Leader of both the People's League and the People's Party was general (marshal) Alexandru Averescu. In 1932, a faction, led by Octavian Goga, breaks away, creating the National Agrarian Party.

² Ferdinand I died on July 20, 1927.

³ During the minority of Mihai, a regency was instituted, formed of Patriarch Miron Cristea, the President of the Highest Court of Appeal, Gheorghe Buzdugan, and Prince Nicolae.

⁴ The Government led by Iuliu Maniu (1928–1930).

⁵ Iuliu Maniu approached in this sense Nicolae Titulescu on November 10, 1928.

This is proved by the fact that Transylvanians who had hitherto been regionalists became imperialists¹. For old as well as new Romanians, Bucharest has become the political centre of the country. We have no regionalism in Romania. On no account should we, by our attitude to Transylvania, give birth to it in the future.

The late M. I.G. Duca knew what I had done, as far as lay in my power, to facilitate the return to power of the National Liberal Party.

He never ceased to thank me for all the friendship I showed him during the 1933 crisis. He even spoke of it to me during the ceremony of the taking of oath by our Government. I remember that, because of that very conversation, I was unable to read the oath correctly when it came to my turn.

I.G. Duca is dead, and his place has been taken by M. Tataresco.

The only mistake I consider I ever made in matters of political orientation comes now. That mistake, however, had its excuse: the fact that I still had imprinted on my mind the picture of the old Liberal Party.

I did not want to become a member of the 1934 Cabinet.

I ought to have raised quite frankly the question of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and said that I could not accept to belong to a Tataresco Government.

But I thought that, since M. Dino Bratiano², head of the National Liberal Party, had accepted M. Tataresco as head of the Liberal Government, my attitude could only be determined, in the circumstances, by the great international interests of the country at that time.

Now, after all this, is it still going to be said that, if M. Tataresco had not evicted me, I would have overthrown his Cabinet in favour of M. Mihalake?

I have never been capable of an act of treason, and I shall never even contemplate such an act in the future.

When I was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Vaida-Voevod Ministry, and John I.G. Duca was in the Opposition, I said to him: "You can ask me to work to make you Prime Minister when the Vaida-Voevod Cabinet has fallen, but I shall never lift my little finger in order to encompass the fall of the Cabinet."

I adopted the same tone with my friends of the Peasant National Party when I was a member of the Liberal Government.

I entertain the deepest friendship and esteem for M. Mihalake. On July 14th, 1936, however, when I withdrew my resignation, he criticised my action, and predicted that my arrangements with the Government would be worthless because they would not be carried out.

Now, after all I have said, is it not plain that, from 1926 until the present day, when, for the time being, I no longer wish to become Minister for Foreign Affairs, no Government has failed to offer me that portfolio?

In the summer of 1925, Marshal Averesco, who has reason to believe he was about to become Prime Minister, offered me two portfolios at the same time: Foreign Affairs and Finances. My health having been impaired by my mission to America for the consolidation of war debts, I was unable to accept his offer, which was repeated in 1926, when he became Prime Minister.

¹ In this context, Nicolae Titulescu lends to the term an antinomial meaning as compared to the term "regionalists".

² Constantin (Dinu) I.C. Brătianu.

M. Stirbey also offered me the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹.

I was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of John I.C. Bratiano and Vintila Bratiano in 1927 and 1928.

The same portfolio was offered to me in M. Maniu's Cabinet in 1928, and I refused it for the reasons which I have just explained.

In 1931, I was asked to accept at least the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since, for various reasons, I had already refused to form the Ministry.

My reply was that, since I had refused the whole, I could not accept a part thereof.

M. Vaida-Voevod, in 1932, not only offered me the same portfolio once more, but also stated that he regarded himself as my substitute.

This went on until October 1932, when, because of the policy I advocated with regard to the U.S.S.R., I had to take over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to put my theories into practice².

Consequently, if anyone imagines that I covet this Ministry today – when I have refused it so many times and when I no longer have the opportunities of the past – my reply is that, in the present international circumstances and having tasted the joys of freedom, I have no desire to resume the bonds of slavery.

But people might say: "All this is very interesting, but it does not throw much light on the reasons why you were evicted from the Tataresco Cabinet."

Well, when I have dotted my I's everybody will be fully informed.

My foreign policy, based on collective security and indivisible Peace, my policy which aimed at constituting a united front of possible victims of an aggression against the united front of possible aggressors – of which the minutes of July 14th, 1936, merely draw the practical consequences for Romania – has ceased to meet with M. G. Tataresco's approval. He has not replaced that policy by any other, but simply by nothing at all, or rather, by a tendency towards isolation, by the neutrality of Romania. It remains to be seen how such a policy can be carried out in practice, when Romania is a neighbour of the U.S.S.R., herself the ally of France and Czechoslovakia.

In any case, to return to the traditional policy of the country is a much more complicated matter than might be supposed in Romania and abroad.

A detailed study of Romania's foreign policy will serve to show that the truth, hidden behind so many words addressed to myself and to others, can only be found in the above statements. It will also enlighten national and international public opinion once and for all with regard to my own foreign policy.

¹ Barbu Știrbey.

² In his political report of March 9, 1940, addressed to Carol II, on the evolution of the Romanian-Russian (Soviet) relations, Nicolae Titulescu offers numerous details on his dispute with Alexandru Vaida-Voevod in 1932, concerning the negotiations with the Russians for the conclusion of a Non-aggression Pact, the differences of view in matters of content and of procedural questions.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF ROMANIA

This study must be based on the idea that *nowadays nothing is local, or even continental, but that everything is of world interest.*

To give its full value to our political judgment, we must always bear in mind the other magnitude of various great Powers which have at present a particularly strong influence on international politics. With these great Powers are naturally included their possessions¹, which are of such value in supplying them with raw materials in war-time.

According to Schrader and Gallonedec's "*Atlas Classique*", that order of magnitude is as follows:

Great Britain, with 12,560,231 sq. miles, and a population of 492,300,000;

U.S.S.R., with 8,108,108, sq. miles, and a population of 162,000,000;

France, with 4,560,231 sq. miles, and a population of 102,364,000;

United States, with 3,616,988 sq. miles, and a population of 137,255,000.

These four States constitute in themselves alone an area of 28,571,428 square miles², and a population of 895 million inhabitants³ – that is to say, approximately half the population of the earth (2,000 million).

To return to our quotations:

Italy, with her possessions, of course, has an area of 988,223 sq. miles, and a population of 43,825,000;

Germany has an area of 181,081 sq. miles, and a population of 64,776,000;

Poland has an area of 149,957 sq. miles, and a population of 32,120,000;

Japan has an area of 265,135 sq. miles, and a population of 91,783,000.

These for latter States therefore represent an area of 1,584,397 square miles⁴, and a population of 232,504,000 inhabitants.

And if I were to add these figures the population of the other countries, the conclusion put forwards by President Roosevelt,⁵ in his speech of October 5th, 1937, would be reached. I quote:

"The peace, freedom and security of 90 per cent of the population of the world is being jeopardised by the remaining 10 per cent, who are threatening to break down all international order and laws."

¹ Possessions have been of various forms: colonies, semi-colonies, trusteeships (the present term replaces the "mandates" of the League of Nations. The configuration of the "colonial empires" has substantially changed after WWI, and especially after WWII. In 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." An ample and very serious examination of such possessions and their evolutions is offered by the work written by David P. Henige, *Colonial Governors from the Fifteenth Century to the Present*, Madison, Milwaukee, London, 1970.

² Erroneous sum total. The correct figure: 28,845,558 sq. miles.

³ Erroneous sum total. The correct figure: 893,919,000 inhabitants.

⁴ Erroneous sum total. The correct figure: 1,584,396 sq. miles.

⁵ Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Let us therefore proceed to a detailed examination, based on existing data, of the international situation of Romania.

I believe that such a study has not yet been undertaken in such a thorough and sincere spirit as that by which I am actuated.

At times, my official capacity has prevented me from making a complete public statement, and many other people have been prevented from doing so by lack of sufficient documentation.

For our purpose, let us examine the relations existing between Romania and other countries one by one. Let us state exactly what they used to be, and what they have now become since I left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Above all, let us try to determine in what direction they should be developed.

And, before concluding, let us also consider the situation of the world at the present moment.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE

To say that the Little Entente is the basis of the foreign policy of Romania is an axiom.

But what is the Little Entente?

It is an association of three States for mutual protection against common dangers.

At the outset, the Little Entente was the expression of an association limited to a defensive military alliance¹ between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania against a possible aggression from Hungary, acting alone or in conjunction with other States. That alliance was completed by a defensive alliance between Romania and Yugoslavia against a possible aggression from Bulgaria, acting alone or in conjunction with other States.

It is important to note that from the very beginning the relations between Romania and Yugoslavia had a wider aim than those between Romania and Czechoslovakia.

From the time of its creation in 1921 by Take Jonescu, Passic² and Benes³, the Little Entente has sought to develop its field of action in various ways, as for instance by a Treaty for mutual arbitration, resolutions on its own rules of procedures, etc.⁴

But, strange to say, there was no such tendency in the political field.

It was only in the new Pact for Organisation⁵ of the Little Entente, signed in Geneva on February 16th, 1933, by M. Benes, M. Jevtic¹ and myself, that we decided to

¹ The Convention of Defensive Alliance between Romania and Czechoslovakia, signed in Bucharest, on April 23, 1921, The Convention of Defensive Alliance between Romania and Yugoslavia, signed in Belgrade, on June 7, 1921. The Convention of Defensive Alliance between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, concluded in Belgrade on August 14, 1920. The package of these Conventions – rounding off the creation of the Little Entente – expressed the decision of the three states to oppose any revisionist claims, to defend the territorial status quo, established under the Peace Treaties of Trianon (June 4, 1920) and Neuilly-sur-Seine (November 27, 1919).

² Nikola Pašić.

³ Edvard Beneš.

⁴ On May 21, 1929, the foreign ministers of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, gathered in Belgrade and signed the Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Regulation General Act between the Little Entente Countries, by which all differences between them, whatever nature they may be, and which could not be solved by diplomatic means, should be submitted to a judicial arrangement or arbitration. This provision did not apply to matters which were of the exclusive competence of the states. The act – which put into force the recommendation of the League of Nations Assembly of September 26, 1928, concerning the conclusion of pacific settlement of differences – marks a moment of paramount importance in the life of the Little Entente, strengthening the alliance between the three states.

⁵ The Preamble of the Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente emphasises the wish of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to “Maintain and organise peace,” to intensify economic relations with all states, with the Central European ones in particular, to lend to the links between them a stable and organic basis. The Pact of the Little Entente provided: the creation of a Permanent Council of the Little Entente states, made up of the foreign ministers of the three states, or special delegates, acting as a directing body of their common policies; creation of an Economic Council for the coordination of the three states’ common economic interests; creation of a permanent Secretariat, headquartered, for a term of a year in the capital city of the president in office of the Permanent Council and a permanent branch at the seat of the League of Nations. There were extended for unlimited terms the alliance conventions between Romania and Czechoslovakia (April 23, 1921), Romania and Yugoslavia (June 7, 1921). Romania ratified the Little Entente Pact on May 9, 1933, and it came into force on May 30, 1933.

reinforce the unity of action of the States of the Little Entente by providing that no one of the three States could conclude treaties with the other contracting States or take any action capable of altering their present international situation, or sign economic Conventions having an important political bearing, without the consent of the other two parties.

On the other hand, the new Pact of Organisation has not increased any of the military obligations which were agreed upon in 1921.

What are Romania's obligations under the Treaty of the Little Entente?

According to the Conventions of 1921, which were approved by all Romanian Governments: those of Marshal Averesco, Take Jonesco, John and Vintila Bratiano, Maniu, Vaida, Mironesco², Stirbey, Jorga³, Duca and Tataresco, Romania undertakes to go to war in defence of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia if these two countries should be attacked by Hungary, acting either alone or in conjunction with other States.

This means that Romania must come to the aid of Czechoslovakia should the latter be attacked by Hungary alone or by Hungary in conjunction with Germany, and to the aid of Yugoslavia should the latter be attacked by Hungary alone or by Hungary in conjunction with Italy, by Bulgaria alone or by Bulgaria in conjunction with other States.

Moreover, incredible as it may sound:

Romania who, on account of Hungary, may at any moment find herself at war with Germany and Italy in defence of Czechoslovakia, is left alone, completely isolated, in the event of a possible attack from Soviet Russia.

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have always tried to exclude any intervention on their part in the event of an attack by the U.S.S.R. on Romania.

As a matter of fact until recently, when the relations between Russia and Romania were such as to render a Soviet attack most unlikely, all Conferences of the Little Entente began with the following statement by the delegates of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia:

"Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia declare that they reserve full liberty of action with regard to Soviet Russia."

Such being the case, in order to restore the balance in favour of Romania, my first care has been for a long time, and, more particularly, in 1932, when I took over again the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *to reinforce the bonds of the Little Entente in such a way that if any of its members should be attacked by one of its neighbours the latter should become, ipso jure⁴, the enemy of the whole of the Little Entente.*

This explains why the new Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente contains a clause whereby none of the three States members could give any undertaking without the consent of the other two; it also explains how the Little Entente became an important international unit.

Such a system could only be advantageous to Romania.

What she could give, as we saw, she had already given in 1921, and very unilaterally, I might almost say that she gave the lion's share.

We now had to reap the harvest of the efforts made in 1933 to create stronger bonds of union.

¹ Bogoljub (Bosko) Jevtić.

² G.G. Mironescu.

³ Nicolae Iorga.

⁴ *Ipsa jure* (lat.) – By the operation of law.

When I say this, I do now claim to have done more for the new Little Entente than President Benes and President Jevtic.

I have placed in the hands of Romania the right of *veto* of all political acts of our two associates, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

A right of *veto* does not, in any way, signify that one should always answer in the negative. It allows of an affirmative answer but gives one the right to lay down conditions which take into account the interests of Romania in order to ensure the maintenance and the destiny of the Little Entente as an important international unity.

Any authorisation given against the spirit of the Pact of 1933, especially when the unilateral obligations of Romania, assumed in 1921, were still in force, is an unparalleled error, detrimental to the Little Entente in general and to Romania in particular.

I take the liberty of thinking that the authorisation given by M. G. Tataresco's Government to the Yugoslav Government to conclude with Italy the Convention of March 25th, 1937, is likely to weaken the bond of unity¹ of the Little Entente which, if reinforced, is the only way to load the scales of justice in favour of Romania.

Far be it from me to think that a treaty of friendship between Yugoslavia and Italy would not be a good thing.

As I shall state further on, the thought that Italy might become the spiritual leader of the Little Entente came to my mind on the very day on which the new Treaty of organisation was signed, that is to say, on February 16th, 1933.

But the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty contains provisions which are contrary to the interests of Romania and to the spirit of the Little Entente. We had to request the suppression of those paragraphs unless we could manage to obtain their extension to Czechoslovakia and Romania.

For instance, Article 4 of the Treaty provides:

"Article 4. – The High Contracting Parties undertake not to tolerate on their respective territories, or to aid and abet in any way, any activity directed against the territorial integrity or existing order of the other contracting Party or which might be likely to impair the relations between the two countries."

In other words, Italy undertakes to abstain from revisionist activities against Yugoslavia and to refrain from supporting Hungarian revisionism against Yugoslavia.

This clause is one which Yugoslavia could not have accepted for herself alone.

If she could not obtain its extension to the whole of the Little Entente, she should have refused it for herself.

What does this mean?

That henceforward Hungarian revisionism, authorised by the Romanian Government, will be carried out only against Romania and Czechoslovakia, with the approval of Italy? Is this the spirit of the Little Entente?

Does not Hungarian revisionism constitute a common danger, to parry which the Little Entente has been created?

¹ In its Communiqué of April 2, 1937, the Permanent Council of the Little Entente appreciated that "these negotiations, either economic or political, have already yielded positive results"; it welcomed with satisfaction Yugoslavia's agreements with Bulgaria and Italy, convinced "that they will efficiently help the strengthening of peace"; it expressed its belief that "observance of the pledges assumed is one of the intangible principles guiding the policies of each of the three states," being "a matter of course that the new agreements do not depart from the commitments binding the Little Entente countries."

The Italian Government is not at fault since it is under no obligation to us. Nor is the Yugoslav Government to be blamed, for it has fulfilled its one obligation – that of asking for the previous consent of the Governments of Bucharest and Prague.

And if Yugoslavia were responsible the noble attitude of her people in favour of maintaining the traditional external policy of the country would exonerate her even assuming an error had been committed.

There is no question here of any responsibility on the part of Italy or Yugoslavia, but of the responsibility of the Romanian Government.

M. G. Tataresco's Government, by raising no objection to the request of the Yugoslav Government, who, for their part, intervened in Bucharest every time they had any objection to raise, have created a new and perilous situation and at the same time a very dangerous precedent for Romania.

We Romanians are ashamed of saying "*no*" or rather, as in this case, of saying "*yes*", in such circumstances.

Yugoslavia, for her part, does not suffer from this shyness.

It is not a fact that Yugoslavia, by urgent intervention, has twice prevented royal visits to Bucharest?

Did not this intervention at one time become so insistent that I had to pay a personal visit¹ to Belgrade to explain the true facts of the situation?

Did not Yugoslavia once inform us that she considered a certain visit from a Prime Minister as an unfriendly act, as a result of which the visit did not take place?

Finally, did not Yugoslavia oppose for many years the construction of a bridge across the Danube to Bulgaria? Even in connection with the ferry boat which I had undertaken to run I met, in the past, with great difficulties from the Yugoslav side.

None of this has prevented Yugoslavia from becoming, three years later, the everlasting friend of Bulgaria².

As M. G. Tataresco's Government considers, since I left it, that it is by remaining passive, and not by taking active measures, that national interests are best served, it has acquiesced in the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty.

What attempts were made to modify the text?

What should the Romanian Government have done? It should have requested the deletion of the clause concerning the abandonment of revisionism unless and until such a clause was extended to Romania and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia already derived great advantages from the other provisions of the Treaty with Italy, such, for instance, as the respect by Italy of their common frontiers. All that need have been done was to omit from that Treaty any provisions which undermined the unity of action of the Little Entente.

¹ To counterbalance Milan Stojadinović's schemes to prevent the Prince-Regent Paul to attend the Conference of the heads of state of the Little Entente, Nicolae Titulescu will pay a swift visit to Belgrade, on May 30–31, 1936, obtaining eventually Prince-Regent Paul's participation at the June 6–8, 1936 summit, but not that of Milan Stojadinović, who will put forward the pretext of an insecure domestic situation as an excuse for his absence in Bucharest. Actually Milan Stojadinović's attitude was prompted by his hostility against the projected Single Pact of Alliance between the Little Entente and France, that had to be examined in Bucharest by the heads of state of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

² On January 24, 1937, in Belgrade, Milan Stojadinović, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, and Georgi Kjosseivanov, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, signed the Yugoslav -Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship.

Friendship between Italy and Yugoslavia, if not bought at the price of dismemberment of the Little Entente, is a good thing for Yugoslavia, for the Little Entente and for peace in general.

I have striven to bring about such friendly relations between Italy and Yugoslavia for a long time, ever since January 1928 when my friend Voislav Marinkovitch, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, asked me to do so.

And now what is the situation?

Although Italy, and indirectly Hungary, do not continue to indulge in a policy of revision against Yugoslavia, Romania's burden has not diminished.

She still has Hungarian revisionism hanging over her head like the sword of Damocles. Moreover, she is under an obligation to go to war against Hungary and Italy if, by any chance, those two countries, reverting to their former policy of revision, were to attack Yugoslavia.

Can this be allowed?

On the other hand the precedent created by the Romanian Government is very dangerous.

Either the Romanian Government signs a Convention similar to the Italo-Yugoslav Convention, thus leaving Czechoslovakia isolated and definitely breaking up the Little Entente, or the Romanian Government does not sign such a Convention and remains for ever faced with the spectre of revisionism.

But something still more serious may happen.

On August 29th, 1937, during the week devoted to the study of Central European problems, M. Krofta¹, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, made a speech in which, referring more particularly to the Italo-Yugoslav and Bulgaro-Yugoslav Treaties, he said in conclusion:

"It would be stupid to believe that the Little Entente might break up because any of its members established friendly relations with another state."

This means that Czechoslovakia considers that the fact of having signed a Treaty with Italy analogous to the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty could not in any way harm the Little Entente.

And the Romanian Government, if it continues to be represented by MM. G. Tataresco and Victor Antonescu, having set up the precedent of authorising this kind of Treaty in the case of Yugoslavia, will not be able to refuse similar authorisation to Czechoslovakia.

But what would be the position of Romania if Czechoslovakia signed a Treaty analogous to that of Yugoslavia and Italy?

Romania would remain completely isolated since the doctrine of M. Tataresco's Government is that each member of the Little Entente may obtain anti-revisionist guarantees for itself without such guarantees being extended to the other members.

Romania will remain alone, face to face with Hungarian revisionism and, moreover, she will still be under an obligation to go to war, because of Hungary, against Germany on behalf of Czechoslovakia, and, because of Hungary, against Italy on behalf of Yugoslavia.

And if by any chance we were attacked by Russia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would remain severely aloof.

¹ Kamil Krofta.

Such is the present situation, thanks to the activity – or rather the inactivity – of M. G. Tataresco's Government.

I shudder to think of it.

It is enough to have a glimpse of such a contingency, which is strictly within the legal rights of M.G. Tataresco's Government, to realise that the Little Entente thus understood, instead of being a shield for its three members, has become a heavily undermined association.

Let us speak the truth: the Little Entente has emerged considerably weakened from the Yugoslav Agreement and the possibility of a repetition in the future of certain acts approved in the past renders it distinctly vulnerable.

What is the good of official statements? Of what avail the possible adverse opinion of Czechoslovakia?

When Romanian interests are at stake, public opinion within the country must choose between what I say and the words of other competent Romanians. Foreigners have no right to voice their opinion where Romanian interests are concerned.

And if Czechoslovakia was not in agreement, it is neither the first nor the last time that I tell her she is wrong.

But Czechoslovakia can afford to indulge in such a mistaken policy because she has two Treaties of mutual assistance for the defence of her frontiers, which Romania has not: one with France and the other with the U.S.S.R.

There are two means of remedying the present weakness of the Little Entente:

a) the conclusion of similar agreements with Italy by all three States of the Little Entente;

b) a single alliance with France, directed against any aggressor whatever, would drive the Little Entente towards that united policy of which I had a glimpse in 1933, and from which it has departed by the statements made in Bratislava in September 1936 by the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

I shall deal with these points in the chapter concerning our relations with Italy and France.

However, I must state, here and now, that, notwithstanding all past events, I still have faith in the Little Entente. I believe that I might find the right path again, if it could recapture the spirit which animated it in the past. It is precisely because I have faith in the destiny of the Little Entente that I feel obliged to state the whole truth.

THE BALKAN ENTENTE

Passing from the Little Entente to the Balkan Entente, we find that M.G. Tataresco's Government, through the consent given to the Yugoslav Government, placed our country in a still more serious position.

Substantially, the Bulgaro-Yugoslav Pact, signed on January 24th, 1937, comprises only one Article, for Article 2 deals only with the ratification of the Agreement.

"Article 1. – There will be inviolable peace, together with a permanent and sincere friendship, between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Bulgaria."

It would indeed be difficult to conciliate frontier disputes with friendship.

I do not know if this is the interpretation given by Bulgaria to the foregoing text. What I do know is that, in the course of my conversation with President Stojadinovich¹ at St. Moritz on January 8, 1937, he interpreted this text (which was already a final one) as meaning the renunciation by Bulgaria of her rights to revise the Yugoslav frontiers.

And M. Tataresco's Government gave its consent unconditionally² to this renunciation by Bulgaria of the revision of one frontier alone: the Yugoslav frontier?

We find ourselves faced with a flagrant violation of the Balkan Pact.

That Pact demands that Bulgaria should enter our association by a final recognition of the frontiers of all four Balkan States, or that they should all keep an equal distance from her.

The end of Bulgarian revision on the Bulgaro-Yugoslav frontier means that the revision will be exercised either on the Romanian or Greek frontiers.

It was incumbent upon M. Tataresco's Government to take the initiative of defending Romanian interests in this connection.

As a matter of fact, the Turkish Government had already signed a Treaty of perpetual friendship with Bulgaria³, similar to that concluded with us by Turkey. It would have been difficult for the Turkish Government to prevent Yugoslavia from acting in the same way.

It should, however, be pointed out that the Treaty of perpetual friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria was concluded prior to the Balkan Pact.

According to that Pact, Turkey, after the conclusion of the pact of friendship with Bulgaria, assumes the obligation of rendering military assistance to Romania; whereas Yugoslavia assumed obligations of perpetual friendship with Bulgaria, after the

¹ Milan Stojadinović.

² The Athens Fifth Ordinary Session of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente, which took place over February 15–18, 1937, under the acting chairmanship of Milan Stojadinović, Yugoslav Prime Minister, mentioned in its Final Communiqué: "The Permanent Council has noted with satisfaction the conclusion of the Pact of Friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, signed in Belgrade on January 24, 1937. The Council noted that the Pact meets the aims of the Balkan Entente: Maintenance and strengthening of peace in the Balkans. Subsequently, it considers that the Pact is a precious contribution to the stability of friendly cooperation between all Balkan peoples."

³ The Treaty of Perpetual Friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria was signed on October 10, 1925, in Ankara.

conclusion of an Agreement for mutual assistance in favour of Romania arising out of the Balkan Pact.

And M. Tataresco's Government never thought of intervening in this connection?

But there is something even more serious, which ought to have been quite obvious to everybody.

The Italo-Yugoslav Treaty of March 25th, 1937, contains the following express provision:

"Article 6. – The High Contracting Parties agree that nothing in the present Agreement shall be considered as being contrary to the international obligations already existing between the two countries, these obligations having in fact already been made public."

In exchange, there is no clause by which Yugoslavia excepts from the inviolable peace with Bulgaria her obligations under the Balkan Pact and those of the Little Entente with regard to Romania.

How can inviolable peace and perpetual friendship exist side by side with Yugoslavia's obligations, under the Balkan Pact and that of the Little Entente, to attack Bulgaria should the latter commit an act of aggression?

And how can the Balkan Pact and that of the Little Entente (the Romanian-Yugoslav Agreement providing for the contingency of a Bulgarian aggression) remain effective if Romania's obligations under those Treaties – which have for object the attack of Bulgaria in case of aggression – no longer exists?

The Romanian Government should be asked for a clear explanation of the situation.

M. Tataresco's Government has considered the problem in a somewhat simplified manner.

It decided the answer must be *Yes* or *No*, and therefore chose to answer *Yes*, since its policy has always been to avoid all possible antagonism, even when a stronger line of action would have been more to the national interest, although possibly leading to temporary friction.

Well! The Romanian Government has made a bad mistake.

It would have been possible to answer *Yes*, while making certain stipulations, as follows:

1. – The insertion in the Bulgaro-Yugoslav Agreement of a clause making exception of the obligations assumed by Yugoslavia under existing Agreements;

2. – A request that the signature of Yugoslavia be postponed until all States members of the Balkan Entente had obtained similar terms from Bulgaria, or had at least secured the renunciation of revision;

3. – The prolongation of the Balkan Pact for a further period, in order to show quite clearly that that Pact takes precedence over everything else.

Only those who, like myself, have lived through the stormy period which led up to the Balkan Pact can understand the importance of its prolongation being made a condition of Romania's signature of the Bulgaro-Yugoslav Pact.

At the outset, Romania, Turkey and Greece wanted a permanent Balkan Pact. But M. Jevtic, Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, wanted to limit its duration to two years.

Nobody can deny that M. Jevtic has been – and still is – one of my best friends.

It is therefore clear that, when my country's interests are at stake, I am not at all influenced by the fear of displeasing my friends.

In a spirit of conciliation, Romania, Turkey and Greece have accepted the restricted period of validity of fifteen years.

I was forced to declare my intention of leaving Belgrade for Bucharest to report on the situation, in order to obtain, with many difficulties, a duration of seven years for the Balkan Pact.

As I asked King Alexander¹ and M. Jevtic why they wanted it to have such a short duration, they both gave me the same explanation:

“We don't want to tie our hands for too long a period where Bulgaria is concerned.”

The Balkan Pact, it is true, provides that its signatory Powers must give their consent to the conclusion of a political Agreement with any of the Balkan States.

The Little Entente stipulates that the consent of all its Members must be obtained before any of them may sign a political Agreement with any State whatsoever.

How long has the Balkan Pact still to run?

About three years, for it expires on February 9th, 1941, if denounced by any of the Parties.

It is highly probable that one of the four States will denounce it, unless we continue our present policy of subservience.

Romania has lost the opportunity of extending the duration of the Balkan Pact in exchange for the authorisation of the Bulgaro-Yugoslav Pact.

No subsequent opportunity can efface the error of this. Then we would have been able to count on a certainty; now there will always be an element of risk.

Let me now sum up the situation of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente:

a) Yugoslavia is protected from revisionist policy on the part of Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy. Romania and Czechoslovakia are not.

b) Czechoslovakia may at any moment conclude arrangements with Italy similar to those concluded in the past with Yugoslavia. The authorisation precedent has been set up by the Tataresco Government, and the risk of revision on the part of Hungary and Italy will also cease to exist for Czechoslovakia.

Romania will thus remain the only State open to Hungarian, Italian and Bulgarian revision.

And if Romania concluded a Treaty with Italy similar to the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty, then Czechoslovakia would remain isolated and the Little Entente would be dismembered.

c) Yugoslavia's obligation under the Balkan Pact has become doubtful, because existing obligations were not formally excepted.

d) The prolongation of the Balkan Pact is doubtful – it may or may not take place.

e) But, the Little Entente being permanent, Romania, notwithstanding the unfortunate situation in which she has been placed by the Agreements concluded by Yugoslavia on January 24th and March 25th, 1937 (or any subsequent Agreements which may follow), is still under an obligation to go to war with

¹ Alexander I Karadjordjević.

Germany because of Hungary and on behalf of Czechoslovakia, or to go to war with Italy because of Hungary and on behalf of Yugoslavia.

Finally, as far as a possible aggression by the U.S.S.R. is concerned, Romania would get no help from either Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia.

To such a pass ignorance of the subject, coupled with a desire to please, has led us.

The mistakes of the past can only be corrected by a frank and loyal entry of Bulgaria into the Balkan Entente. However, we must distinguish between the Balkan Entente whose policy is "The Balkans to Balkan people" and a Balkan Entente which would become the political instrument of one or several great Powers. I refer to the first of these conceptions when I think of the remedy which should be applied to the above-mentioned evils.

POLAND

For some time past we have heard the expression: “the renewal of friendship between Poland and Romania.”

What does this mean?

Does it mean that one man was an obstacle to the normal development of relations between Romania and Poland? Or, speaking objectively, does it mean the Polish-Romanian friendship is closer than ever before?

Let us study these two hypotheses.

I am not afraid of throwing full light on the subject.

When Poland was continuously being attacked by Germany, I always defended her vigorously in Geneva. Stresemann¹ used to say to me: “As soon as you hear the name of Poland you automatically spring up and speak in her defence.”

For many years I have considered myself a great friend of Poland and Poland has considered me as such.

I cannot forget the cordial collaboration I had, in my capacity of Permanent Delegate of Romania in Geneva, with Minister Zaleski², for whom I still have a deep regard.

I do not, however, confuse certain statesmen with the Polish people, for whom I entertain a most friendly feeling.

I consider the alliance between Romania and Poland as a necessity.

It is for me a source of deep satisfaction to have been a member of Marshal Averesco’s Cabinet – when Take Jonesco was Minister for Foreign Affairs – at the time the first Treaty of Alliance between Romania and Poland³ was signed.

However, there is no friendship without a clear understanding.

But I must confess that, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, I was not very fortunate, at the outset, in my relations with Poland.

At that time, Poland insisted that Romania should sign a Pact of non- aggression⁴ with the U.S.S.R., even if such a Pact contained the words “existing dispute.”

I made an attempt, to which I shall refer later, to induce Warsaw to intervene in our favour, but I met with no success.

It is only fair to recall that, at the time, there was a strong pro-Soviet tendency in Warsaw and Warsaw was put out because Romania was not prepared to follow in her footsteps. The violent Press attack of 1932 against me will perhaps be remembered. I was accused of having prevented Romania from coming to an agreement with the U.S.S.R. because my exaggerated demands.

¹ Gustav Stresemann.

² August Zaleski.

³ The Convention of Romanian-Polish defensive Alliance was signed in Bucharest on March 3, 1921. It came into force on July 25, 1921.

⁴ Late 1931 witnessed the first contacts between the representatives of the Romanian Government and those of the Soviet Government (Mihail Sturdza and Boris Spiridonovich Stomoniakov), followed by negotiations. Over January 6–10, 1932, Riga hosted the negotiations for the conclusion of a Treaty of Non-Aggression between the two countries. A new round of negotiations took place in Geneva, over September 26–October 5, 1936, between the representative of the Romanian Government, Victor Cădere, and the representative of the Soviet Government, Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov, for the conclusion of the Pact of Non-Aggression between the two countries. Serious differences between the points of view of the two parts led to the failure of these negotiations.

This Press campaign and the attitude of some of the statesmen at the time give me food for thought.

Was not the U.S.S.R. by any chance as communistic in 1932 as she is today? Were not our leads as bourgeois then as they are today?

Why were we obliged, in 1932, to fall with the U.S.S.R., even if it meant the sacrifice of Bessarabia?

And now that Bessarabia is secure, why should we not today come to an agreement with the U.S.S.R. just because Soviets are communistic?

The explanation is simple: between 1932 and 1936 the wind has veered round in Warsaw. In 1932 it blew towards the east, whereas now it blows towards the west.

When Romanian policy does not find favour in Warsaw, it is immediately the object of very violent and rather strange attacks.

When it blindly follows Warsaw, it is considered as being independent.

If, for reasons connected with the defence of our national interests, Romanian policy is unfortunate enough not to be in complete agreement with Warsaw, then it is at once said to be a subservient policy.

The least I can say is that in 1932 all Romanian parties approved of my attitude with regard to Warsaw, and I even have in my possession telegrams of approval from high circles.

However, if in November 1932 my first relations with Warsaw were somewhat unlucky, my collaboration with Poland during the summer of 1933 was completely satisfactory.

When I came to a direct agreement with the U.S.S.R. on the definition of aggression and on that of "Romanian territory", Poland raised an objection which cancelled all the possible advantages of my direct negotiations with the U.S.S.R. She wanted the Treaty to be valid for only five years.

The Delegate of Poland, Count Raczyński¹, who was then only Minister in Geneva and is now Polish Ambassador in London, understood so well Romania's interest in having a Treaty of unlimited duration with the U.S.S.R. that he made strenuous efforts to get the Polish Government to abandon the 5 years validity clause.

In this discussion he behaved as a true friend of Romania, and he managed to convince the Polish Government of the harm done to Romania by the clause in question.

I then asked his Majesty the King to decorate Count Raczyński with the Grand Cross of the Crown of Romania, and my request was immediately granted by His Majesty.

As a result of the attitude of Poland in London, I felt it my duty, as a Minister for Foreign Affairs, to make an official visit² to Warsaw in October 1933, before going to the Balkan States.

M. Beck³ returned my visit⁴ in May 1934.

In September 1934, in his speech to the Assembly of the League of Nations, M. Beck unilaterally repudiated¹ the Minorities Treaty. He had given me no warning of the

¹ Edvard Raczynski.

² Nicolae Titulescu paid an official visit to Poland on October 9–10, 1933, which was followed, during the same month by visits to Bulgaria, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

³ Józef Beck.

⁴ Józef Beck visited several times Romania in his capacity of Foreign Minister, both during the intervals when Nicolae Titulescu was his counterpart and afterwards. In this specific case, Nicolae Titulescu refers to Beck's official visit of May 10–11, 1934.

attitude which Poland intended to adopt in this matter, but this did not prevent me from using my influence with the Little Entente, as an ally of Poland, to ensure that none of us should make a speech directed against this policy. Thus, the States of the Little Entente were associated with none of the public criticism of Poland by France, England and Italy.

At the time the speech was made, M. Arcziszewski, Polish Minister in Bucharest, thought fit to give an interview to the Romanian Press in which he stated that anyone who did not follow M. Beck's line of action was not a good Romanian.

It will easily be understood that MM. Beck and Arcziszewski have a perfect right to teach patriotism to the Polish people, but only Romanians are entitled to tell our people what is patriotic and what is not.

Would Poland tolerate in Warsaw a Romanian Minister who declared that anyone not following M. Titulesco's line of action was not a good Polish citizen?

I ask for equality with Poland; nothing more.

As a consequence of this intervention, I informed M. Beck that I would have to request the recall of M. Arcziszewski. M. Beck replied: "Send me a request in writing and I shall immediately recall him, as I could not do otherwise. You must know, however, that I shall not appoint another Minister in Bucharest for three years; I shall just leave a Chargé d'Affaires there."

In other words, Romania had to be punished because M. Acziszewski had blundered.

I replied: "If such is the case I shall certainly not ask for the recall of M. Acziszewski because Romanian public opinion, stirred up by you, would reproach me with having spoilt the relations between Poland and Romania. But I warn you that I shall no longer receive M. Acziszewski."

Which attitude I strictly maintained.

This did not prevent me from going to the Polish Legation to present to M. Acziszewski the condolences of the Romanian Government on the day of Marshal Pilsudski's death². He was very much moved, and, since then, I sometimes received him in my house.

This lack of warning from Poland as to her intentions, with which I had been confronted at the time of the repudiation of the Minorities Treaty, was repeated at the time of the Polish-German rapprochement.

In October 1933 I went to Warsaw. Marshal Pilsudski merely told me on October 9th: "*Romania is our ally only against Russia and not against Germany.*"

But no one, in Geneva, Bucharest or Warsaw warned me of such a prospect until the eve of the signature of the Polish-German agreement.

¹ Józef Beck denounced, on September 13, 1934, before the Assembly of the League of Nations, the Treaty on Minorities. Motivating his decision, Józef Beck stated: "The present system of guarantees granted by the League of Nations and its specialized bodies to the rights of minorities, taken in its whole, looks like an imbalanced construction, built at random and fundamented on political paradox... The implementation of the system as it is now proves absolutely disappointing. It did not make use of minorities, but, due to its much too often abusive application, alien to the spirit of the treaties, it served on a large scale as a means of defamatory propaganda directed against the states subjected to it and as a means of political pressure exerted by states, which, without being bound by it, made use of the prerogatives to participate in this control. A paradoxical situation of a régime of exception grafted on the body of the League of Nations, which claims its political justification from its very universality, and from the democratic principle of equality applied in the sphere of public law, could not but continue to irreparably compromise the moral grounds on which the League of Nations was created in 1919."

² Józef Piłsudski died on May 12, 1935.

There is great significance in the tone of the telegrams sent by M. Comnène¹, Romanian Minister in Berlin, when his colleague, Lipsky², Polish Ambassador in Berlin, did not inform him in good time of the negotiations between Poland and the Government of the Reich.

Thus, if the words “*the renewal of friendship between Poland and Romania*” mean that one man prevented the improvement of Polish-Romanian relations, they should be interpreted as follows:

“As soon as Romania finds one of her Foreign Ministers does not please a given State because he defends Romanian interests, which do not always coincide with everybody’s interests, Romania, anxious to please other countries, dismisses her Minister, instead of backing him up and imposing him on foreign countries as do Poland and Yugoslavia, for instance.”

It is impossible to realise immediately how disastrous the consequences of this system may be for the future defence of Romanian interests.

Let us now pass on to the second hypothesis:

Did Romania and Poland conclude a closer political agreement than that already in force? Personally, I do not believe that they did, for our agreement with Poland, even if only in appearance, cannot be surpassed from the point of view of strictness.

In any case, it is the duty of the Government to publish any new agreements which may have been entered into.

In this connection, it is fitting to recall the facts.

In 1921, Take Ionescu – a realistic politician – concluded a Treaty with Poland, simply in case of Soviet aggression.

John Duca, in 1926, widened the basis of that Treaty and concluded a Treaty of alliance with Poland³, *erga omnes*⁴, for all frontiers.

Being impressed by the serious consequences which might have been involved by that Treaty, I went from London to Bucharest and held conversations with John Brătianu⁵ and I.G. Duca.

I pointed out that a Treaty with Poland concerning the eastern frontier was a normal thing. Romania, like Poland, runs the risk of an attack by the Soviets.

But as far as the western frontier is concerned, a Treaty with Poland is extremely unfavourable to us.

We must not forget that, in 1926, Polish-German relations were very bad, and although they may be good today, they may have deteriorated by to-morrow.

Which are the States on the western frontier against whose aggression Poland could help Romania? Since Czechoslovakia must be excluded, only Germany and Hungary are left.

In these circumstances, Romania would have to support Poland in a war against Germany, in exchange for the help which she would receive from Poland on the western frontier against Hungary, for instance, where Romania already has the support of the Little Entente.

¹ Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen.

² Józef Lipski.

³ The Treaty of Guarantees between Romania and Poland was signed in Bucharest on March 26, 1926. It came into force on the same day (Art. 7), although, according to the exchange of notes of March 3, 1926, the Treaty was still in force until April 3, 1926.

⁴ *Erga omnes* (Lat.) = towards all; in international law the phrase is used with the meaning “towards all states”.

⁵ Ion I.C. Brătianu.

One of the chief advantages of our foreign policy is that we have no dispute with Germany. How could we run the risk of a war with that country when, on our western frontier, there is no State as important as she is threatening me, against which Poland would be called upon to support us?

My arguments were convincing. What had been signed in 1926 could not be changed. However, it was then decided to conclude military Conventions with Poland, for the eastern frontier only and not for the western frontier, by interpreting the general character of the Treaty with Poland as a form of politeness to the Soviets who, in this manner, were not expressly pointed out as the possible aggressor against which we were forming the alliance.

On January 15th, M. Mironesco renewed the Treaty¹ with Poland, improving the drafting but making it permanent in so far as it is renewed every five years by tacit consent if one or another of the parties does not denounce it.

The Treaty signed by M. Mironesco came into force on March 26th, 1931. On October 20th, 1932, I became Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I was given to understand that it would be advantageous to conclude military Conventions for the western frontier too. I replied that the Treaty only bound Romania and Poland as far as the eastern frontier was concerned. Moreover, I repeat that on October 9th, 1933, Marshal Pilsudski told me that Romania was bound to Poland against Russia only and not against Germany.

On March 26th, 1936, while I was Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Treaty was tacitly renewed until 1941, but, of course, with the restrictive interpretation which had been given to it for ten years, that is to say, that it only protected our eastern frontiers.

What new Convention could have been concluded between Romania and Poland? In my opinion, none; for, in appearance, we are bound hand and foot.

a) We are obliged to fight for Poland, and, reciprocally, Poland is obliged to fight for us, *erga omnes*, whoever the aggressor may be.

b) We are obliged to fight if the Council of the League of Nations is unanimous.

c) Equally, we are obliged to fight if the Council of the League of Nations is divided, that is to say, we have to fight for Poland even if only one vote is cast in her favour in the Council and all the other votes are cast in favour of the other party.

d) We are obliged to fight whether the aggressor is a Member of the League of Nations or not.

I ask: "What more could be added to our apparent political obligations?"

Nothing on paper, since they are all there already.

But the restrictive interpretation given to the Polish-Romanian Treaty for the past ten years, and according to which, in particular, the Treaty only guarantees the eastern frontiers, may no longer be in force and it may have been decided to give strict application to the Treaty with Poland, Romania fighting on behalf of Poland for the western, as well as for the eastern, frontiers.

In this case, I declare that the Government is responsible for two extremely serious facts:

a) Assuming, in favour of Poland and without compensation for us, the risk of war with Germany;

b) Obliging Romania to side with Poland against Czechoslovakia in the event of a Polish Czechoslovak conflict.

¹ The Treaty entered into force on March 26, 1931.

I would feel happier in my mind if the Minister for Foreign Affairs would answer this question: “In case of a Polish-Czechoslovak conflict on which the Council of the League of Nations was divided, would Romania remain neutral, as I hold she should, or would she be obliged to go to war by the side of Poland against Czechoslovakia, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Polish-Romanian Treaty of January 15th, 1931, widened by the interpretation involved by the *‘renewal of friendship between Poland and Romania’?*”

The situation is truly Shakespearian.

As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, the only aggression against which we are obliged to lend our support is that of Hungary and her allies. In the case of Poland, if the restrictive interpretation which has been in force for the past ten years is no longer valid, we are compelled to fight on the western frontier, that is, against Czechoslovakia too.

The Treaty signed by Romania must be very closely studied in order to understand the significance of an extension of our obligations towards Poland.

This year, we have seen very impressive Polish-Romanian manifestations: M. V. Antonesco’s visit¹ to Warsaw, that of M. Beck² to Bucharest, of H.R.H. the Grand Voevod Michael³ to Warsaw, of President Moscicki⁴ to Bucharest, of His Majesty King Carol⁵ to Warsaw, of Marshal Rydz-Szmigly⁶ to Bucharest – and all these within a few months.

Either these visits are mere formalities having no hidden political significance in addition to that which already exist, or they are intended to mask new obligations assumed by Romania: those of making war on Germany and on Czechoslovakia.

The country awaits and answers.

The Government must furnish it.

¹ Victor Antonescu visited Poland over November 26–28, 1936, accompanied by Alexandru Cretzianu, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and General Florea Țenescu.

² Józef Beck paid an official visit to Romania between 22 and 25 April, 1937.

³ H.R.H. Grand Voivode Mihai paid a visit to Poland over May 24–25, 1937.

⁴ Between 7 and 9 July 1937, Ignacy Móscicki, President of Poland, paid an official visit to Bucharest.

⁵ King Carol II’s visit to Poland took place in the June 26–30, 1937 interval. On this occasion, the decision was made to raise diplomatic relations at the rank of embassy.

⁶ Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigly visited Romania in October 1937.

THE U.S.S.R.

There are some Romanians who cannot speak of relations between Romania and the U.S.S.R. without at once exclaiming: "Titulesco and his communism – Titulesco, who has opened the Romanian frontiers to the Soviets!"

These two assertions are unjustified. And if the first is not an insult, the second certainly is.

There is no disgrace in being a communist, any more than in being a Hitlerite or a fascist. It only signifies being a follower of one of the three conflicting totalitarian doctrines.

I am not a communist, and my intellectual upbringing prevents me from becoming one, just as it prevents me from becoming a Hitlerite or a fascist.

I am a liberal-bourgeois democrat, for whom a respect for private property and freedom is the very basis of life. And I believe that such a doctrine can only be safeguarded by non-intervention in the ideological struggle we are now witnessing.

Vintila Bratiano came much nearer the truth when he instinctively called me "Lord". I apologise to English Lords for this.

The second assertion, however, according to which I am supposed to have thrown open the doors of Romania to Soviet armies, constitutes a painful insult. I say "painful", because I have no more than on one occasion denied this statement in official communiqués and speeches in Parliament¹.

What is the use of questioning a Minister in Parliament if his negative answer is completely ignored?

Yes, I am a liberal-bourgeois democrat, but I consider a political rapprochement between Romania and the U.S.S.R. as a vital necessity for my country.

What are my reasons for holding this belief?

They must be well known to Romanian public opinion.

Nobody in Romania has fought more than I to defend Romanian interests with regard to the U.S.S.R.

We have at last arrived at the moment when I can throw my cards on the table. The torture of silence is over, and now I can say all that is in my mind.

First of all, I must make a friendly reproach to the U.S.S.R. Government for not having realised to a greater extent the identity of our interests, for having lost many favourable opportunities², and for having seen the possibility of adhering to our

¹ Quite revealing for Nicolae Titulescu's viewpoint in this matter is his reply, on December 13, 1935, in the Chamber of Deputies to the interpellations addressed on October 5 and November 26, 1935, by deputy Gheorghe Brătianu, concerning the Pact of Mutual Assistance between Romania and the Soviet Union and the possibility of transit, if the case may be, of the Soviet armies through Romania's territory. The report sent by Nicolae Titulescu to King Carol II, on March 9, 1940, on the evolution of Romanian-Soviet relations is fully enlightening as concerns his position and acts, characterized by spirit of principledness, patriotism, care for the country's integrity, independence and sovereignty.

² In September 1935, Nicolae Titulescu carried exploratory talks with M.M. Litvinov, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., without engaging effective negotiations. The talks on this question continued in January 1936 in London and in March 1936 in Geneva. Only after July 14, 1936, when the Romanian Government reconfirmed the full powers granted to Nicolae Titulescu to negotiate and sign the Romanian-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, the negotiations between the two foreign ministers would be

proposals, through their representative, only at the eleventh hour, and even then only in principle and in a personal capacity.

What are the reasons in favour of a political rapprochement between Romania and the U.S.S.R.?

The proximity of a State with an area of more than four times that of Europe, excluding Russia, and with a population of 162 million, makes it necessary for the neighbouring States to adopt either a hostile or a friendly policy. A third course of action is unthinkable.

In any case, indifference would be impracticable, for it would prevent an advance decision of what action should be taken if and when the neighbouring Colossus went to war. The most precious fruits of friendship cannot be gathered at such a time, but rather in the calm moments of peace. Nor is it an appropriate moment for deciding to go to war with the Colossus State, since such measures must be prepared in advance: alliances must be made to that end, if possible, for otherwise there is a risk of being purely and simply crushed by the Great Neighbour.

And now we ask objectively: "Can Romania afford the luxury of a hostile policy with regard to her Great Neighbour, Russia?" I am convinced that we cannot.

History shows that Russia has always been the ally¹, not the enemy, of Romania.

Again I ask: "Can anybody seriously believe that Romania might fight an ally against Russia in the West, *solely for the defence of Romanian interests*?"

Let us think it over.

It is true that, in order to provide for the contingency of an aggression by the U.S.S.R., Romania allied herself with Poland; but, in this case, there is a common risk, since Poland and Romania are equally exposed to a possible Russian aggression.

But when, in 1932², it was in the interests of Poland and France to draw closer to the U.S.S.R. by the famous Pact of Non-Aggression of November 1932, although we objected³ that such a Pact could not be signed as long as the U.S.S.R. was still contesting

resumed, issuing, on July 21, in Montreux, in the initialling of the Pact. Though the parties agreed on three of the four items of the Pact, the Soviet foreign minister asked for a delay in the completion of the text and the signature of the Pact until September 1936, at the session of the League of Nations Assembly. Nicolae Titulescu's removal from the Cabinet, on August 29, 1936, was the reason why this opportunity was lost.

¹ Russia was actually Romania's ally in certain wars waged during the 18th and 19th century, as well as in WWI (1914–1918). The Russian Empire, like the Soviet one, nurtured feelings of open or masked hatred against the national interests. One should not forget though that Romania suffered losses due to the wars waged by Czarist Russia with some of its neighbours, falling prey to territorial Maiming following the peace treaties they signed. Thus, under the Peace Treaty between Russia and Turkey, concluded in Bucharest on May 28, 1812, Romania was robbed of Bessarabia, which was annexed to Russia. Under the Adrianople Russian-Turkish Peace Treaty, of September 14, 1829, Russia gained control over the third arm of the Danube (Sf. Gheorghe), the Romanian Principalities being placed under Russian protectorate. Under the Berlin Peace Treaty, of July 13, 1878, Romania lost southern Bessarabia, which was incorporated into the Czarist Empire. Violating the decisions, made by plebiscite, regarding the union of Bessarabia (April 9, 1918) with Romania, the U.S.S.R. – on the grounds of the agreements recorded in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939 – proceeded again, in June 1940, after two ultimative notes, to robbing Romania of Bessarabia, Bukovina and the Herza Land.

² The Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty was signed on July 25, 1932. The French-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty was signed on November 29, 1932.

³ During the Romanian-Soviet negotiations of Riga (December 1931–January 1932) and of Geneva (September–October 1932), the Soviet part insisted on having the territorial litigation mentioned in the text of the Pact ("territorial dispute", "Bessarabian dispute", "existing dispute"). On September 30, 1932,

Bessarabia by asking to have the “existing dispute” mentioned in the Treaty, our two allies – and more particularly Poland, who was our ally on the Bessarabian question – signed an independent pact with the U.S.S.R. despite the lamentation of Romania.

Romania has been left completely isolated.

I feel very bitterly about this.

My whole foreign policy from 1932 to 1936 was due to the fact that I had foreseen the possibility of complete isolation for my country.

That policy was briefly as follows:

The new Little Entente, which prevents Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia from signing a political treaty with anyone without the consent of Romania; the Balkan Pact, which prevents Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia from signing a treaty with any Balkan State without the consent of Romania; the creation of close relations with France, which implied mutual consultations, and, thanks to which, we were working hand-in-hand with France because of the identity of our ideas; the establishment of satisfactory direct relations on our own account between the U.S.S.R. and Romania, which began by the definition of aggression¹ in London in July 1933 and was continued by the resumption of diplomatic relations between Romania and the U.S.S.R. in June 1934, destined to lead to a Pact of Mutual Assistance of the kind desired by me, which I shall explain here, and not a fanciful pact of assistance in which foreign propaganda would have Romanian public opinion believe in order to show me in an unfavourable light. Finally, freedom of movement with regard to the other States, Italy and Germany, would have enabled me to conclude any Agreement with these States, provided they were willing.

In recalling that time, I cannot help a certain feeling of pride, just as I experience a certain amount of sadness in thinking of the present and future.

Who would become an ally of Romania solely for the defence of Romanian interests?

Let us speak plainly: Germany?

Never.

In her own interest, Germany might ask Romania to take part in an offensive war against the U.S.S.R. But that, in my opinion, would ring the knell of Romania. Germany, however, will never change her relations with the U.S.S.R. just to defend Romanian interests.

If Germany does not wage war on the U.S.S.R., I foresee a return to Bismark’s policy – that is to say, Russo-German friendship².

I shall deal with this idea more extensively later on.

Nicolae Titulescu – authorized in the meantime (September 21, 1932) by the Romanian Government to negotiate an initial a Pact of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. – declared to the “Reuter” News agency that the formula proposed by the Soviet Government did not take into consideration the legitimate interests of the Romanian state and, subsequently, Romania could not sign such a bilateral Pact, relying further on the provisions of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

¹ On behalf of Romania, Nicolae Titulescu welcomed and backed the proposal advanced on February 6, 1933, at the Disarmament Conference General Commission, by M.M. Litvinov, Foreign Affairs Commissar of the U.S.S.R., concerning the definition of aggression. Nicolae Titulescu will participate himself in the drafting of those Conventions.

² Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck is the initiator of the Three Emperors’ League (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia), concluded in 1873, and renewed in 1881 and 1884. In 1887, Bismarck signed with Russia the so-called Treaty of Reassurances. Considering a war with Russia might be harmful for Germany, he opposed the German military circles who supported the idea of a preventive war against Russia.

In these circumstances, our only possible policy with regard to the U.S.S.R. is one of friendship.

The duty of carrying on such a policy devolved upon me.

But what difficulties beset my path, for, when I undertook this task, the Dniester was an impassable frontier!

From 1918 to 1934, we had no relations whatsoever with the Russians.¹ We were like people living on two different planets.

Let us recapitulate the facts:

I have worked for the resumption of our relations with the U.S.S.R. as Permanent Delegate accredited to the League of Nations, as Minister in London, and, since October 20th, 1932, in my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The first attempt at a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. was due to the suggestions made by France and Poland, who wanted to sign with the U.S.S.R. a Pact of Non-Aggression to which Romania would also be a party.

The U.S.S.R., however, was not willing to sign such a Pact if Romania did not recognise, in the text of that Pact, that it was without prejudice to the *existing dispute*.

Anyone having had access to the diplomatic records knows that the words "*existing dispute*" replaced the words "*territorial dispute*", which had themselves replaced "*Bessarabian dispute*".

Consequently, instead of the Kellogg Pact², according to which the U.S.S.R. assumed the perpetual obligation not to attack Romania, and which threw no doubt on the Bessarabian question, instead of such a Pact (of which Article 1 excluded war as an instrument of national policy, and Article 2 excluded the use of force) we were offered a Pact of Non-Aggression for five years duration, and Romania was asked to recognise the existence of a Bessarabian dispute.

For several long months, I made every possible effort, through Poland (then represented by M. Zaleski), to secure the abandonment of Russia's demands.

My efforts were all in vain.

Then I tried to get some help from France.

Again I met with failure.

Worse still, the French Government informed Bucharest of the subordination of its Agreement with the U.S.S.R. to one single condition, which had already been fulfilled: the assent of Poland.

This was exactly as if the French Government were to announce in Warsaw one day that an Agreement had been concluded between France and Germany with regard to the Polish Corridor, subject to the single condition that Romania should assent hitherto.

¹ Nicolae Titulescu means the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries. On January 26, 1918, the People's Commissars Council decided to break up diplomatic relations with Romania and expel the Romanian Government's representatives. Nevertheless, contacts for the settlement of the bilateral disputed issues took place several times: Warsaw – 1921; Vienna – 1924; Riga – 1931–1932; Geneva – 1932, 1933.

² The general pact of renouncing war, known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact, after the names of the French and U.S. foreign ministers who had initiated it, or as the Pact of Paris, was signed on August 27, 1928. The signatories committed themselves to renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and as a means of settling conflicts, pledging to peacefully settle all their differences. Romania adhered to this Pact on February 9, 1929. Romania signed, alongside Estonia, Latvia, Poland and the U.S.S.R., the Moscow Protocol of anticipated implementation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

The French Government asked Romania to show a spirit of conciliation and to accept either the formula of the “existing dispute” or another equivalent formula.

The Romanian Government having consulted me, an answer was made to Paris that the *Bessarabian question* had already been settled by the French Government in 1920, when they affixed their signature to the Bessarabian Treaty¹ recognising the union of Bessarabia to the mother-country, this unions having been voted by the Bessarabian Parliament (Sfatul Țării) under the Soviet régime.

As I felt that the non-signature of a Pact of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. was unfavourably considered in Bucharest, I resigned my post as Minister in London in the autumn of 1932 and published a statement² giving the reasons for which Romania could not sign a Pact of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. under existing circumstances.

I suffered for this action.

I was offered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order that I should have the responsibility for the policy I had advocated. I could not refuse, for, if I had done so, I should have been accused of being courageous in word but not in deed.

Thus, on October 20th, 1932, I became again Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I should like to recall and elaborate here a fact to which I have already referred.

Towards the end of the Ministry of M. Zaleski, whose succession was shortly afterwards assumed by M. Beck, I asked the Polish Government to intervene in favour of Romania in order to secure the deletion of the words “*existing dispute*”.

The answer of the Polish Government – which, it must be remembered, is obliged to defend Bessarabia by force of arms – was that it had no further interest in Russo-Romanian negotiations.

What?

If Bessarabia were attacked, Poland would shed the blood of her sons and spend her money for Romania, but when asked in time of peace to give diplomatic support – even if she has often been called upon to do so before – can our Polish ally answer us, her Romanian ally, that she has no further interest in the negotiations concerning *Bessarabia*, when that is the very object of her alliance?

Was Bessarabia of no interest to Poland?

I finally came to an agreement with France, then represented by President Edouard Herriot, on the following formula: France and Poland alone will sign the Pact of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R.

As for Romania, she will stand on the basis of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, otherwise known as the Treaty of Paris.

Since that Treaty was largely the work of France, it cannot be said that Romania’s attitude was opposed to France.

The greatest triumph of my parliamentary career was the fact that all Romanian political parties, without exception, approved my policy as regards the Pact of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R.

¹ On October 28, 1920, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Romania signed a Treaty concerning Romania’s eastern frontier, by which Romania’s sovereignty over Bessarabia’s territory was recognized. Great Britain ratified the Treaty on April 14, 1922, France on April 24, 1924, Italy on May 23, 1927. Japan never ratified the Treaty.

² Interview granted by Nicolae Titulescu to the “Reuter” news agency, mentioned above.

Having obtained the approval of the Chamber, however, I reflected for a long time on Ibsen's¹ idea, and came to the opposite conclusion to that of the great writer: that it was not true that man was never greater than when he was alone.

When two of Romania's allies, France and Poland, came to an agreement with the U.S.S.R., Romania could ill afford to stand alone.

I followed a programme to which I had given much thought with a view to a rapprochement between Romania and the U.S.S.R., so that Romania, although defending her national interests, should no longer be an obstacle in the way of our allies.

In the new Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente, signed on February 16th, 1933, I obtained that none of the three States should conclude a political treaty, or take any unilateral action which might change the existing political situation, without the consent of the other States.

It followed that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia could not organise diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. without the consent of Romania.

This situation, together with the proposal made by the representative of the U.S.S.R. in Geneva with regard to the definition of aggression, which is one of the most useful contributions ever made to the cause of peace, has brought about an important change in Russo-Romanian relations.

Starting from the axiom that God helps those who help themselves, I endeavoured to establish cordial relations with the U.S.S.R., without having recourse any longer to our allies, France and Poland.

Thus, when, in Geneva, the representative of the U.S.S.R. – with whom I had hitherto only had duels, as evidenced by the records of the League of Nations – proposed the definition of aggression, on March 2nd, 1933, I decided to support him. Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia did likewise.

It became possible to appoint a special committee to study the question. I refused, however, to be a member of that Committee, so as to avoid the risk of a fresh disagreement between the U.S.S.R. and Romania, but I was present at all the meetings.

On that Committee, the U.S.S.R. Ambassador, Dovgalewski², voiced opinions in complete harmony with my own. As I did not know him, I introduced myself in order to offer him my congratulations.

At the same time, I came into contact with all with all the other Delegations, and ensured the acceptance of M. Litvinoff's³ proposal by the Drafting Committees.

My friends M. Politis⁴ and the French legal expert, Basdevant⁵, upheld the Romanian point of view.

It was in that Committee that a definition of the territory on which there should be no aggression was given.

M. Politis, who was Rapporteur, made a masterly speech at the meeting of the Disarmament Conference, in addition to his Report.

As a conclusion to all these activities, I was called upon, in July 1933, to sign with the U.S.S.R. in London two Treaties¹ with the same text concerning the definition of

¹ Henrik Ibsen.

² Valerian Savielevich Dovgalevski. He signed, on behalf of the U.S.S.R., the Pact of Non-Aggression between the Soviet Union and France and participated, in 1933, in the Disarmament Conference.

³ Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov (Vallah Max).

⁴ Nikolaos Sokrates Politis.

⁵ Jules Basdevant.

aggression; one in the name of Romania, in her capacity as a neighbour of the U.S.S.R., and the other, open to the adherence of all countries concerned, in the name of Romania as a member of the Little Entente.

I quote the following extremely important provisions from those Treaties.

To begin with, the preamble, which runs as follows:

“Being desirous of consolidating the peaceful relations existing between their countries;

Mindful of the fact that the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of which they are signatories, prohibits all aggression;

Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified;

And noting that all States have an equal right to independence, security, *the defence of their territories*, and the free development of their institutions;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries;

And judging it expedient, in the interest of the general peace, to bring into force, as between their countries, precise rules defining aggression, until such time as those rules shall become universal;

Have decided, with the aforesaid objects, to conclude the present Convention, and have duly authorised for the purpose”...

Article I

“Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the other Parties, from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, the definition of aggression as explained in the report dated May 24th, 1933, of the Committee on Security Questions (Politis Report) to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which report was made in consequence of the proposal of the Soviet delegation.”

In the above-mentioned report, § 23 gives a definition of the territory of each Signatory State as being the territory actually controlled by the State.

Article II

“Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

- (1) Declaration of war upon another State;
- (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
- (3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
- (4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;

¹ The Convention on the Definition of Aggression, of July 3, 1933, was signed in London by the representatives of Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Turkey, the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan. The Convention on the Definition of Aggression, of July 4, 1933, was signed in London, by the representatives of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R.

(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory, which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

Article III

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article II. (For examples, see Annex.)”

Articles IV and V deal with ratifications.

The Annex to Article III of the Convention relating to the definition of aggression runs as follows:

“The High Contracting Parties signatories of the Convention relating to the definition of aggression,

Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the rule laid down in Article III of that Convention shall be in no way restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor,

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article II of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

A. In internal condition of a State:

E.g., its political, economic or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war.

B. The international conduct of a State:

E.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article II.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognise that the present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.”

What difference is there between these Treaties and that which M. Vaida wanted to sign at the same time as France and Poland, in 1932?

An enormous difference:

a) The 1932 Treaty was for a duration of five years; in other words, after that time, we might run the risk of a Russian aggression. The Treaty signed by me in 1932 is perpetual.

b) The 1932 Treaty robbed the Kellogg Pact of all its substance, by recognising that the former only excluded war, and not the use of force as well, since it was necessary to have a special Treaty of Non-Aggression in order to place force on the same footing as war.

The 1933 Treaty, signed by a great many States, stipulates that the Kellogg Pact excludes the use of force, even without a declaration of war.

It therefore constitutes a proper international interpretation of the Kellogg Pact.

Such an interpretation may be of use to us in our relations with other States, or when we have no treaties other than the Kellogg Pact.

In any case, in the 1933 Treaty, the U.S.S.R. undertook not to use force against, or go to war with, Romania.

c) Finally the Treaty M. Vaida wanted to sign¹ in 1932 obliged Romania to recognise the “*existing dispute*,” *that is to say, the Bessarabian dispute*.

The 1933 Treaties not only did not contain these words – the mere suppression of which implied that the U.S.S.R. had recognised Bessarabia as Romanian territory – but also these Treaties, expressly based on the Politis Report, defined the territory of the High Contracting Parties as being territories actually under their control.

Thus to the first right of Romania over Bessarabia, arising out of the vote of the Bessarabian Parliament (Sfatul Țării), which no power in the world can change, and to the second right, created by the Treaty signed in October 1920 with France, Italy, England and Japan, was added a third right originating in the recognition of Romania’s present possessions as being Romanian territory.

As far as the 1920 Treaty is concerned, I have two comments to make: in the draft submitted by the Great Powers in 1920, the Chilia arm of the Danube was taken away from us, and a right of appeal over the Bessarabian question was given to the U.S.S.R. In May 1920, having been appointed Delegate to the Peace Conference by Marshal Averesco, I negotiated these two questions alone in London. The first was finally settled by the Danube Conference². The second ceased to exist when the U.S.S.R. was refused the right of appeal to the League of Nations on the question of Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia, and that of her frontiers.

This refusal, which was written by me in the text which can be found in the Foreign Office file then kept by my friend Allan Leeper, finally gave us Bessarabia.

But for it, the Great Powers would have given us, instead of Bessarabia, a legal dispute in Geneva with the U.S.S.R.

And when, in October 1920, Take Jonesco was given the original text of the Bessarabian Treaty containing the right of appeal of the U.S.S.R. to the League of Nations, it was I who took the initiative of intervening with the Foreign Office in order to point out the mistake which had been made. The Foreign Office then gave Take Jonesco a second draft, as amended by me, in May 1920, after my negotiations – that is to say, the text refusing to the U.S.S.R. the right of appeal against the sovereignty of Romania over Bessarabia or with regard to the question of her frontiers.

This was the text which was finally signed.

And now may I ask if I can be said to be the puppet of Russia in Romania?

¹ The differing points of view on the content of the Non-Aggression Pact between Romania and the U.S.S.R., and on the ways of following the negotiations for the achievement of this goal have caused an irreconcilable conflict between Nicolae Titulescu and Alexandru Vaida-Voevod. On October 14, 1932, the latter tendered his resignation from the office of Prime Minister, trying to settle in his favour the conflict with the Romanian diplomat. King Carol II accepted his resignation and will entrust the mandate to form the new Government to Iuliu Maniu, in this Cabinet Nicolae Titulescu assuming the function of Foreign Minister.

² On July 23, 1921, the representatives of Great Britain, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Romania, sign the Convention on the Statute of the Danube; later, the Convention will be signed by Italy (July 31) and by Yugoslavia (September 23).

Was it I who, through the imaginary obligation to allow Russian troops to pass through Romania, jeopardised the interests of Bessarabia?

On the contrary, I succeeded, eight months later, in having the Romanian point of view incorporated in a regular Treaty with the U.S.S.R.

I am sorry to find M. Vaida-Voevod, my former Prime Minister, amongst those who speak unfavourably of me in connection with the Russian question.

Was it not M. Vaida who, in 1932, sent a telegram to M. Cadere¹, our Minister in Warsaw, asking him to sign the Treaty with the Russians and to accept the wording, favourable to the Soviets, by which the Pact which was about to be signed would be without prejudice to any dispute, past, present or future?

Did not M. Cadere inform M. Vaida by telegram that, after the signature of the Pact of Non-Aggression, M. Litvinoff had told him that all outstanding questions should be discussed in a friendly spirit between the U.S.S.R. and Romania – which means therefore, that the Bessarabian question should be dealt with in a special Conference?

Is it not written in black and white in the guarantee given by the U.S.S.R. to France in 1932 that the former will not have recourse to war in order to settle the Bessarabian question and that she will maintain for three months her offer to sign a Pact of Non-Aggression with Romania *under the conditions proposed by M. Cadere*?

I was not able to speak openly in Parliament in 1932.

At that time, I was Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, in conformity with tradition, I had to shield my subordinates.

Today, I am a private individual, but I am also a man who is constantly being attacked over the Russian question by M. Vaida's Party,² which, in 1932, wanted to sign a Pact of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. under any terms whatever; whereas it is to me that Romania owes the suppression of the words "*existing dispute*" in our Treaty with the U.S.S.R.

The historical truth is that I am the man who most actively defended Bessarabia in the discussions between Romania and the U.S.S.R.

The favourable repercussions of the Convention signed in London on July 3rd and 4th, 1933, concerning the definition of an aggressor were so great that, in October of the same year, I was able to reach a provisional conclusion of the Balkan Pact based on the territorial *status quo*. The final signature of that Pact took place in Athens on February 9th, 1934.

As a matter of fact, Turkey and Soviet Russia are bound by an agreement³ preventing both these two countries from signing any Agreements with their neighbours by land or by sea unless they have previously obtained the consent of the other Party.

As a consequence of the London Agreements, I signed a Pact of Perpetual Friendship with Turkey on October 17th, 1933. But the Balkan Pact, which aimed at maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkans, would never have been signed by Turkey without the consent of the U.S.S.R.

¹ Victor Cădere.

² On March 29, 1935, the right wing of the Peasant National Party, led by Al. Vaida-Voevod, separated from it and formed the Romanian Front.

³ The Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between Turkey and the U.S.S.R., signed in Paris, on December 17, 1925.

If, therefore, legally speaking, it is Turkey which guarantees our Balkan frontiers, the moral guarantor is the U.S.S.R., since, without her consent, Turkey would not have been in a position to undertake the obligations of the Balkan Pact.

In April 1934, I made an official visit¹ to President Barthou, who replied² by coming to Romania in June 1934.

On the later occasion, President Barthou informed me that France intended to have the U.S.S.R. admitted to the League of Nations.

For that purpose, he asked for the support of the Little Entente.

He did not make any secret of the fact that the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations was to be the prelude to a Franco-Russian Pact of Assistance, and he asked that Romania should conclude a similar treaty with the U.S.S.R.

Besides M. Barthou, President Doumergue³ and authorised members of the French General Staff made the same suggestions, never ceasing to repeat that a pact with Soviet Russia would be necessary in the near future.

In June 1934, on the basis of these appeals from France I obtained full powers⁴ from His Majesty King Carol and the Romanian Government to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

These relations were resumed on June 9th, 1934.

At the same time as Czechoslovakia⁵, I wrote to M. Litvinoff, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, in the following terms:

"I have the honour of informing you of the following facts:

At the Conference of the Little Entente, held at Zagreb on January 22nd, 1934, the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs agreed⁶ that the States members of the Little Entente should resume normal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., as soon as necessary diplomatic and political conditions have been attained.

Following on the conversations which I had with you, Sir, at the beginning of June, the *Permanent Council of the Little Entente* has ascertained in Geneva that political and diplomatic conditions now allow each of the States members of the Little Entente to implement the Zagreb resolution at a suitable opportunity.

In view of the above, I have the pleasure of informing you that, as a consequence of our conversations, the Royal Romanian Government has decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the U.S.S.R. and to appoint an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

I am firmly convinced that the relations thus established will always remain normal and friendly, and that our countries will continue to cooperate to their mutual advantage for the maintenance of world peace.

I have the honour to be, etc.

¹ Nicolae Titulescu's official visit to France took place between April 16 and 19, 1934.

² Jean-Louis Barthou returned the visit over June 22–23, 1934.

³ Gaston Doumergue.

⁴ Nicolae Titulescu was authorized in this sense by King Carol II, on June 7, 1934.

⁵ Czechoslovakia established diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. on the same day with Romania, on June 9, 1934.

⁶ Upon Nicolae Titulescu's proposal, the Third Ordinary Session of the Little Entente Permanent Council, held in Zagreb, on January 22–23, 1934, makes the decision that the three member-states of the Little Entente should resume normal relations with the U.S.S.R. "as soon as the diplomatic and political conditions imposed by the interests of each of the three parties are fulfilled."

(signed) N. Titulesco”

M. Litvinoff replies as follows:

“Geneva, June 9th, 1934

Your Excellency,

I have the pleasure of informing you that, following on our conversations, the government of the U.S.S.R. had decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Kingdom of Romania and to appoint an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

I am firmly convinced that the relations thus established will always remain normal and friendly, and that our countries will continue to co-operate to their mutual advantage for the maintenance of world peace.

(signed) M. Litvinoff
People’s Commissary for
Foreign Affairs”

There was another exchange of notes between M. Litvinoff and myself on June 9th, 1934. I shall merely quote a few extracts from those letters:

“By the letters we exchanged on June 9th, 1934, regular diplomatic relations were established between our two countries.

In order that these relations may develop normally in the direction of a still closer contact and a real and enduring friendship, I have the honour to confirm our agreement as follows:

The Governments of our two countries mutually guarantee a full and entire respect of the sovereignty of each other and that they will abstain from any direct or indirect interference with the internal affairs and the development of each country, more particularly from all agitation, propaganda and any kind of intervention, and that they will abstain from supporting such action.

They also undertake not to set up or support or authorise on their territories any organisations whose aim would be an armed attack against the other State, or forcible attempts against its official representatives, as well as any organisations which would claim to be the Government of the other State or of any part of the territory of that other State.

Similarly, they undertake to forbid the recruiting, as well as the entry on their territories and the transit through their territories, of armed forces, of arms, munitions, equipment and any kind of war material intended for the use of such organisations.

(signed) M. Litvinoff
People’s Commissary for
Foreign Affairs”

In a letter dated June 9th, 1934, I accepted similar obligations on behalf of Romania and reproduced word for word the letter of the people’s Commissary for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

Everybody will remember that, at that time, President Barthou’s plan comprised the conclusion of two Agreements with the U.S.S.R.

The first of these, the Oriental Pact¹, grouped together Germany, the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia, whose obligations of non-aggression were guaranteed by France. The Baltic States were also to take part in this Agreement.

The second, the Mediterranean Pact, comprised the States bordering on the Mediterranean.

But, strange though it may seem, Romania was so completely forgotten at the time that she was not even mentioned either in connection with the Mediterranean Pact, the conclusion of which was viewed with scepticism from the very moment of its inception.

The Prime Minister of Romania, M.G. Tataresco, seeing that Romania was mentioned in none of the proposed Agreements with the U.S.S.R., wired to me during the summer of 1934 to inform me of the very bad impression made by this omission on the Romanian public opinion, and asking me to sign at least the Pact of Assistance with the U.S.S.R. and with Poland, of which there had been some question in 1934.

I replied that we should first of all endeavour to become a Party to the Oriental Pact. If we failed, we should try to enter into the Mediterranean Pact before having recourse to limited Agreements with the U.S.S.R.

I therefore undertook, during the so-called summer holidays of 1934, the necessary work in order to obtain the acceptance of Romania as a Party to the Oriental Pact.²

At first, I met with strong resistance from France, but this gradually weakened, and Romania was finally accepted by that country as a Party to the Oriental Pact.

After having at first refused, M. Litvinoff also finally agreed to this.

But I unexpectedly came up against the categorical resistance of His Excellency M. Benes, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Long diplomatic conversations took place between us.

President Benes finally accepted Romania's entry into the Oriental Pact, but by then the fate of that Pact had already been decided by Germany's rejection thereof.

In consequence of Germany's opposition, France and Czechoslovakia began to conclude Pacts of Assistance with the U.S.S.R. It is true that these Pacts were bilateral, but they were open to adherence of all interested Parties.

¹ The failure of the Disarmament Conference was followed by new attempts at building collective security, on the basis of some regional pacts. The Oriental Pact is one of those examples. Grounded on the collective security principle, the Oriental Pact enjoyed the support of the Little Entente and of the Balkan Entente. Germany's and Poland's opposition caused the failure of the Oriental Pact.

² A special opportunity will be the visit paid to Romania, between June 20 and 23, 1934, by the French Foreign Minister, Jean-Louis Barthou, which occasioned a broad exchange of opinions on the Oriental Pact and offered Romania the possibility to express her interest in this project. On July 18, 1934, the Romanian Government decides to participate in the Oriental Pact, Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing officially the French Government about its decision. If her request would be rejected, Romania intended to participate, alongside France, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia and other countries in the Mediterranean Pact and, in case of failure of this project, to conclude a three-power pact, with Poland and the Soviet Union, of guarantees against an attack perpetrated by one of the signatories. The Little Entente Permanent Council decided, at its Geneva session of September 13–14, 1934, to support the conclusion of the Oriental Pact. On November 26–27, 1934, Nicolae Titulescu had several talks on the Oriental Pact with members of the French cabinet, among whom, Pierre Laval, Pierre Etienne Flandin, Edouard Herriot, Georges Mandel.

Since it was stated that it was I who, because of diabolical powers of persuasion, had thrown France into the arms of the Soviets, I shall have to shed some further light on this question in addition to what has already been stated.

On March 29th¹ I arrived in Paris to deal with questions entirely unconnected with our relations with the U.S.S.R. President Laval² had already handed in to the U.S.S.R. Ambassador the text of the Franco-Russian Pact of Assistance.

How can it be said that I induced France to conclude a Pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R., when President Barthou had already mentioned to me the decision of the French Government to conclude such a Pact after the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations, and when M. Laval's Government had handed in the draft Pact to the U.S.S.R. without even giving me notice thereof?

There is no doubt that, for us, Romanians, Franco-Russian friendship constitutes a very precious guarantee, since any gesture of confidence, help, or even of mere consideration, made by the U.S.S.R. to France is to our advantage.

I do not think I am betraying President Laval's confidence if I give the reasons for which he decided to sign a Pact with the U.S.S.R.

Besides, he gives them himself at every opportunity and absolute sincerity.

The first reason for the signature by France of the Pact of Assistance with the U.S.S.R. is that, for M. Laval, the Pact is a legacy of the Herriot³, Paul-Boncour⁴ and Doumergue⁵ Governments, with President Barthou as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The second reason is to be found in the fact that a Pact of this kind is reassuring for the States of the Little Entente, as far as their relations with the U.S.S.R. are concerned.

The third reason is that the Franco-Russian Pact does not impose any new obligations on France, since she is already obliged to come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia should the latter be attacked by Germany.

On the other hand, the Pact gives France increased security, for the U.S.S.R. no longer retains her freedom of action with regard to Germany.

In May 1935, France signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R.⁶

In June of the same year, Czechoslovakia signed a similar Pact.⁷

On July 12th, 1935, His Majesty King Carol II and the Tataresco Government authorised me to sign a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. in the name of Romania.

On July 14th, 1936, the Tataresco Government confirmed these full powers in writing.

Contrary to the belief of some people, the consent of Poland is not required for the conclusion of a Treaty with the U.S.S.R.

This is shown by the text of Article 5 of the Polish-Romanian Treaty of January 15th, 1931, which reads:

¹ March 29, 1935.

² Pierre Laval.

³ June 3–December 14, 1932.

⁴ December 18, 1932–January 28, 1933.

⁵ February 9–November 8, 1934.

⁶ May 2, 1935.

⁷ May 16, 1935.

“Article 5. – Neither of the High Contracting Parties may conclude an alliance with a third Power without having previously consulted the other. Are excluded from this condition, the alliances made with a view to the maintenance of Treaties already signed both by Romania and Poland.”

I would like to remark that:

a) A Pact of Mutual Assistance within the framework of the League of Nations does not constitute an alliance, because it is open to the adherence of all interested parties. For instance, the Pacts concluded with the U.S.S.R. by France, Czechoslovakia and possibly by us will be open to the adherence of Poland and Germany.

b) The text of our Treaty with Poland does not mention consent *but consultation*.

c) Article 5 of the Polish-Romanian Treaty adds: *“Are excluded from this condition the alliances made with a view to the maintenance of Treaties already signed both by Romania and Poland.”*

Actually the Pact of Assistance between Romania and the U.S.S.R. aims at maintaining the frontiers fixed by the Treaties of Trianon¹, Saint-Germain² and Neuilly³ signed by both Poland and Romania, just as we have a Treaty signed by both Romania and Poland⁴ with regard to Bessarabia.

Since France delayed the ratification of the Franco-Russian Pact and since Romania asked that she should take action when France did – a clause which was granted by the U.S.S.R. to Czechoslovakia – M. Litvinoff refused to negotiate a Pact of mutual assistance between Romania and the U.S.S.R. until France had ratified the Franco-Russian Treaty.

I wish it be noted that, in discussing these questions, I have no intention to imply that any particular State wished to violate Peace.

However, it would be foolish not to foresee the possibility of a future war and not to study all eventualities in connection with it.

It would be too marvellous to be able to believe that the Peace Treaties of 1919 and 1920 have finally ended war.

¹ The Trianon Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and Hungary, on the other, was signed on June 4, 1920. The Treaty established the frontiers of Hungary with Romania, the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene Kingdom and Czechoslovakia. It recognised internationally the union of Transylvania, the Banate, Crişana and Maramureş with Romania. The Treaty came into force on July 26, 1921.

² The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye was concluded on September 10, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria. The Treaty sanctioned the dismembering of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the creation of new nation-states – Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary – the union of the parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire inhabited by Romanians, Italians, Slavs, to the states they rightfully belonged: Romania, Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland. Austria renounced in Romania's favour to all the titles and rights over the part of the former Duchy of Bukovina (Art. 59). It came into force for Romania on September 4, 1920, a date on which the Romanian Government handed over in Paris the ratification instruments.

³ The Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine was concluded on November 27, 1919 between the Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, and Bulgaria, on the other. The Treaty established Bulgaria's frontiers with the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene state, with Greece and Romania (as they used to be on August 1, 1914). It came into force for Romania on September 4, 1920, when the Romanian Government handed over in Paris the ratification instruments.

⁴ The Protocol A of the Convention of Romanian-Polish Defensive Alliance, signed on March 3, 1921, in Bucharest, defines the eastern frontier of the two countries, according to the Paris Treaty of October 28, 1920, and the preliminaries of peace signed on October 11, 1920, between Poland and the Soviet Union.

The following pages should read in this sense only.

The resistance of the U.S.S.R. continued even after the ratification given by France in March 1936.

It is a great illusion to believe that Romania can easily obtain a Pact of Assistance with the U.S.S.R.

It was only on July 21st, 1936, that M. Litvinoff agreed to consider under what conditions a Pact of Mutual Assistance could be drawn up between Romania and the U.S.S.R. Moreover, he only did this in a personal capacity without binding the U.S.S.R. Government in any way, though it was understood that official negotiations would begin in Geneva in September 1936.

On August 29th, 1936, I ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Since then, Romania has made no further progress towards the desired goal, but has rather receded from it.

The Press became very agitated about my meeting with M. Litvinoff at Talloires¹. What did they not say?

Above all, I am a free agent and I have the right to see whom I like, where I like.

There was talk of a second meeting in Joachimow, but that was sheer and perfidious invention, as it never took place.

I said that I would make everything public.

I do it now.

If what I state is incorrect, I would ask the Moscow Government to be good enough to say so.

At Talloires I had lunch with M. Litvinoff. Even before the lunch started, he asked me: "Do you believe that Bessarabia belongs to Romania?"

I was surprised to hear M. Litvinoff mention Bessarabia since, for the last five years, he had not uttered its name, that I replied: "Yes, but why the question?"

M. Litvinoff answered: "Because your successor does not think so. He asked me for a *de jure* recognition of Bessarabia."

At that moment I felt a terrible bitterness.

What! Did the vote of the Bessarabian Parliament (Sfatul Țării) mean nothing?

Did the signature of the 1920 Treaty, by which England, France, Italy and Japan recognised the full sovereignty of Romania over Bessarabia in consequence of the latter's union with the mother country, mean nothing either?

And was the definition of the territory, arising out of the Convention on the definition of aggression, signed in London in 1933 and according to which we can consider as Romanian territory actually under Romanian control, also devoid of meaning?

Is it possible to accept, even for a moment, that by her gesture of May 1937, Romania should have created, between 1918 and 1937, a great international hiatus?

Some territories are protected from aggression and revision, as, for instance, Alsace and Lorraine by the Treaty of Locarno.

¹ The Talloires meeting (Talloires is a French town, near the French-Swiss border) took place, most probably (by corroborating all data) on May 29, 1937. An ample description of the meeting is recorded in the report on the Romanian-Soviet relations, addressed by Nicolae Titulescu to King Carol II on March 9, 1940.

Other territories such as Transylvania are only protected from aggression, since, for some of them – you will see that I do not share this point of view – there is a legal possibility of revision under the Treaties of Peace.

In this case the U.S.S.R. renounced aggression, and, since she had an anti-revisionist policy, she may be considered, for the present at least, as having also renounced revision. And, in spite of all this, in 1937, we ask for the *de jure* recognition of Bessarabia?

On what did Take Jonescu base his action in 1921 when he withdrew his delegation from Warsaw because the U.S.S.R. raised the question of Bessarabia? On nothing more than the Self-determination of 1918 and the Treaty of 1920.

On what did John I. C. Bratiano base his action when he withdrew his delegation from the Vienna Conference at the time the U.S.S.R. raised the question of Bessarabia? On nothing more than the Self-determination of 1918 and the Treaty of 1920.

On what did I base my own action when, sacrificing my whole career, I resigned from my office of Minister in London in 1932 because Romania was on the point of accepting the request of the U.S.S.R. to mention the “existing dispute” in the Treaty? On nothing more than the Self-determination of 1918 and the Treaty of 1920.

Today, when, in addition to those two titles, we have also the definition of the territory provided by the 1933 Convention and when, so far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned, by Romanian territory is meant all that Romania now possesses, we ask the U.S.S.R. for the *de jure* recognition of Bessarabia?

But M. V. Antonesco has asked other Foreign Ministers to intervene in the same direction.

I do not know if they have done so.

How often have I not said to those who, in Romania, raised the question of the non-recognition of Bessarabia by the U.S.S.R.: “You are placing weapons in the hands of the Russians because they will be able to say that my interpretation is a personal one since Romanians of high standing view the situation differently.”

At Talloires, M. Litvinoff went on to say that he had told M. V. Antonesco: “*I note the fact that you do not consider that Bessarabia is Romanian and I ask you to note that it never will be. Your policy is not that of Titulesco. You threw yourself into the arms of Poland and Germany is behind her. I do not intend to raise the Bessarabian question so long as Romania does not oppose the U.S.S.R. But, now that I find you going against us, we cannot leave in your hands the asset constituted by Bessarabia in the event of war, which you might use against the U.S.S.R.*”

Continuing the conversation, M. Litvinoff told me that he had asked M. Antonesco what the latter was offering him in exchange for a *de jure* recognition.

A Pact of assistance?

According to his declaration to the Romanian Parliament, M. Antonesco replied: “No, I cannot give you a Pact of assistance because Romanian public opinion is opposed to it, but I can offer you a Pact of friendship.”

M. Litvinoff also asked M. Antonesco: “*If that is the situation, why did your Government, and especially you, give full powers to M. Titulesco to sign a Pact of assistance with the U.S.S.R.?*”

I asked M. Litvinoff to modify his views. Things in Romania are not as he believed them to be.

All my efforts were in vain. M. Litvinoff remained firm.

It must not be considered from the above that I consider our rights with regard to Bessarabia to have been diminished in any way.

No error, however serious, made by a Minister for Foreign Affairs, can deprive a country of her ancestral rights. If, as a result of M. V. Antonesco's unfortunate intervention, the U.S.S.R. raises the question of Bessarabia, I shall be in the forefront of those who will defend the rights of our country over this province.

However, it is none the less true that where we had a clear situation, we have created new complication.

Our efforts should be devoted solely to overcoming the difficulties of the present and the future, and not to repairing an already established situation which a Minister for Foreign Affairs has taken it upon himself to spoil.

And why all this? In order to be able to say: "Titulescu has not obtained Bessarabia. It is I who bring it to you."

I do not wish to spend any more time on such considerations.

Therefore, the memorable day of May 28th, 1937, when some of our politicians attacked me in their newspapers, was one of the saddest of my political career.

In fact, even if M. V. Antonesco had succeeded in his attempt, he would have abandoned the ground on which all his predecessors had taken up their stand.

We wanted to obtain Bessarabia from the U.S.S.R.

This idea is a very dangerous one: our rights over Bessarabia cannot depend on the disposition of the U.S.S.R. towards us.

We own Bessarabia through our historical rights dating back to two thousand years. Formerly, it was disposed of and given to the Russians by the old Turkey. Part of it was restored to us¹ in 1856. In 1878, Russia, with the consent of the Great Powers, took back three districts from us.

Today, there is a five-fold legal basis for the justification of our rights over Bessarabia:

First of all, the principle of nationalities, Bessarabia having a large majority of Romanians;

Secondly, the vote of the Bessarabian Parliament (Sfatul Țării) under the Soviet régime, which nobody can alter;

Thirdly, the Treaty of 1920 with the Great Powers;

Fourthly, the Convention signed in London in July 1933, which gives a definition of the Romanian territory;

Fifthly, when Romania became a Member of the League of Nations, she already had Bessarabia, as a result of the vote of the Bessarabian Parliament (Sfatul Țării) before she signed some of the Peace Treaties. She also had it according to the Treaty signed with the Great Powers in 1920, before she signed other Peace Treaties.

Moreover, according to international law, when the U.S.S.R. became a Member of the League of Nations, she was admitted with her existing territories, not including Bessarabia, concerning which she made no reservation.

¹ The Paris Peace Treaty, concluded on March 30, 1856, restored to Moldavia the Danube Delta and southern Bessarabia (counties Cahul, Bolgrad and Ismail), that had been snatched from it under the Bucharest Treaty of 1812.

It was in these circumstances, and in respect of the territories they had when they became Members of the League, that Great Romania and the U.S.S.R. were recognised *de jure* by the community of States as units in international law.

I have stated how this question should be viewed by Romania. It constitutes the strongest line of defence in case of our rights over Bessarabia being contested, and should be adopted by the Romanian people, if they have not already done so.

It should be noted that my conversation with M. Litvinoff took place after conversations between the latter and M. Antonesco, who, as matter of fact, left Geneva for Paris on the evening of May 28th, 1937.

Needless to add, there was no witness of my conversation with M. Litvinoff, and those who published in the Press that Minister Antoniadu was recalled because he had been at Talloires was simply lying.

The Talloires incident having been liquidated, I feel certain that, if I had remained Minister for Foreign Affairs, I should have concluded with the U.S.S.R. a Treaty taking full account of all Romanian interests.

I am afraid that the opportunity I had may not present itself again.

If such is the case, Romania will be isolated, and may be invaded by the U.S.S.R. under the legal and unilateral pretext of the so-called obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

I repeat that I never undertook to allow Russian troops to pass through Romania.

On the contrary, I am able to assert – and I ask the Moscow Government to deny my statement if it is not an expression of truth – that, if I had ever signed a Pact of Assistance between Romania and the U.S.S.R., three clauses would have been inserted therein:

First of all, the Pact would only apply if the enemy were on national territory;

Secondly, the Government of the U.S.S.R. recognises that, according to these various obligations of assistance, Soviet troops may never cross the Dniester without a formal request from the Royal Romanian Government to that effect, and the Royal Romanian Government likewise recognises that Romanian troops may never cross the Dniester into the U.S.S.R. without a formal request from the Government of that country.

Thirdly, on the request of the Royal Romanian Government, Soviet troops must immediately withdraw from Romanian territory East of the Dniester, and likewise, on the request of the U.S.S.R. Government, Romanian troops must immediately withdraw from the territory of the U.S.S.R. West of the Dniester.

Therefore I, of whom it has been said that I undertook to allow a free passage through Romanian territory to the Russian armies, am in reality the man who prevented that very passage, even in the eventuality of the enforcement of Article 16 of the Covenant.

As I understand the Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., it would only have been in case Romanian interests were at stake, and only when the enemy was actually on Romanian territory, that we would have asked for the assistance of Soviet troops. Otherwise, in the absence of a formal request on our part, the Dniester constituted not a frontier, but a veritable barrier.

It will, however, be said: “But Romania was also obliged to help the U.S.S.R.” Yes, but in all probability, *in the present political situation*, the path from Germany to the U.S.S.R. lies through Czechoslovakia and Romania.

Anyway, we would always have had the advantage of the obligation of assistance.

Finally, I went so far in my defence of the country's interests that I foresaw the obligation of evacuation of Bessarabia in case we had to call on the U.S.S.R. for help.

I repeat, these three clauses would have been part of the Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R.

How is it possible for Romania not to realise that the Pact of Assistance with the U.S.S.R. supplies one of her most vital needs?

I have dealt with the hypothesis of Romania being attacked by the U.S.S.R., and I have come to the conclusion that, apart from Poland, which might also be the victim of a Russian aggression, there is no State which would fight the U.S.S.R. for the sole purpose of protecting purely Romanian interests.

Let us return to the hypothesis of a German aggression against the U.S.S.R., through the Baltic States, or through Czechoslovakia.

Aggression through the Baltic States is highly improbable, but, even if it took place, it is very likely that the U.S.S.R. would ask Czechoslovakia and Romania to remain neutral, first of all because our neutrality would be more useful to her, and secondly, because it would not be to her interest to have to fight Germany on two fronts.

There remains the most probable hypothesis in the present political situation: that of a German attack on the U.S.S.R., through Czechoslovakia.

Anybody who thinks that Germany would stop at the Czecho-Romanian frontiers does not appreciate political realities.

Germany is in need of Romanian petrol to send her motorised divisions into the Ukraine, and she also needs our cereals to feed her population.

It might be said, however: "Could we not sell these commodities to Germany, and remain neutral?"

If Russia found us acting in such a way, being concerned with preventing Romanian petrol from falling into German hands, and being the ally of Czechoslovakia and France, she would prevent such transactions by the use of force, if necessary.

In fact, there is a great likelihood of events taking the same course, whether we are the allies of the U.R.S.S. or not.

However, if we have no Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., Soviet armies, on the pretext of defending Czechoslovakia, will enter Romania when and how they please – that is to say, in the role of an enemy – and will occupy the Romanian oil-fields.

On the contrary, if we had a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., Soviet Armies could only enter Romanian territory as when Romania wished, that is to say, as an ally.

Moreover, the U.S.S.R. would be obliged to leave Romanian territory as soon as we requested, and withdraw East of the Dniester. This is a very important obligation, since the U.S.S.R. makes it a point of honour to respect her given word.

Our Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. would certainly be carried out, because it would be based on common interests.

The majority of Romanian public opinion is in favour of friendly relations with France and Czechoslovakia.

We must not forget that these two countries are, in their turn, the allies of the U.S.S.R.

There is no sense in declaring that we are the friends of France and Czechoslovakia if we remain the enemies of the U.S.S.R.

If we do not become the allies of the U.S.S.R., we will be the victims of the suggestions our allies will make, in conformity with their own interests, to the U.S.S.R.

Either we openly break all connection with France and Czechoslovakia and seek other alliances, if possible, in order to continue our present policy with regard to the Soviets, or we conclude a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. in order to reap the benefits of our alliances with France and Czechoslovakia.

I openly claim the responsibility for the following statement: "I have been, I am, and I shall always remain, in favour of a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., as long as that country carries out the policy of peace and amity between nations which she has practised during recent years."

Such a Treaty is necessary for Romania whether Germany makes war on the U.S.S.R. or whether she comes to an agreement with that country.

Moreover, the Treaty will have to be made in due course with Romania; otherwise, the Russo-German rapprochement will be made without us and against us, as I have already pointed out.

The Russo-German rapprochement must therefore find us already allied with the U.S.S.R.

We must remember the teachings of the past with regard to Russo-German relations.

I consider Franco-Russian friendship as an axiom. Its inevitable consequence is a Russo-Romanian friendship.

But how, in the past, did this Franco-Russian friendship come into being?

Bismarck's policy was persistently to maintain the best possible relations between Germany and Russia.

Pre-War Republican France was only able to conclude an alliance with Tzarist Russia by creeping through the crack made by Germany's mistake in not renewing the treaty of reassurance.

The Treaty of Rapallo renewed the tradition of Bismarck's policy.

It was only through the crack made by Germany in recent years as a result of the hostility shown by her to the U.S.S.R. that present-day democratic France was able to creep in again in 1935 in order to conclude an alliance with Soviet Russia.

It is stated today that the difference of ideologies prevents a rapprochement between Germany and the U.S.S.R. That is true. But how long will this obstacle remain? Nobody knows. In any case, it cannot last forever.

The main thing for Romania is to conclude her Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. before any rapprochement takes place between that country and Germany.

After such a rapprochement, a Pact of Mutual Assistance between Romania and the U.S.S.R. would be considered useless by the latter.

I charge these words with all the gravity my political judgement may have acquired in nearly twenty-five years.

And now I come to an important question which, I know, is of serious concern for Romanian public opinion: would a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. not give a fresh impetus to Communism in Romania?

Above all, let there be no misunderstanding: internal and external politics have each their different methods.

I am neither a Communist nor a Nazi nor a Fascist, and I believe that Romania can only emerge victorious from the present difficulties if she maintains an absolutely equal distance from extreme-left and extreme-right doctrines.

Imprisonment within the country – for all extremists, without distinction – and a friendly hand proffered outside the frontiers are not incompatible where politics are concerned.

Internal order is maintained by governmental measures taken according to the political ideas of those in power.

External policy, however, is conducted on the basis of common international interests, whatever the internal régime adopted by the country.

Freedom for ourselves, freedom for all, but within the frontiers of each country.

François I, King of France, gave an example of such a policy when he allied himself with the Turks.

At every opportunity, Russia has found Romania by her side.

Russo-Romanian friendship has its roots in History.

Today, it has become the Titulesco Question.

To say that this long historical process is due to the influence of a single man is a great honour, which, however, I feel obliged to decline.

But to say that, in working as I did, I followed the dictates of our National History, is an honour which I claim.

GERMANY

The relations between Romania and Germany are of vital importance. Her geographical situation has created for Romania two political factors which she must take into account: Russia and Germany.

The leaders of our foreign policy should prevent the Romanian nation from becoming a target for Germany or Russia.

Romania should be equally anxious for friendship with Russia and with Germany. If she cannot have both, our country will find herself in a less favourable position, since Romania could become the battlefield in a Russo-German conflict.

Even if she wanted to, Romania could not remain neutral in such a conflict. In the end she would have to become the ally of whichever of those two great Powers would accept her friendship and would formally guarantee her frontiers at the close of a future war.

It would be an extremely dangerous illusion to believe that German armies, if they went to war on the frontier of Central and Eastern Europe, would stop at the boundaries of Romania if we kept silent and were very submissive.

Romania owes her greatness to action and not to inaction. Present-day Romania can only be defended by action and not by inaction.

Yes, friendship with Germany is imperative for us.

What have we done to secure that friendship? What remains to be done?

I may be mentioning a fact of little importance, but at the dawn of my political life, I felt that the friendship of Germany was necessary to Romania.

In 1918, with Take Jonesco and many others, I opposed a separate peace, which led us to the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on May 7th, 1918 – a Treaty which is very enlightening to those who want to know what peace would be when dictated¹ by others.

In June of the same year, 1918, Take Jonesco and I were considered undesirable by Germany and were asked to leave the country².

I am deeply moved when I think that I am the only survivor of the political Ministers of the Jassy Government, of the most tragic period of our national war: the

¹ On May 7, 1918, the negotiations between Romania and the Central Powers end in the signature of a “treaty” of peace (“Bucharest Peace”), which imposed outstandingly hard conditions. Romania lost Dobrudja, territories in the Carpathians (131 villages and communes, 724,957 inhabitants, an area of 5,600 sq. km.); she was forced to demobilize the Romanian army; to accept the German monopoly over commerce with Romanian cereals, over timber exploitation and processing; German control on the Danube navigation; Romanian shipyards passed into the ownership of the German State; total German monopoly over the exploitation of oil for 90 years, etc. Simultaneously, there were signed further 23 documents which completed Romania’s subordination and exploitation imposed under the “Peace Treaty”. On behalf of the Romanian Government, the document was signed by Prime Minister Alexandru Marghiloman, Foreign Minister Constantin C. Arion, by ministers plenipotentiary Mihail N. Burghiele and Ion N. Papiniu. “The Bucharest Peace” will be strongly opposed by the entire Romanian people; as a matter of fact it was not sanctioned by the King, in spite of all pressures and promises of the Central Powers.

² Nicolae Titulescu leaves Romania for Paris, where he would take action in favour of the national cause, being elected on the National Council for the Unity of the Romanians (created on September 20/October 3, 1918).

period of our retreat, followed by the victories of Marashti¹ and Marasheshti², and then by our being abandoned by the Old Russia: the period of the Armistice³ and of separate peace.

M. Victor Antonesco, whom I succeeded in the Ministry of Finance, became Minister in Paris, and Dr. Angelesco Minister in Washington.

John I.C. Bratiano, Take Jonesco, Vintila Bratiano, Costinesco⁴, Mortun⁵, Delavrancea⁶, Marzesco⁷, Phérékyde⁸, Greceano⁹, Michel Cantacuzène, Duca – in short, short, all those who lived through the last moments of our national war, have one after the other taken the road to eternal and well-deserved rest on which Nicolae Filipesco preceded them.

As soon as the Peace Treaties were signed in Paris, I tried to cultivate the friendship of Germany because, our national unity being an accomplished fact, we had no direct grievance against Germany.

Indirectly, the permanent support given by Germany to revisionist Hungary has somewhat mitigated our desire for friendship.

However, I did not have sufficient opportunity for collaboration with the German representatives.

It was only when Germany became a Member of the League of Nations¹⁰ in 1926, and when Romania was elected a member of the Council of the League of Nations in the same year, it was only when we could meet in that League of Nations which is the butt of so many criticisms nowadays, that we had the possibility of collaborating with Germany.

I took advantage of it and rapidly became a friend of Stresemann.

Far be it from me to meddle in Germany's internal politics. It will be the surest means of missing my goal.

With Stresemann I had a very regular and very close collaboration. We met at least four times a year – for a week whenever the Council of the League of Nations met and for about a month at the time of the Assembly, not to mention the Hague Conference¹¹ in August 1929.

I can say that the impression I have kept of the very friendly collaboration I had with Stresemann from 1926 until the time of his death in 1929 is that, without publicly

¹ The Battle of Mărăști (July 24–August 1, 1917). The Romanian 2nd Army (commanded by general Alexandru Averescu), together with the Russian 4th Army, gained a brilliant tactical success, which could not be strategically exploited due to the general situation on the eastern front.

² The Battle of Mărășești (August 6–19, 1917) was the greatest battle on the Romanian front in WWI. The Romanian Army (under the command of general Constantin Cristescu and, then, under General Eremia Grigorescu) scored one of its most brilliant victories.

³ On December 9, 1917, the truce between Romania and the Central Powers was concluded, at Focșani, following the defection of the Russian Army and the Brest-Litovsk Russian-German Armistice (December 5, 1917). On March 5, 1918, a protocol extending the Armistice with the Central Powers, is signed in Focșani.

⁴ Emil Costinescu.

⁵ Vasile G. Morțun.

⁶ Barbu Ștefănescu-Delavrancea.

⁷ George G. Mârzesco.

⁸ Mihail Pherekyde.

⁹ Dimitrie A. Grecianu.

¹⁰ On September 8, 1926, Germany becomes a member of the League of Nations.

¹¹ The Hague hosted the first round of the International Conference on War Reparations between August 6 and 31, 1929.

declaring it, Stresemann had for his country, in the field of foreign policy, a tremendous desire for glory and expansion.

My relations with him were so cordial that the Doctor who accompanied him on all his travels – Stresemann was a sick man – allowed me to see him as often as I desired. He used to say: “You are a tonic for Stresemann. I don’t know how you manage it, but whenever you leave him I find him in a very good humour.”

What did I do? The question should rather be what did I not do.

I talked German to him and he answered me in French so that we could correct each other’s mistakes of language.

I once said to him: “M. Stresemann, you never pronounce the word ‘revision’, but I know quite well that you are thinking of it. I shall tell you exactly how you are planning your foreign policy with a view to the expansion of Germany, even though you remain silent on the subject.” And I told him what I thought the plan to be, putting myself, of course, in the position of a German.

Stresemann laughed and answered: “Sie sind der Teufel” (“You are the Devil”), and since then he always called me “Devil”.

Take Ionescu was called Beelzebub by his political opponents, but this title was given to me by my friends.

I shall never forget two things which Stresemann did for Romania:

Firstly, Sir Austen Chamberlain’s famous report¹, which actually constitutes the decision in the optants’ case and which adopts the Romanian thesis, was based on a report of jurists, supposed to be anonymous. Minister Gaus², a German jurist, was amongst those who were in favour of Romania.

It is therefore clear that “for political reasons” Stresemann did not prevent the German jurist from stating his real opinion which was favourable to Romania.

Of course, in the Council, when the case was dealt with on political grounds, Stresemann upheld Hungary, but at the same time with what tact in regard to Romania!

Secondly, Stresemann invited me to speak³ in the German Parliament in May 1929. All deputies and members of the Government were present. I cannot forget the warm welcome which Berlin extended to me at the time, nor the unanimity of praise in the Press.

It was a great honour to be invited to the Reichstag in those circumstances.

As a matter of fact very few foreigners have ever had that honour: M. De Peyerimhoff of the Comité des Forges⁴, Lord Cecil⁵, H.G. Wells, Count Apponyi, President Benes – who, however, did not go to Berlin at the last minute – and myself.

It is a curious thing that the first foreign Parliament in which I spoke was the German Parliament and the second the British.

After Stresemann’s death, I had cordial relations with his successors.

And since Chancellor Hitler⁶ came into power my policy has not changed; better still, it has taken a concrete form.

¹ Submitted to the League of Nations Council on September 19, 1927.

² Friedrich Gaus.

³ Nicolae Titulescu delivered on the occasion, on May 6, 1929, his lecture on “Dynamics of Peace”.

⁴ Committee of French Steelmakers.

⁵ Edgar Algernon Robert Cecil of Chelwood.

⁶ On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of the Reich.

In 1935, I asked our Minister in Berlin to offer Germany a Pact of Mutual Assistance provided she concluded similar pacts with our allies.¹

Why did I act in this manner? Because I wanted to place the U.S.S.R. and Germany on an equal footing.

Germany refused.

Indeed, my action was in complete conformity with the doctrine of Louis Barthou: he wanted an alliance both with Russia and Germany. And if, on May 2nd, 1935, M. Laval signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. only, this was due to the fact that Germany refused to become the ally of the U.S.S.R.

While I was in Paris in 1936, at the time of the visit of His Majesty the King², I asked our minister in Berlin, in view of the possible conclusion of a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., to offer Germany a similar pact without insisting further on the condition that Germany should become the ally of Romania's allies.

In his report on his mission, our Minister in Berlin stated amongst other things:

Our Minister has had a conversation of nearly two hours duration with Baron von Neurath³, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich and my former colleague at the time when he was German Ambassador in London. M. Comnène repeated the Romanian Government's wish, and more particularly my wish, to have the best possible relations with the Reich, and recalled the proofs of interest and sympathy which Romania never ceased to give to Germany on all possible occasions.

Our Minister in Berlin then raised the question which was chiefly preoccupying the German Government: our relations with the Soviets, and repeated the well-known explanations which have already been given so many times.

In conformity with my instructions, M. Comnène added that a Russo-German war would endanger the very existence of States having a common frontier with these two countries, a fact which induced in all those States – and more particularly in us – a most ardent desire to contribute to the utmost of their capacity to avoiding such a calamity.

Our Minister in Berlin therefore renewed the oft-repeated declaration that Romania would be very happy to be able to help in any way to improve relations between the Reich and her neighbours.

With regard to the development of our relations with the Soviets, M. Comnène states emphatically that, up to date, no change had taken place, but that if ever Romania thought it necessary to conclude a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., Germany should take note of the two following facts:

- a) That such a Pact is not directed against her;
- b) That Romania is ready to sign a similar Pact with the Reich.

Our Berlin Minister informed me that M. von Neurath thanked him warmly for all the attentions and all the tokens of friendly feelings of the Royal Government of Romania, and more particularly mine, in regard to his country and to himself.

So far as the possibility of our concluding an agreement with the Soviets was concerned, although personally M. von Neurath understood that Romania might, when

¹ On July 27, 1935, Nicolae Titulescu instructs Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, Romania's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Berlin, to advance at Auswärtiges Amt the proposal concerning the conclusion of a Romanian-German Pact of Mutual Assistance.

² Late January–early February 1936.

³ Konstantin von Neurath.

the time came, find herself obliged to conclude such a Pact, he did not try to hide his view that it would create a very painful impression on German public opinion.

However, since it was, for the present at least, hostile to new agreements which might bind it for the future, the German Government was not prepared to conclude a Pact of Mutual Assistance either with Romania or with any other country.

Germany is convinced that, in the present international situation, her interests are better safeguarded by her present policy of isolation than by the conclusion of new agreements.

If, however, at any time, Germany is of opinion that, in her own interest, she should come out of her isolation, she will not fail to remember our proposals and our good offices.

*

And now, what was the policy of Romania with regard to the U.S.S.R. and Germany while I was Minister for Foreign Affairs?

It was a simple one:

In case the territory of Romania should be attacked, I wanted a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R. within the framework of the League of Nations. Such a Pact was not to be directed against a particular country, but against any European aggressor. This deprived the Convention of any anti-German character from the outset.

I wanted the U.S.S.R. Government to recognise such a Pact of Mutual Assistance that, according to the obligations assumed under the Pact, Soviet troops should never cross the Dniester without a formal request from the Royal Romanian Government to this effect, and that, similarly, the Royal Romanian Government should recognise that Romanian troops would never cross the Dniester to enter the U.S.S.R. territory without a formal request to this effect from the Government of that country.

Finally, I wanted the Pact of Assistance to provide that, on the request of the Royal Romanian Government, Soviet troops would immediately withdraw from Romanian territory and pass to the east of the Dniester, and that similarly, on the request of the U.S.S.R. Government, Romanian troops should immediately withdraw from the territory of the U.S.S.R. and pass to the west of the Dniester.

Romania would have obtained such a Pact of Mutual Assistance if I had not ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 29th, 1936.

However, I wanted still more.

I wanted a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Germany within the framework of the League of Nations, not directed against a particular country but against any European aggressor whatsoever, which, from the very outset, deprived the Convention of any anti-Russian character.

In such a Pact of Assistance I wanted the German Government to recognise that German troops should never cross the present frontiers of Romania without a formal request of the Royal Government of Romania to this effect, and that, similarly, the Royal Government of Romania should recognise that Romanian troops should never cross the frontiers of Germany without a formal request of the German Government.

Finally, I wanted a Pact of Mutual Assistance with Germany which would expressly provide that German troops should immediately withdraw outside the present

frontiers of Romania on the request of the Romanian Government, and that, similarly, Romanian troops should withdraw outside the present frontiers of Germany on the latter's request.

Berlin refused such a Pact.

This does not mean that we should not conclude Pacts of Mutual Assistance with other countries, without which we would remain isolated and would be treated as an object and not a subject in the future war.

But why does Berlin refuse?

Because the German Government's idea of security is different from that which the Romanian Government entertained at the time I was Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin believes that security can only be ensured by bi-lateral pacts of non-aggression, independent of each other.

However, must I be considered as an enemy of Germany because of such a divergence of ideas?

I believe that I am one of those Romanians who, if he signed anything in Berlin, would not be suspected in Paris, Prague or Moscow, because I am a champion of collective security and indivisible peace.

Moreover, I consider that to sign with anybody a Treaty violating the principles of collective security and indivisible peace would mean the end of Romania.

In any case, it is not fair that I should pass for an enemy of Germany because my conception of security is different from hers.

What would be fair would be to appreciate on its real merits the sympathy which is evinced by the placing of Germany on a footing of complete equality with France, Great Britain, Italy and the U.S.S.R.

FRANCE

In speaking of the bonds between France and Romania, it is impossible not to realise that something more than mere politics is under consideration.

All Romanians carry France in their hearts¹. Working with Frenchmen, we feel as though we were working with ourselves. Everything affecting France touches Romania to such an extent that her soul vibrates to all things French. The glory of France forms part of our national glory.

Yet, I am the first person to affirm that Romanians do not like to have it said that they copy France.

Of their own accord, Romanians understand their own political interests in a manner so similar to the French that they are afraid their action may be not the parallel action desired by all, but dependent action, which they reject as incompatible with their sense of national dignity.

This identity of interests and ideas determines the identity of action between Romania and France.

Our connection with French life is not very intimate, but we are always by the side of France, because the Romanian national life of conduct is parallel to the French.

Romania is the result of the principle of nationality for which France has fought so hard.

Her ideal has been inspired by the great French Revolution².

Nobody knows better than I that everyday life side-by-side with France is not so easy; but I declare that if I had to die, in the interests of Romania, with a country standing by me, I would like that country to be France.

Passing, however, from the psychological to the legal and political spheres, it is terrifying to discover the enormous gulf which lies between them.

In the case of the political sphere, properly so called, that is to say, of practice not dictated by treaties, the distance is less great.

What are our relations with France? What should they be? What might they have become?

It is interesting to reply to these questions.

But, first of all, it is of interest to see what are the bonds between France and our allies, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland.

It is true that we cannot be involved in a war by the side of France, as an indifferent third party, because of our obligations to Czechoslovakia and Poland, and because of the alliance obligations which these States have, in their turn, with France.

Romanian interest and dignity require that our action by the side of France should be purely Romanian, and not by way of consequence; that it should be action based on a

¹ All along his political and diplomatic career, Nicolae Titulescu delivered memorable speeches, pregnantly expressing the Romanian people's feelings for the French people (June 20, 1934; June 21, 1934; May 8, 1935; May 9, 1935). All these feelings, highly nuanced, have been expressed also in articles, interviews, statements.

² The French Bourgeois Revolution, broken out on July 14, 1789, with the taking of the Bastille, eliminated feudal order and absolutism, imposing in 1792 the proclamation of the Republic.

Treaty signed direct with France, and not such action as might result from the superimposition of a foreign Treaty on a Romanian Treaty.

Until the Treaty of Locarno¹, the bonds between France, on the one hand, and Poland and Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, were rather weak.

Indeed, by the Treaty of February 19th, 1921, signed between France and Poland, the only obligations undertaken by the signatories were the following:

- a) Consultation between France and Poland on questions of foreign policy;
- b) Concerted action and mutual help with a view to economic reconstruction;

- c) If one of the signatory States were attacked without provocation, the two Governments would consult one another as to the defence of their territory and the safeguarding of their legitimate interests;

- d) *Consultation between the French and Polish Governments prior to the conclusion of any new agreements affecting their policy in Central and Eastern Europe.*

As far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, the following obligations were assumed, in addition to those already mentioned in the Franco-Polish Treaty, by the Treaty signed on January 25th, 1924, between France and Czechoslovakia:

- a) Consultation between France and Czechoslovakia as to the steps to be taken in case of threat to the principles of political order contained in Article 88 of the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of September 10th, 1919, as well in the Geneva Protocols of October 4th, 1922, of which they are both signatories;

- b) Special note to be taken of the declarations made by the Conference of Ambassadors on February 3rd, 1920, and April 1st, 1921, according to which the policy of the High Contracting Parties will continue to develop, as well as of the Declaration made in November 10th, 1921, by the Hungarian Government to the diplomatic representatives. Undertaking to consult in case the interests of the two High Contracting Parties were endangered through the non-observance of the principles contained in these various declarations;

- c) A common attitude to be adopted by both countries with regard to any possible attempt at a restoration of the Hohenzollern dynasty¹ in Germany², and undertaking to consult on the measures to be taken in such a contingency;

¹ Over October 5–16, 1925, Switzerland hosted the proceedings of the Locarno Conference. The Locarno Agreements, namely a Final Act and a series of annexes, were initialled on October 16, 1925, these documents seeking to substitute the Versailles system with freely consented understandings on the recognition of the territorial *status quo* in Western Europe as a basis of collective security in Europe. Thus, the Locarno Agreements were composed of: The Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, called also the Rhenish Guarantees Pact, under which the signatories guaranteed the inviolability of the frontiers between France and Belgium, on the one hand, and Germany on the other. Subsequently, the Final Act contained: the Arbitration Conventions between Germany and Belgium, between Germany and France; the Arbitration Treaties between Germany and Poland, between Germany and Czechoslovakia; the Treaties of Guarantees between France and Poland, between France and Czechoslovakia. The Locarno system of agreements issued in the division of Europe into countries with guaranteed and unguaranteed frontiers, because Germany, supported by Great Britain, refused to grant Czechoslovakia and Poland the same guarantees given to its western neighbours, France and Belgium, signing with them only arbitration treaties. The Locarno Agreements made it possible for Germany to invade Poland and Czechoslovakia. On December 1, 1925, the Locarno Agreements were signed in London. Romania welcomed the Locarno Agreements, but did not fail to emphasize their deficiencies.

d) Arbitration of the Permanent Court of International Justice in case of disputes arising in the future between France and Czechoslovakia, if such disputes were not settled by amicable agreement through the diplomatic channels;

e) Undertaking to communicate to each other any agreements, affecting their policy in Central Europe, which they may have previously concluded, *and to consult before making any new agreements.*

On October 16th, 1925, the Franco-Polish and Franco-Czechoslovak Treaties were completed by pacts of real mutual assistance, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Germany having assumed obligations of non-aggression guaranteed by France.

These Treaties contain, *inter alia*, the following provisions:

“In case Poland (or Czechoslovakia, as the case may be) or France happen to suffer through failure to comply with the international undertakings signed this day between them and Germany, and with a view to maintaining general peace, France and, by reciprocity, Poland, acting in conformity with Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, undertake to come immediately to each other’s help, if such failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms.

Should the Council of the League of Nations, pronouncing on a question submitted to it according to the said undertakings, not succeed in having its report accepted by all its Members, with the exception of the representatives of the Parties to the dispute, and should Poland (or Czechoslovakia, as the case may be), or France be attacked without provocation, France or, by reciprocity, Poland (or Czechoslovakia), acting in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, would immediately lend her help and assistance.”

Thus, whether the Council of the League of Nations be unanimous or not, there is an obligation of immediate assistance in case Germany should attack Czechoslovakia and Poland, or France.

When such are the relations between our allies, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and France, what are Romania’s relations with France?

They are comprised in the Treaty³ of June 10th, 1926 (negotiated by John G. Duca, and signed by John Mitilineu).

This Treaty is a mere Pact of Non-Aggression, similar to that signed by Yugoslavia and France on November 11th, 1927.

“Article 1. – France and Romania mutually undertake not to proceed to any attack or invasion, and not, under any circumstances whatsoever, to have recourse to war.

The foregoing provision does not, however, apply in the following cases (here are quoted various provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations):

¹ Hohenzollern. German princely family, which took its name from a Swabian castle in the neighbourhood of Sigmaringen. In 1575, the Swabian line splits into two branches: Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.

² On November 9, 1918, Wilhelm II, Germany’s Emperor, belonging to the Hohenzollern dynasty, abdicated and the German Republic was proclaimed.

³ Ratified by Romania on September 30, 1926, and by France on September 11, 1926. It came into force on November 8, 1926.

a) the exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, the right to oppose any violation of the undertaking contained in paragraph 1 of the present article;

b) an action undertaken in conformity with Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

c) an action undertaken in virtue of a decision of the Assembly or Council of the League of Nations, or in application of Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided that, in the latter case, this action be directed against a State which has been the first to attack.

Article 2. – deals with the settlement of any question which might divide France and Romania, either by way of arbitration or conciliation.

Article 3. – The Government of the French Republic and the Royal Government of Romania undertake to examine together, *subject to any resolutions which may be adopted by the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations, any questions liable to endanger the external security of France or Romania, or to imperil the order established by Treaties to which both countries are Parties.*

Article 4. – If, in spite of the sincerely pacific intentions of the French and Romanian Governments, France and Romania found themselves attacked without provocation, the two Governments would consult together without delay as to their respective action within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, with a view to safeguarding their own legitimate national interests and maintaining the order established by the treaties to which both countries are Parties.”

What? Germany attacks Czechoslovakia or Poland: France immediately takes up arms. Romania is attacked by Hungary, Bulgaria or the U.S.S.R.: France and Romania limit themselves to studying the question together, with a view to concerted action, *and even this subject to possible resolutions in Geneva?*

But to continue with this curious document:

“Article 5. – The High Contracting Parties agree to consult together in the event of any modification or attempt at modification of the political status of European countries and, *subject to any resolutions which might be adopted in such a case by the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations*, to come to an agreement as to the attitude to be maintained by each of them in such a contingency.

Article 6. – The High Contracting Parties declare that nothing in the present Treaty shall be deemed to be contrary to the provisions of any Treaties at present in force which may have been signed by France or Romania concerning their European policy.

They undertake to exchange views with regard to questions relating to European policy in order to co-ordinate their pacific efforts, and, *to this end, to inform each other of any Treaties or Agreements which they may conclude on this subject with third Powers*, the aims of which would always be in conformity with the maintenance of peace.

Article 7. – *Nothing in the present Treaty shall be interpreted or carried out in such a way as to imperil the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations.*”

Article 8 deals with the registration of the Treaty with the League of Nations.

Having read these texts, I cannot refrain from making certain rather bitter reflections.

The problem of the revision of frontiers being raised, France and Romania, instead of saying categorically “No”, *will consult together as to the attitude to be adopted, and even that, subject to any decisions which may be taken at Geneva.*

Fortunately I obtained from M. Paul-Boncour, former Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Note, dated June 7th, 1933, by which France undertook not to authorise the invitation to discuss revision except in conformity with Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, that is to say, only through the Assembly and not under the dictates of a directorate. By this Note, France undertook once again not to accept any invitation to revision covered by Article 19 without unanimous consent, including the votes of the Parties concerned.

Furthermore, the two countries undertook to communicate to each other any Treaties which might be concluded with third parties.

What? France and Romania communicate to each other only accomplished facts and not the Treaties which they intend to conclude with regard to Central and Eastern Europe?

Indeed, even in the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921 and the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of 1924 – that is to say, even when the proper Pacts of mutual assistance were not binding upon France, Poland and Czechoslovakia – France had undertaken to consult these two states *before concluding any new agreements susceptible of having repercussions on their policy in Central and Eastern Europe.*

No such obligation exists with regard to Romania: Treaties are communicated only after they have been signed.

This difference of treatment explains the manner in which we were dealt with by France with regard to the 1932 Pact of Non-Aggression.

Finally, the Franco-Romanian Treaty stipulates that none of its provisions shall be interpreted or carried out in such a way as to jeopardise the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In other words, if in the Covenant of the League of Nations, we read “Romania and France” for “the High Contracting Parties”, the result is an exact replica of the Franco-Romanian Treaty.

I know no diplomatic instrument more devoid of substance than the Franco-Romanian Treaty signed on June 10th, 1926.

On the basis of this Treaty, France has approximately the same obligations towards Romania as she has vis-à-vis Nicaragua or Guatemala in virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Romanian Government has never consulted me on the subject of this Pact.

What is more, in order to conclude this Treaty, France asked us to make of formal declaration of non-aggression against the U.S.S.R., based on the existing *status quo*, although John I.C. Bratiano had already, on May 17th, 1922, at the fifth meeting of the

First Commission of the Genoa Conference, made authorised declarations to the same effect.

In 1927, when I became Minister for Foreign Affairs, I was unable to ask for the modification of this Treaty, because it had been in force for scarcely a year and its duration was for ten years.

In 1932, however, when I once more became Foreign Minister, I asked that the Franco-Romanian Treaty should be changed so as to render it of real utility.

With this end in view, I engaged in conversations with the French Government.

In 1935, notice was given with a view to prolonging the existing Treaty, as we were already negotiating a new Treaty.

And since France, when justice is at stake, cannot remain passive or incomprehensible, these negotiations finally convinced her of the necessity for a Treaty of alliance with Romania.

In fact, France offered us a Treaty of mutual assistance similar to that which binds her to Czechoslovakia and to Poland. But the Romanian Government rejected the offer.

Let us sum up the facts which preceded this offer on the part of France, and examine the consequences for Romania of her refusal.

And in doing so, let us take into account the fact that practically everybody in Romania wants to have neutrality, and forget that we are the allies of Poland and Czechoslovakia who are themselves the allies of France.

Within the country, I made use of the following arguments:

If Germany, on the one hand, and France and her allies on the other hand, are at war, it would be absurd to believe for a moment that Romania would not also be involved.

In reality, we would be fighting on behalf of France without getting anything from her in exchange, because we would have been involved in the war by events and not by an anticipated and well-considered obligation.

In fact, in a new Peace Conference, France would be able to sign the peace treaties even if the present frontiers of Romania had been violated.

In this hypothesis, *volens nolens*, we will be the allies of France, but France will not be our ally.

This is absurd.

I would not like any great writer to be able to repeat in the future what Michelet¹ said of Romania: "Oh, you, Romania, who have known suffering without knowing glory!"

Beyond the frontiers, I reasoned with France to divide Central European States into two categories: those for the sake of whom she would fight – Poland and Czechoslovakia – and those whom she is content to advise; those for whom she will shed her blood and those for whom she will give no more than words.

If we are not all on a footing of equality with regard to France, there will be several currents within the Little Entente.

The opponents of France will not fail to seize the opportunity of her having no agreements with some States in order to influence those States.

¹ Jules Michelet.

I therefore proposed a single Pact of alliance between France and the Little Entente against any aggressor whatsoever.

On June 6th, 1936, at the meeting of the three Heads of the States of the Little Entente, I explained to them for what reasons there would be a single Pact between France and the Little Entente.

They agreed on this point and asked me, in my capacity of representative of the Little Entente on the Council of the League of Nations, which was to meet at the end of the same month, to raise with the French Government in Geneva the question of a single Pact between France and the Little Entente.

On June 27th, 1936, during a political lunch given by M. Yvon Delbos – a lunch of the Geneva type, where one talks more than one eats, and which was attended by M. Tewfik Rüstü Aras, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Ponsot¹, French Ambassador in Ankara, M. Politis, Greek Minister in Paris, M. Kunzl Jijersdsky², Czechoslovak Minister in Berne, M. Pouritch³, Yugoslav Minister in Paris, the French Minister Massigli⁴ and myself – I explained the reasons in favour of a single Pact between France and the Little Entente.

M. Delbos, who had only just taken up his ministerial office, replied that he took note of my statement and would study it carefully.

Indeed, with his characteristic tenacity, he has made great efforts to carry out the idea.

On July 1st, 1936, I had an interview with M. Léon Blum, then Prime Minister, to whom I explained the same idea.

He understood full well the necessity of a single Pact which would bind the Little Entente to France, and he promised me all the help in his power for the carrying out of this scheme.

On July 14th, 1936, President Tataresco, and with him MM. Inculetz, and Victor Antonesco, confirmed once more – and this time in writing – the full powers given to me for the conclusion of a single Treaty of alliance between France and the Little Entente.

Indeed, point 2 of the programme drawn up on July 14th, 1936, and which I have already quoted, says: “A single Pact of alliance between France and the Little Entente against any aggressor whatsoever.”

I feel it necessary to repeat this because I am so nonplussed by what happened.

I therefore repeat that these full powers did not prevent M. Victor Antonesco from declaring a few months later, on April 2nd, 1937, to M. Stanislas de la Rochefoucauld: “Now we have to widen the basis of the Little Entente and conclude a general Pact of mutual assistance. This is a problem which needs much thought.”

And M. Antonesco added: “*At present we only have a Treaty of friendship with France. The strengthening of our diplomatic bonds is also a problem for the future.*”

What? On July 14th 1936, the single Pact between France and the Little Entente was such an immediate problem for M. Victor Antonesco that he gave me full powers to

¹ Henri Ponsot.

² Rodolphe Kunzl-Jijerski.

³ Bojidar Purić.

⁴ René Massigli.

conclude it, and on April 2nd, 1937, an alliance with France becomes, for the same M. Victor Antonescu, a problem for the future, needing much thought¹.

Let us set aside all contradictions, however important they may be, and let us return to my political account.

In view of the fact that Paris made no reply to my proposal for a Pact of alliance, and being already ill at the time, I telephoned to Paris to ask the French Government to be good enough to send to Cap Martin a Minister who would be able to negotiate the question with me.

Minister Pierre Cot was entrusted with this mission. He arrived at Cap Martin on August 14th, 1936.

After the explanation which I gave him, M. Cot undertook to convince the French Government of the necessity of transforming the inefficient Franco-Romanian Pact into a real Pact of assistance according to which articles 16, 17 and 15, paragraph 7 of the Covenant would become effective for the parties.

As a consequence of such a Pact of assistance, M. Cot foresaw the possibility of a Franco-Romanian air pact.

On his return to Paris, M. Cot wrote to me that the plans I had outlined to him at Cap Martin greatly interested MM. Blum and Delbos who would work with the same end in view.

On August 29th 1936, I ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, but the idea I had launched was well on its way.

From now on, my statement relates to a period during which I was no longer Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, my information is so complete that I declare in all sincerity that it is impossible to deny any of the facts I shall state concerning Romania.

I do not think I am mistaken in saying that, in Paris, it was Yugoslavia who made the most strenuous efforts to obtain precise agreements to implement the Pact which bound her to France and which is similar to ours.

I hasten to add that, today, Yugoslavia denies ever having taken such an initiative in Paris.

It is, however, characteristic that, in Paris, Yugoslavia only asked for an improvement of the terms of her Pact with France, and not for a single Pact between France and the Little Entente. I had a thought for Romania and her allies; others only thought of their own countries.

The consequence was that France proposed to the States of the Little Entente the conclusion of the following agreement: draw up between yourselves a Pact of assistance against any aggressor whatsoever and, in this case, if a third party violates the Pact against any of you, France will rise in arms against the aggressor and by the side of the victim.

At last, Romania too had equality with Czechoslovakia and Poland.

As I have already said, at the time of the Treaty of Locarno, these two States concluded Treaties with Germany, according to which Germany would never use force

¹ Belgrade hosted over April 1–2, 1937, the session of the Permanent Council of the Little Entente (V. Antonescu, K. Krofta, M. Stojadinović). In the discussions over the conclusion of the Treaty of Assistance between the Little Entente and France, supported by Czechoslovakia (she even submitted a relevant draft to the French Government on November 21, 1936), Romania agreed of the idea of having a bilateral pact signed with France, while Yugoslavia was categorically against. Both V. Antonescu and M. Stojadinović asked Czechoslovakia to settle her relations with Germany as a prerequisite of negotiations with France.

against them. France – I have quoted the texts – guaranteed that, if such Treaties were violated by Germany, she would immediately provide the help and assistance of her armies, whether the Geneva Council were unanimous or not.

Is it realised what would have been the significance for Romania of the military assistance of France against Hungary, Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R.?

Do not let us play with words: “*I accept if Yugoslavia accepts*” or “*I cannot sign without Yugoslavia*” are formulae of refusal.

The Romanian Government should have studied its own interests, and answered by a categorical *Yes*, leaving to others the responsibility for the non-realisation of the alliance.

One hears much about independent policy and national dignity, but nowadays, on the international stage, we hide behind others.

If the Royal Government of Romania had carried out the open policy which I advocated, and for which M. Tataresco’s government had given me full powers on July 14th 1936, it would have been said: “The Single Pact of Alliance between France and the Little Entente has failed because of Yugoslavia,” and not, as is now said: because of Yugoslavia and Romania.

If Romania had answered *in good time* by a *categorical Yes*, the door to a bilateral Franco-Romanian Agreement – and such an Agreement is very difficult to obtain today – might, perhaps, have been opened.

Not only has Romania not answered a *categorical Yes*, and not only has she hidden behind Yugoslavia, but, at the time when a single Pact of alliance was discussed with France, Yugoslavia was authorised to conclude with Italy the Treaty of Friendship of March 25th 1937, which renders still more difficult the realisation of a single Pact of alliance between France and the Little Entente.

In the present state of affairs, there is a triple current within the Little Entente. The first is represented by Czechoslovakia, who is closely bound to France; the second by Romania, who is closely bound to Poland; and the third by Yugoslavia, who is closely bound to Italy.

Is this the Little Entente I bequeathed to my successors?

According to the guiding principles which I had laid down for it, and by means of the consent each State had to obtain from the other two in order to conclude any political Agreement, it was intended, at the outset, to become an important political unit.

The way in which the authorisations stipulated by the Pact of the Organisation of the Little Entente on February 16th, 1933, are given, instead of helping us towards the creation of this important political unit, leads us rather to a divorce by mutual consent.

But let us return to our examination of the facts:

France thus said to the States of the Little Entente: Unite by means of Pacts of mutual assistance *erga omnes*, and, in such a case, France will give you her guarantee that she will help the State which is victim of aggression, with all the strength of her arms.

In the autumn of 1936, there was talk of a single Pact with the Little Entente, but, in order to avoid giving Germany a pretext for refusing the negotiations then offered by London and Paris, it became necessary to await the result of the neo-Locarno negotiations.

Then, it was Czechoslovakia who made the most careful study of the question, and opened direct negotiations with Romania and Yugoslavia.

Czechoslovakia declared, in Bucharest and in Belgrade: as a condition of our alliance with France, there must be an Agreement between the Little Entente States, *erga omnes*; France will give an undertaking either before or at the same time as the three States.

It was then that France made a further step forward, and said: *We are ready to carry on the two negotiations at the same time*, that is to say, on the one hand, negotiations between the Little Entente States, and, on the other hand, the Pact of assistance between France and the three States of the Little Entente. Yugoslavia refused, and her example was followed by Romania.

Yugoslavia invoked, as a pretext for such an action, that this Agreement might harm her relations with Germany.

Then France proposed to conclude such an Agreement as an anticipation of part of the Agreement for Central Europe, provided for in the Laval-Mussolini¹ Protocol of 1935.

Czechoslovakia resumed negotiations with Yugoslavia. All in vain. Yugoslavia refused. Romania hid behind Yugoslavia, and today, Yugoslavia is contesting the initiative taken.

Romania has had the opportunity of becoming the ally of France, the two countries defending each other *erga omnes*.

She has not availed herself of this opportunity. It is impossible to say if it will ever present itself again in the future.

I have tried to show that, since 1921, the Pact of the Little Entente was extremely unfavourable to Romania: Romania has to fight Germany because of Hungary and in favour of Czechoslovakia; Romania has to fight Italy because of Hungary and in favour of Yugoslavia; but Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have never undertaken to fight the U.S.S.R. in favour of Romania.

To these initial lacks of equilibrium of 1921 should be added those which arose from the authorisations given in 1936 and 1937 to Yugoslavia, and which placed that country in a special position with regard to Italy and Bulgaria.

The single Pact of alliance with France was the cement poured into the cracks made in 1921 and 1937, in order to reinforce the structure of the Little Entente.

Some people think that the Pact of Assistance with France would lead us into a war with Germany. This is a mistake. Everybody wants peace – in other words, neutrality in the event of a possible conflict.

I want Peace, too. But neutrality cannot be achieved by the mere words: I want to remain neutral. It results from Pacts of assistance concluded with a view to possible aggression.

In order to remain neutral, it is first of all necessary to be in agreement with all neighbouring countries; but it is also imperative to possess the necessary weapons in

¹ On January 7, 1937, as a follow-up of the Rome Laval-Mussolini negotiations, Agreements between France and Italy were concluded: a) a Treaty on the settlement of French-Italian interests in Africa; b) a Protocol by which, in her attempt to strengthen her influence in the Danube Basin, France, actually, gave free scope to Italy in Ethiopia; c) French-Italian statement by which the two governments pledged to cooperate in a spirit of mutual understanding “for the safeguarding of peace”.

order to command the respect of one's neighbours, in case the latter should retract their given word; and, if a State has not itself got an army sufficiently large to fight its neighbours, it must inevitably become the ally of all those who have the same interests.

How curiously short-sighted some people are! We always speak of neutrality, of the necessity of not displeasing Germany, etc., and, at the same time, we are bound to Czechoslovakia and Poland by alliances which may, at any time, involve us in a war with Germany and the U.S.S.R.

We have chosen the methods of security based on the Pacts of assistance, and we have stopped half-way.

Clever propaganda has raised the spectre of terror before our eyes, and we proceed no further on the path we were already following. Thus, we refuse to close the circle we had started, thereby running the risk of war, without the advantage of being defended, in all hypotheses, in case of war.

Who will defend Romania against aggression by Hungary? A weakened Little Entente.

Who will defend Romania against aggression by Bulgaria? A weakened Balkan Entente.

Who will defend Romania against aggression by the U.S.S.R.? Poland! I should have preferred Poland, the Little Entente and France.

Who will defend Romania against aggression by Germany? Nobody.

And since, in case of war, Romania might become the scene of operations, since our territory might be occupied by the enemy under conditions still worse than those of 1916–1918, what Great Powers, at the future Peace Conference, will refuse to sign any new Peace Treaties as long as Romania has not recovered her former frontiers?

In my plan, there are two: France and the U.S.S.R.

In the plan opposed to mine, there are none.

Yes, by a single stroke of the pen, the 1918 Treaty of Bucharest has been cancelled, but this was possible because we were the ally of the Powers which decided the conditions of Peace.

Today, after having refused the alliance with France and the alliance with the U.S.S.R., we may be involved in a war by force of circumstances, and not through our own mature decision. The *status quo ante* will be merely a complaint by Romania, and not, as hitherto, the necessary condition laid down by powerful countries.

ITALY

How often it has not been said that it was on my account that Romania had not the friendly relations with Italy she should have? I know no legend which is more unjust.

From the time when I finished my studies, until 1934, I spent nearly all my holidays in Italy.

A former French Prime Minister used to reproach me with the fact that I always went to Italy to spend my holidays: “Why do you always go to San Remo¹ or the Lido²; have we not sea and sun in France?”

I know what will be said in reply to this: this is love for picturesque Italy. It is not the kind of love that the Duce³ expects from Italy’s friends. That may be so. But a man who, over a quarter of a century, has never been happier than in Italy is already psychologically disposed towards political friendship.

It is more particularly in the political sphere that I feel at liberty to say how much I appreciate Italy and how great has been my desire for a close collaboration with her.

In 1927, I became Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of John I.C. Bratiano.

At the time, the first official visit of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania was always to Paris. I thought: I want my first official visit to be to Rome⁴ and from there I shall go to Paris. I suffered a good deal afterwards for this special gesture of courtesy towards Italy.

In Rome, I had a very warm reception. The Duce’s exceptional qualities made a deep impression on me and, since then, I have kept for him an admiration and feelings which have remained unchanged⁵ through the most critical moments, but which I am now prevented from expressing.

When I arrived in Paris⁶ from Rome, I found a much colder atmosphere. Several newspapers attacked me for my visit to Rome. Even “Le Temps”¹ criticised my favourable disposition towards Italy.

¹ Italian city in Liguria (NW Italy), on both sides of the Genoa Gulf.

² Fashionable resort in Italy on a long narrow island (12 km), separating the lagoon of Venice from the Adriatic.

³ *Il Duce* (It.) – “Leader”. Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini.

⁴ In his capacity of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Titulescu paid a visit to Italy in the January 24–February 1, 1928 interval. He had four interviews (January 24, 25, 26, and 30) with Benito Mussolini and other five interviews (January 24, 26, 27, 28 and 30) with Dino Grandi. During his visit, Nicolae Titulescu attended the inauguration of the building site of the Romanian Academic Institute in Valle Giulia in the neighbourhood of Rome. On January 30, 1928, the Romanian Foreign Minister was received in private audience by Pope Pius XI at the Holy See.

⁵ Nicolae Titulescu’s words are a mere matter of politeness, without real foundation, as the Romanian-Italian relations witnessed, in the 1933–1936 years, a continual worsening. The creation of the Little Entente (1933) and of the Balkan Entente (1934), Romania’s vigorous opposition to the Four-Power Pact and, eventually, the condemnation of Italy’s aggression against Ethiopia and Romania’s approval of the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy, embittered Romanian-Italian bilateral relations, the fascist Rome authorities conditioning the “normal course” of the relations between the two states on Nicolae Titulescu’s removal from the leadership of Romania’s foreign policy.

⁶ Nicolae Titulescu’s official visit to France took place between February 2 and 14, 1928.

I would like to hear of the name of any other Foreign Minister of Romania who was attacked in the French Press, during his official visit and for many months afterwards, for his pro-Italian feelings.

In Romania, M. Vaida-Voevod put a question to the Government in Parliament and said that my visit to Rome had endangered the interests of the Little Entente.

I did not disarm. There exist many telegrams and reports sent by me, in 1928, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explaining the necessity for Romania to be on friendly terms with dynamic States like Italy and Germany².

In these reports I said, in substance: I do not ask that the Italian friendship should take the place of the French; I ask that we should be friends with Italy and Germany as well as with France. And I added: I cannot understand why a man should be deemed to be pro-French or anti-French according to whether he drinks Vichy³ Water or Nocera Ombra Water, Sorgente Angelica.

However what was my reward for all these efforts towards the rapprochement between Romania and Italy, at the risk of displeasing Paris?

I read one day that, to Lord Rothermere's⁴ famous article: "A place in the sun for Hungary", was added a thundering pro-revisionist declaration by the Duce in favour of Hungary⁵.

In all my life I never received a colder shower.

It should not be forgotten that, at the time, Romania, like the two other States of the Little Entente, was bound to Italy by Treaties of friendship⁶ according to which the High Contracting Parties mutually guaranteed their territorial integrity.

So far as Romania is concerned, this Treaty was in force until 1934.

Of course, I was attacked in Romania for my pro-Italian policy.

In August 1928, I left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As a delegate of Romania in Geneva, I had the best possible relations with Signor Grandi⁷, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

¹ French daily, founded in 1829 by Jacques Coste. As an evening paper, it asserted itself as one of the major news media in the last years of the Second Empire (1852–1870). Edited after the Paris Commune, by Adrien Hébrard, "Le Temps", may be considered the official press organ of the Third Republic (1870–1940).

² Nicolae Titulescu could not eschew the problem of this country's relations with Italy and Germany – economically significant for Romania – though his attitude, as totalitarian regimes were concerned, was unfailingly hostile. The new mutations of forces in the international arena, the very attitude of the great western democracies as Rome and Berlin were concerned, prompted Titulescu to handle with the greatest care the relations with those capitals, in spite of the fact that he gave priority of place in matter of Romania's foreign policy to the relations with France and Great Britain.

³ French spa world-known for its mineral water springs, curing stomach and liver diseases.

⁴ Harold Sidney Harmsworth, 1st Viscount of Rothermere.

⁵ Benito Mussolini made this speech before the Chamber of Deputies in spring 1928, in his capacity of Foreign Minister, resorting to the leit-motif of the "great injustices suffered by maimed Hungary".

⁶ At the end of his visit to Italy over September 9–16, 1926, Romanian Prime Minister Alexandru Averescu signed on September 16, 1926, with Benito Mussolini, his Italian counterpart, the Pact of Friendship and Cordial Collaboration between Romania and Italy. It was ratified by Romania on March 28, 1927, and by Italy on June 9, 1927. Starting 1932, the Treaty (concluded initially for a five-year term) was prolonged every six months, the last extension being made on July 17, 1933, which held it in force until January 17, 1934).

⁷ Dino Grandi di Mordano.

However, I felt that the friendship of Italy meant the sacrifice of the Little Entente. Indeed, Italy was continually supporting Hungarian revisionism and saying to the other States of the Little Entente: "This is not levelled against you, but against your neighbour." One lives and learns! It appeared that the members of the Little Entente could only become the friends of Italy if they abandoned one of the States of the Little Entente.

At the beginning, Yugoslavia was to be sacrificed; then it was Czechoslovakia.

I felt this Italian tendency more particularly when the new Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente was signed on February 16th, 1933.

As soon as we signed it, and with the full authority of MM Benes and Jevtic, I called on the Prime Minister of France, M. Paul-Boncour¹, who was also Minister for Foreign Affairs, and told him: "France is always, and by right, with us. Why should she oppose our offering to Italy the spiritual guidance of the Little Entente? Italy has interests in Central Europe. The Little Entente and Italy together will reconstitute the former unit of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy within the frontiers determined by the principle of nationalities."

M. Paul-Boncour thought it over and replied: "You are right; you have the full agreement of France to speak to Italy on these lines."

On the very evening of that day, February 16th, 1933, when we signed the new Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente, I went to call on my friend Ambassador Baron Aloisi², Italian Delegate to the League of Nations, whose serviced to Italy at that period and later will only appear in their true light in the future. I told him: "This is the new text of the Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente, signed today by myself, Benes and Jevtic. In full agreement with them and with President Paul-Boncour, I ask the Italian Government to assume the spiritual guidance of the Little Entente."

Baron Aloisi answered that he would immediately communicate my declaration to Rome.

One day, two days, elapsed, and on the third day Baron Aloisi called on me, bringing me a negative answer in the most veiled and tactful terms.

In March 1933, when I went to Bucharest to make a statement³ to Parliament on the new Pact of Organisation and to obtain its ratification, the Italian Minister in Bucharest, M. Ugo Solla, called on me and, on this occasion, told me in his usual blunt language: "I know of the offer you made to Baron Aloisi. Italy will never have an agreement with the Little Entente en bloc; with parts of the Little Entente, she might. There are too many houses to let for Italy ever to agree to inhabit the house called the Little Entente as tenant."

The Little Entente as an enemy of Italy?

My offer of February 16th, 1933, made also in the name of Yugoslavia, who, at the time, was not on good terms with Italy, forever destroys the possibility of such a legend.

What was Italy's reply to the offer of friendship of the Little Entente? The Four-Power Pact.

¹ Joseph Paul-Boncour.

² Pompeo Aloisi.

³ Nicolae Titulescu delivered a speech in this sense to Romania's Parliament on March 16, 1933.

What, in two words, is the Four-Power Pact?¹

The creation of a European Directorate, having as its aim the revision of the frontiers of the Little Entente and of Poland.

The Little Entente delegated its powers to me in order to fight the Four-Power Pact in Paris and in London².

Finally, after long negotiations, I obtained the Note of June 7th, 1933, from the French Government, that is to say, from the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paul-Boncour. In this Note, France guaranteed to us that the invitation to discuss revision should only take place through the Assembly of the League of Nations, on the basis of Article 19 of the Covenant, i.e. not through a Directorate, and that, with this end in view, in order to apply Article 19 and invite the parties to re-examine the Treaties, unanimity, including the parties concerned, was necessary.

Of course, such an action on my part could not have pleased Rome.

But, it was not due to any anti-Italian feeling, but to a deeply national sentiment, that I fought the Four-Power Pact.

I did not fight to diminish the glory of Rome, but to keep for Romanians the land of their forefathers. I did not fight to prevent the Franco-Italian rapprochement, but to prevent the formation of a European Trust, which would replace by others frontiers barely established for the last sixteen years. I did not fight as an opponent of Rome, but as a descendant of Rome. Indeed, Rome has transmitted to us, with her blood, a love for the land, an instinct of conservation and an impulse to sacrifice our lives rather than our frontiers.

If M. Mussolini had been a Romanian, he would have acted exactly as I did.

In 1934, in answer to a question raised in Parliament by M. I. Maniu, I tried³ to establish a distinction between Italian and Hungarian revisionisms, calling the former a theoretical one and the latter a guilty one, thus endeavouring to place Italy outside any discussion.

In the meantime, Italy was building up the Rome-Vienna-Budapest triangle⁴.

¹ On March 18, 1933, Benito Mussolini proposed the conclusion of a Pact between Italy, Germany, Great Britain and France ("Four-Power Pact"), providing for a close cooperation among the signatories in settling by mutual agreement all political and economic questions in Europe. Its signing, in its initial form, would have instituted a real Directorate in the political life of the Continent and the ousting of the small and middle-size states from the settlement of issues of international interest.

² In the March 29–April 9, 1933 interval, Nicolae Titulescu paid visits of information to Paris and London, explaining the stand of the Little Entente states against the Four-Power Pact project. Among the personalities with whom he had talks were: in France – J. Paul-Boncour, E. Daladier, E. Herriot, A. de Monzie, C. Chautemps, P. Cot, J. Caillaux, L. Blum, A. Tardieu, P. Laval, L. Marin, P.E. Flandin, F. Bouisson; in Great Britain – J. Ramsay MacDonald, Sir John Simon, Sir William Tyrrell, Allan Leeper, Sir Frederic Keith-Ross, Sir Austen Chamberlain. His conclusions drawn from these interviews were laid down in an ample report sent to the King and the Prime Minister.

³ Nicolae Titulescu's speech to the Romanian Parliament on April 4, 1934. In spite of the distinction mentioned by him – given the fact that until 1934, Italy had not openly formulated territorial claims to her direct benefit – Nicolae Titulescu stated: "If I make this distinction, I shall nevertheless not excuse the first revisionism to the detriment of the second one. Both are unacceptable and harmful in my opinion".

⁴ On March 17, 1934, in Rome, two protocols were signed which traced the framework for a political and economic collaboration between Italy, Austria and Hungary. They stipulated the wish of the three states to enlarge their collaboration scope, by creating greater facilities for their economic cooperation. At the same time, Italy and Austria pledged to support Hungary's arming and back the Hungarian revisionists' claims. On March 23, 1936, in Rome, three additional protocols were signed concerning the relations between

In 1935, the question of sanctions arose. In this sphere, I feel quite at ease.

The minutes of the meetings at which the sanctions taken by the League against Italy were discussed have been published.

In none of them is it possible to find a word more against Italy than was said by the Delegates of Yugoslavia and Poland.

Yet, in the eyes of Italy, Yugoslavia deserves a special treaty of friendship and Poland deserves an official Note supporting her participation in the naval control of the Mediterranean, though her only seaboard is on the Baltic?

As to Romania, she had been left completely aside.

All the above goes to show that the question is not one of a hostile Italian policy towards Romania on account of Titulesco, but of a political association to which Romania does not belong because of the policy she has followed hitherto.

Had not Titulescu already been sacrificed as a Minister for Foreign Affairs when, notwithstanding all this, on November 3rd, 1936, the Duce made his most revisionist speech, excepting only Yugoslavia from the policy of revision?

Not only will it be impossible to prove from the records of the League of Nations that I said one word more against Italy than did the Yugoslav and Polish Delegates, but, on the contrary, it will be plain that, within the limits allowed by a respect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I gave permanent assistance to Italy as an expert, having collaborated with the League of Nations since creation.

The position I took with regard to sanctions can be defined as a scrupulous respect for the Covenant of the League of Nations, since we should not forget that any State may become somebody's Ethiopia. I therefore faithfully followed the line of conduct of Great Britain.

On the other hand, when the principles capable of helping States victims of an aggression had been formulated, it was not I who asked that Italy should be treated with the utmost severity.

Let us recapitulate the factors.

In his speech to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, at their joint meeting on December 12th, 1936, M. Victor Antonescu declared: "Notwithstanding the painful past of the Ethiopian question, Romania claims that she maintained, in the Committee of Six of the League of Nations, that Italy should not be declared to be the aggressor."

Who was the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time? Myself.

Let me, then, explain the situation, with all the precision arising out of a detailed knowledge of the subject.

I have studied the Italo-Ethiopian dossier very closely and I have been able to ascertain that Ethiopian armed bands have done much harm to Italy by their action.

My idea – and some Italians shared it – was that Italy should state her case before the Council. Opinion in the Council would have been divided, and Italy would thus have been able to wage a legal war in conformity with Article 15, paragraph 7.

Italy, Austria and Hungary, reaffirming the determination of the three states to faithfully observe the Rome protocols of March 17, 1934, and to abstain from entering into any significant negotiation relating to the Danubian question without a prior notification of the other signatories of the Rome protocols of March 17, 1934. On November 12, 1936, in Vienna, a secret Italian-Hungarian-Austrian protocol is signed, stating that, in case of war, the three signatories shall keep a benevolent neutrality towards one another.

There could have been no unanimity against Italy if she had respected the rules of international law, which she recognised by her signature of the Covenant of the League and according to which any dispute susceptible of leading to rupture should be submitted to arbitration or to the Council of the League of Nations.

It was only Italy's refusal to state her case, and the assertion she made that the League of Nations could not intervene in her conflict with Ethiopia, with all the array of arguments drawn from an ancient past which should not be resuscitated, even if the case arose – arguments such as, for instance, the right of peoples to expansion and the right to impose by force a superior civilisation on an inferior one – which explain the unanimity formed against Italy.

Does Romania realise what fate would be hers if, under the simple pretext that a given nation is more civilised than she, her territory should be occupied?

Notwithstanding all the efforts made, it was impossible to obtain from Rome any instructions for the Italian Delegation to state Italy's case before the Council.

The Committee of Six, appointed by the Council and of which I was a member, wanted to declare immediately that Italy was the aggressor. I opposed this and said: "The Italo-Ethiopian dossier is not known in all its details, because Italy, in violation of her international obligations, refused to speak before the Council. If Italy was a neighbour of Ethiopia and if, after all the Ethiopian armed bands had done, she had mobilized, in all probability, her gesture would have been called legitimate defence. Because Ethiopia is thousands of miles away from Italy and the Italian counteraction took several months, must it be deemed to be aggression?"

I was then asked: "If you consider things from this angle, has Italy no responsibility in your eyes?"

"Yes", I answered, "she has, because she did not state her case before the Council, although she undertook to do so under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Moreover, she did not respect the delay of three months provided by the Covenant for a recourse to war." "In any case," I said, "the word 'aggression' is not used in the Covenant of the League of Nations."

Following upon this, it was registered in the minutes that Italy had violated Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant¹.

For my part, I never ceased to make all possible efforts to convince the Italian Delegation that Italy should state her case in writing, even when the final curtain had gone down upon the lay.

I said: "The day will arrive when this case will come up for revision. On the basis of what documents will you ask for it? You must constitute your dossier immediately."

I do not know how far my advice was useful, but Italian documents were progressively handed in to the League of Nations, although this could not stop the machinery of sanctions.

What must also be known is that economic sanctions were accepted in advance by Italy.

¹ On October 7, 1935, the Council of the League of Nations, debating the aggression act of Italy against Ethiopia, approved the conclusions included in the report submitted by the Committee of Six, which read: "The Italian Government resorted to war, violating the commitments contained in Art. 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations," and decided on the basis of Art. 16 of the Covenant to apply the sanctions imposed in such cases.

This has no importance from the point of view of international law. When the League of Nations applies sanctions, it fulfils the duty of a judge and is not concerned with the opinion of the parties.

On the other hand, from the political or psychological point of view, that is to say, from the point of view of view of friendship, it is important to be able to show that the defendant was in agreement with the judge.

The Duce stated it in a public speech. As a matter of fact, I know it, thanks to the kindness of President Laval, who read me various telegrams on this subject from Count de Chambrun¹, French Ambassador in Rome.

It goes without saying that economic sanctions² had a far more serious effect than was foreseen by Italy, since, although they had been accepted by her, those who took them were afterwards covered with insult³.

There is no need to pass judgment here on the members of the League of Nations who, in the application of sanctions, stopped half way and did not fulfil their mission. Hence the discredit in which the League found itself.

I will limit myself to pointing out what Romania did for Italy, through me, in agreement with France and Great Britain, in order to find a solution of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict by way of a friendly agreement.

One of my chief aims was a rapprochement between French and Italian experts. I invited the present French Ambassador, M. de Saint-Quentin⁴, who has not yet taken up his post, to meet M. Pilotti⁵ and other Italians, and for hours we discussed a solution by conciliation.

I maintain that only an expert on League of Nations affairs could, after reading the minutes, realise how strictly I applied the Covenant of the League of Nations and how, on each occasion, I tried not to cause too much damage to Italy.

In September 1935, Minister Ugo Solla came to see me, to convey to me the thanks of the Duce for my attitude.

Later, M. Ugo Solla wrote an article in the Romanian newspaper "Argus"⁶ in which he said that I had thrown the large stone of compensations into the machinery of sanctions.

M. Ugo Solla went much too far. I raised the question of compensation as a sacred right of Romania, arising out of Article 16, paragraph 3, in order to defend our national interests.

But, in so doing, we met with many difficulties.

¹ Charles de Chambrun.

² On October 10, 1935, the League of Nations Assembly approved the decision to impose sanctions against Italy, who attacked Ethiopia, adopting a resolution by which a new committee was formed to coordinate the application of sanctions provided by Art. 16 of the Covenant.

³ On October 21, 1935, the Romanian Government started effectively to apply the sanctions decided by the League of Nations against Italy, following the latter's invasion of Ethiopia. On November 11, 1935, the Italian Government addresses a note of protest to the Romanian Government for Romania's adhesion to the policy of sanctions against Italy. On November 26, 1935, after consultations with the Little Entente and Balkan Entente states, the Romanian Government replies to the note of protest of November 11, 1935, showing that Romania supports the measures adopted by the League Nations Assembly and Council.

⁴ René Doyne de Saint-Quentin.

⁵ Massimo Pilotti.

⁶ Bucharest daily, founded in 1910; by mid-fourth decade its director was Grigore Gafencu, future Romanian Foreign Minister.

Thus, on November 1st, 1935, I was obliged to make a speech in Geneva, because, when I entrusted Minister Visoianu¹ with the defence of Romanian interests, the latter fulfilled his task with such sincerity and in such a brilliant manner that the League of Nations thought that Romania was trying to wreck the policy of sanctions against Italy.

I quote here an actual passage from my speech: "I ask: are there any members of the Committee who believe that there is something hidden behind the statement of the Romanian representative, M. Visoianu?"

Romania has not tried to wreck sanctions. If there were not a question of deep-rooted justice involved, I, who have worked with your Committee for sixteen days to set up the machinery of sanctions, would not come at the last minute to raise this problem."

The question was that of Romania's outstanding claims against Italy, and I explained the Romanian attitude: to make no new purchases in Italy, but to continue to purchase in Italy in exchange for arrears, which was the only way of liquidating the Romanian claims.

A negative answer was given to the Romanian Delegation, because the system I advocated might have created the impression that exchanges were continuing between the two countries, which was contrary to the idea of sanctions in the sense of Article 16.

I then asked that, in the organisation of mutual support, there should be a special chapter concerning countries having claims of this kind, that is to say, claims arising out of clearing agreements.

To have done with this question, I obtained the following resolution from the League of Nations, in connection with our outstanding claims against Italy:

"(a) That, on the discontinuance of the measures taken in regard to Italy under Article 16 of the Covenant, they (i.e. the Members of the League of Nations) should support one another in order to ensure that Italy discharges her obligations to the creditor States as she should have done if she had not incurred the application of Article 16 of the Covenant.

(b) Furthermore, that, if in the meantime particularly serious losses are sustained by certain States owing to the suspension by Italy of the payment of the aforesaid debts, the mutual support provided for by paragraph 3 of Article 16 will be specially given in order to make good such losses by all appropriate measures."

The Italo-Ethiopian war continued. Addis-Ababa² fell. In the meantime, sanctions also collapsed³.

Sanctions have so much modified the relations between Italy and Romania that, on May 28th, 1936, I had the pleasure of seeing on the platform of the Gare du Nord, the Italian Minister Ugo Solla, who had come to greet me on my return from abroad.

On August 29th, 1936, I ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At the League of Nations Council meeting on June 26th, 1936, when the raising of sanctions was being confirmed, I said: "For Romania, the application of sanctions to Italy has been a profoundly painful experience. Such is the friendship the Romanian people entertains for the Italian people that they had to summon up all that fortitude of political

¹ Constantin Vișoianu.

² On May 5, 1936, the Italian troops enter Addis Abbaba, Hailé Selassié I having to take refuge in Great Britain. On May 9, 1936, Italy occupies Ethiopia.

³ On July 6, 1936, following the vote of the League of Nations Assembly and Council, the Coordination Committee, created to apply the sanctions against Italy, votes to have them raised as of July 15, 1936.

orthodoxy which I claim for my country, to enforce the Covenant without flinching. I do not think any member of the Council will deny that, from the very beginning of this grave crisis, Romania has not flinched for a single moment in fulfilling her obligations under the Covenant.

As Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have followed a direct line, but it was the direct line of the bullet which passes through the heart to reach its object.”

I know the reproach addressed to me by some of my Italian friends: France and England would long ago have agreed to raise sanctions if Titulesco had made a gesture, and, in particular, if he had pulled their chestnuts out of the fire by being the first to ask that they should be raised.

Well, my Italian friends are mistaken. During the whole period when sanctions were being discussed, I was in such close and frequent contact with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France and England that I would have sensed such a desire if they had actually entertained it. I had the impression, as a result of that contact that, if I had spoken in the manner desired by my Italian friends, I would have remained alone and would have brought blame on myself and on my country.

Indeed, if I had acted in this manner, and if Romania were one day to be attacked, I would deserve to be told: “You are asking for sanctions? You, who, in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, instead of applying the principles of collective security of the Covenant of the League of Nations for what they are worth (but which can be amplified), repudiated them?”

I was very careful to avoid such a mistaken policy, and I saved Romania from its consequences.

There is still another fact on which I would like to throw light.

On July 1st, His Majesty the Negus Haïlé Sélassié¹ took the platform to make a speech. Before he had uttered one word, hissing and booing² came from the public galleries, where I could not tell who was present.

While President Motta³ went up to hand over the culprits to the police, to my great regret nobody rose in the Assembly to make a protest.

The platform of the League of Nations must be one of freedom and justice, or it has no *raison d'être*.

I felt that it was incumbent upon me to make a gesture which would save the honour of the League.

And I intervened to ask the President to maintain order.⁴

¹ Haïlé Sélassié (Tafari Makonen, Ras Tafari).

² According to the confessions of some participants in the meeting, the signal of this obstruction was triggered by the Italian Consul General at Geneva, General Speichel, from the seats reserved to the diplomatic staff.

³ Giuseppe Motta.

⁴ Describing this event, Nicolae Titulescu wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Central: “Yesterday, at the moment when the Emperor of Abyssinia took the platform in perfect dignity, and before having the opportunity to say a word, hissing and booing came from the public galleries. President Van Zeeland, though a very wise man, probably because he avoided to commit himself, did not intervene. The delegates lost their heads and their show was a real shame. In full knowledge of the situation, but ignorant of the initiator of the cat-calls, I advanced to the middle of the hall and I said the following words: ‘Mr. President, in the name of justice, I ask you to be so kind and make something so that such acts may cease.’ The whole Assembly received with ovations my statement [...] Our enemies, be they Hungarian or Polish, lost no minute to cable to Rome that I asked that the Italian savages be expelled.// Had I known they were Italians,

It was said that, on this occasion, I called the Italians savages.

A denial, based on the statements of the representatives of the States of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, in their capacity of Delegates to the League of Nations, destroyed such a legend for ever.

Besides, how could I have called the Italians savages on July 1st, when I spoke about Italy as I did, and as I have just explained, four days before, on June 26th, 1936.

In their capacity of Delegates to the League of Nations, MM. Krofta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Tewfik Rüstü Aras, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Minister Mavrudi¹, M. Politis, Greek Minister in Paris, and M. Pouritch, Yugoslav Minister in Paris, gave me their written denials.

They declare that in no way did I criticise Italy or her citizens, but that I only exercised the natural right of any Delegate to ask the President not to allow the public in the galleries to disturb the discussions of the Assembly.

They also declare that it is a well-known fact that, far from being hostile to Italy, I have the most sincere sympathy for that country, and that I never miss any opportunity of expressing those feelings in public.

This is proved by my speech in favour of Italy, made four days before – on Friday, June 26th.

They therefore deeply regret the attacks of the Italian Press against me, and consider them to be unfair, tactless and completely unfounded.

At the very time when I wished to publish this denial, the Italian Press attacked me to such an extent that, morally speaking, I could not reply at once.²

There are attacks to which one cannot reply immediately.

The Italian Government had been informed by our Minister in Rome, M. Lugoiano³, so that Rome immediately knew the true facts of the case. A few days later, the Press campaign was stopped.

Anybody would have acted as I did if he had known, from the outset, the kind of attacks that were made against me.

I quote one of them, from the newspaper “Lavoro Fascista”:

“Between the Negus and his supporters there is the kind of complicity and solidarity which binds offenders together. Between the Negus, bandit and murderer, and the savage Italians, Titulesco preferred the Ethiopian. The reason for this is clear. The Italians are white men; the Negus and Titulesco are niggers. Titulesco is half Asiatic, a mixture of inferior races, the product of a connubium in which Western varnish cannot cover up his coloured origins.”

Later, when the tension had relaxed, I published my denial in the newspaper “Universul” dated 27 April 1937.

I would have done the same, for, if the League of Nations, after disobeying its own principles, does not remain at least a club where gentlemen's rules are observed, it should be better be dissolved immediately.”

¹ Nikolaos Mavrudis.

² The Italian newspapers, published in Rome or elsewhere in Italy, at the pressure of the fascist Minister of the Press and Propaganda, criticized violently Nicolae Titulescu. In this campaign, came to the fore “Popolo di Roma”, “Giornale d'Italia”, “Corriere della Sera”, “L'Avvenire d'Italia”, “Lavoro Fascista”, “Il Messaggero”, “La Stampa”, some of them going as far as conditioning the normalisation of relations with Romania on Nicolae Titulescu's removal from office.

³ Ion Lugoșianu.

All the above goes to prove that I have shown Italy a warm friendship which I wanted to use as the foundation of an Italo-Romanian friendship, even at the risk of displeasing certain people.

Italian revisionism has cut across the path I intended to follow.

However, the first disappointment did not prevent me, on the very day – February 16th, 1933 – on which the new Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente was signed, from offering its spiritual guidance to Italy. She refused, saying that an agreement with the Little Entente en bloc was impossible, but might be feasible with some of its elements.

Finally, in connection with sanctions, I have shown my friendship for Italy, within the limits allowed by the application of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

If Italy is not, today, closely bound in friendship to Romania, I am not to be blamed.

Today, I still face Italy with an unaltered affection, but having acquired the experience which enables me to say: Italy repudiated not me, personally, but my policy.

I am the symbol of the policy of justice, accomplished in the past, and of strong anti-revisionism for the future.

M. Mussolini symbolises the policy of so-called present injustices and of revisionism at all costs for the future.

This point of view should escape none of the Romanians who are anxious for friendship with Italy.

And, though I have a complete knowledge of these divergences, I still believe that the hour of Italo-Romanian friendship will soon strike.

In order to reach this result, Italy should begin by concluding with the two other States of the Little Entente Conventions similar to that which she has concluded with Yugoslavia.

GREAT BRITAIN

The relations between Romania and Great Britain will, in my opinion, always be determined by my two experiences as Romanian Minister at the Court of St James's.

I learned much during the ten years I lived in Great Britain, or in the company of British Ministers at various international conferences.

I was fortunate enough not to know English when I was first appointed Minister in London by my chief, Take Jonesco.

As I was very careful to avoid speaking French, because I knew Britishers preferred the worst English to the best French, I started my diplomatic career in London by keeping silent.

This, according to André Maurois¹, is the best possible "début."

It was given to me to learn English at the same time as I became acquainted with the English mentality.

This being so, I learned that Great Britain was a country in which public opinion had an intense dislike of assuming obligations in advance, with a view to meeting possible contingencies.

I also learned that British public opinion is very sensitive to anything which savours of *humanity and justice*, and that Great Britain is the country in which private and public morality are most closely linked.

Many statesmen have honoured me with their friendship: Mr. Lloyd George², Lord Curzon³, Lord Cecil, Mr. MacDonald⁴, Mr. Henderson⁵, Lord Baldwin⁶, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Mr. Winston Churchill⁷, Sir Samuel Hoare⁸, Mr. Eden⁹, and several others.

To these names I should like to add those of some members of the Foreign Office and the Treasury, who gave me much help throughout my mission in London: Lord Tyrrell¹⁰, Sir Robert Vansittart¹¹, Cadogan¹², Sargent¹³, Rex Leeper¹⁴, Sir Otto Niemeyer, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross¹⁵, Waley, and a great many more.

I cannot forget that, scarcely two years after my arrival in London, Mr. MacDonald entrusted me with a very special and difficult mission: that of convincing M.

¹ André Maurois (pseudonym of Émile Salomon Wilhelm Herzog).

² David Lloyd George, 1st Earl of Dwyfor.

³ George Nathaniel Curzon, 1st Baron and 1st Marquis Curzon of Kedleston.

⁴ James Ramsay MacDonald.

⁵ Arthur Henderson.

⁶ Stanley Baldwin, 1st Earl Baldwin of Bewdley.

⁷ Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill.

⁸ Sir Samuel John Gurney Hoare.

⁹ Sir Robert Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon.

¹⁰ William George Tyrrell, 1st Baron Tyrrell of Avon.

¹¹ Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart, 1st Baron Vansittart of Denham.

¹² Sir Alexander Montagu George Cadogan.

¹³ Sir Orme Sargent.

¹⁴ Reginald Wilding Allen Leeper.

¹⁵ Sir Frederick William Leith-Ross.

Herriot that he ought to come to Chequers for the preparation of the Dawes Plan Conference in July 1924.

And my efforts were crowned with success.

I cannot forget the words of Lord Baldwin in 1933, when he was only the President of the Board of Trade. He said to me, in the course of our talks about the commercial debts of certain Romanians:

“Mr. Titulescu, a great struggle has taken place in me between the Englishman and the bourgeois. As an Englishman, I ought to ask you for the guarantee of the Romanian Government for the arrangement you suggest concerning the commercial debts of Romanians. But the bourgeois has triumphed. When any State guarantees the payment of private debts, the limits which divide public credit from private credit cease to exist, and, in this way, the State ceases to be a bourgeois State. Well, I want Romania to continue to be bourgeois.”

When I recall my collaboration with Sir Austen Chamberlain, I am overcome by a profound feeling of emotion such as I rarely feel.

Sir Austen worked with me for many years on the question of optants. Out of this collaboration arose a series of oratorical contests in the League of Nations, and also a correspondence containing such friendly letters from him that is now one of my most cherished possessions.

His death was a very painful ordeal for Great Britain, for the cause of Peace, for his family, and for myself.

All the Chamberlain family, composed of statesmen descended from the great Joe Chamberlain¹, is dear to me.

For me, today, Sir Austen Chamberlain is represented by his wife, Lady Chamberlain, and his brother, Neville Chamberlain², now Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Romania should never forget the debt of gratitude she owes to Sir Austen Chamberlain.

If she has been libelled by Hungarian propaganda in connection with the optants question, all trace of that libel has disappeared, thanks to Sir Austen Chamberlain's report of September 1927, which is the real decision on the matter.

Similarly, it is also to Sir Austen Chamberlain that Romania owes the favourable solution given to the question of Colonists in 1925.

The great merit of Sir Austen Chamberlain's actions was due to the fact that they did not spring from friendship or sympathy, but from a deep-rooted belief in the justice of the Romanian cause.

Hence their authority.

And how shall I describe the friendship of Winston Churchill, whose brilliant brain is allied with an unsurpassable sacred fire?

And, while I am talking of him, I must thank my English friends Lord Cecil, Winston Churchill, General Spears³, Alfred Bossom, Dalton⁴, Noel Baker⁵, Dr. Madge,

¹ Joseph Chamberlain.

² Sir Arthur Neville Chamberlain.

³ Maj.-Gen. Edward Louis Spears.

⁴ Hugh (Edward) Dalton (John Neale) of Forest and Frith.

⁵ Philip John Noël Baker.

W. Steed¹ and Seton Watson², together with many others, who, in June 1937, gave me the opportunity of speaking on the conditions for the maintenance of existing peace, and on all international problems, with special regard to Romanian interests: twice in the British Parliament (once to the Majority³ and once to the Labour Party⁴); at Oxford University⁵; at the Royal Institute for Foreign Affairs⁶; at the Committee for Peace and Defence⁷, etc. etc. I was unable to accept all the invitations I received⁸, as I had to be in Bratislava on June 19th, to be made Doctor *Honoris Causa*⁹.

All these lectures were strictly private.

With regard to the relations between Romania and Great Britain, I have already stated elsewhere – but the truth will bear repetition – that Romania is not situated in a zone where British interests are specially at stake; neither is the bordering upon a sea in which Great Britain is specially interested. Consequently, if Romania keeps on good terms with all her neighbours, if she is not a disturbing factor for Peace, if she avoids exaggerated ideologies in any direction, if she follows a policy in keeping with the teachings of morality, if she is closely bound to States of direct concern to Great Britain, such as France, and if she acts in conformity with the great principles of the League of Nations, then she can obtain the moral support of Great Britain.

Anybody who does not realise the significance of the moral support of Great Britain had better cease to meddle in European politics.

The material help of Great Britain can only come by way of consequence, when there is identity of interests between Romania and Great Britain, and after a spontaneous decision by Great Britain to defend the aforesaid British interest.

¹ Henry Wickham Steed.

² Robert William Seton-Watson.

³ *On Practical Methods to Maintaining Existing Peace* – June 3, 1937.

⁴ *Orientations in the International Policy of European Democracies* – June 9, 1937.

⁵ *Present-day International Situation* – June 4, 1937.

⁶ *Is a League of Nations Covenant Reform Desirable?* – June 9, 1937.

⁷ June 14, 1937.

⁸ He was also invited by Cambridge University but could not comply with the invitation.

⁹ On this occasion he made the speech *Orderly Thinking*.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

With their area, including their possessions, amounting to 3,617,000 square miles – that is to say, a surface almost equalling that of the whole of Europe – with their population of 137,255,000, their unique geographical position, which keeps them at an equal distance from the political disturbances of Asia and those of Europe, with the Monroe¹ Doctrine², preventing any foreign intervention on the American Continent, and with the decision they have taken not to interfere in the troubled political life of Europe, the United States of America constitute a world apart which, more than any other, can afford to live alone.

Without undue exaggeration and without losing sight of the fact that the Anglo-Saxon idea of Justice creates favourable dispositions towards revisionism, we should note with satisfaction the words of President Roosevelt when he declared recently that neutrality was no longer a guarantee for the United States.

The United States can afford the luxury of a policy of carrying into practice any kind of social doctrine and, above all, the ambition of setting up new ideals of life.

This being the case, it might seem that there is not much to be said concerning the relations existing between Romania and the United States.

This would be a very hasty conclusion.

There is a spiritual life which is of even greater importance than material existence.

In the spiritual realm, the strength of the bonds uniting Romania to the United States is very striking.

It has been said of the U.S.A. that, after having brought children into the world, she leaves them at the door of Europe.

This statement does not quite correspond to the facts, since the soul of the U.S.A. is already full of its own ideals.

Let us, however, assume that Europe might become America's Tarpeian Rock³

How fortunate for Europe in the present juncture!

Could we, Europeans, find enough spare time and leisure from our difficulties to create new ideals of life, to the same extent as in the past?

When a European State rises above its daily needs and considers the great goal towards which, in reality, the community which it represents is striving, it then becomes conscious again of its true self and it often expresses an American ideal.

The greater part of Europe bases its international life on the League of Nations. Thus has been especially the case in the past, and is affirmed to be so in the present.

¹ James Monroe.

² Monroe Doctrine. Foreign policy doctrine presented in his address to Congress by U.S. President James Monroe (on December 2, 1823), expressing U.S. opposition to the European nations policy of intervention in Latin American affairs. The Monroe Doctrine contains a few positive principles, if considered the historical period of its launching as compared to the feudal-monarchic diplomacy of the Holy Alliance. The complex and contradictory nature of the Monroe Doctrine is even clearer if viewed from the vantage of the U.S. Latin American states practical relations.

³ Tarpeian Rock, on the Capitol Hill in Rome, from which traitors were thrown to death.

When Europe remembers to settle disputes in conformity with the great humanitarian principles contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and wishes to submit to the recommendations of the Great President Wilson¹ – then it is an American ideal which speaks within her.

When Europe applies the Covenant of the League of Nations in part only – and in a distorted manner, and hesitates and compromises only to arrive at inconceivable results – then it is the voice of the present-day Europe which speaks within her.

It is true that in Europe today we have thinkers who try to carry on the great tradition of their predecessors.

But action is now more urgent than ever.

President Roosevelt gave the world an example of reform in all quarters, which would become distorted if applied to Europe, owing to the lack of power and of identical ideals.

But President Roosevelt also gave Europe guiding principles of foreign policy which must, through the force of his ideas, be accepted by all.

Indeed, in the U.S.A., President Roosevelt, because of his internal reforms², has deserved well of the country, and has been re-elected³.

Besides these internal reforms, however, there is an ideology of President Roosevelt which alone can save Europe from the dangers which now threaten her: the extreme-right and the extreme-left.

On the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the American Constitution⁴, President Roosevelt gave utterance to words which should constitute de Bible for all European democracies, including Romanian democracy:

“Of late we have heard a clear challenge to the democratic idea of representative government.

We do not deny that the methods of the challengers, whether they be called ‘communistic’ or ‘dictatorial’ or ‘military’, have obtained for many who live under them material things they did not obtain under democracies which they have failed to make function.

Unemployment has been lessened – even though the cause is a mad manufacturing of armaments. Order prevails – even though maintained by fear, at the expense of liberty and individual rights.

So their leaders laugh at all constitutions, predict the copying of their own methods, and prophesy the early end of democracy throughout the world.

¹ Thomas Woodrow Wilson.

² Just before taking office on March 4, 1933, F.D. Roosevelt mapped out a domestic and social program to fight Great Depression (“New Deal”). As of March 1933, F.D. Roosevelt succeeded to win from Congress the passing of several laws which would make U.S. drop the purely liberal concept on economy and would persuade them to accept state interventionism. The first priority steps operated in banking (Moratorium: May–June 1933 reforms); financial (38% devaluation of the U.S. \$ in April; taking the U.S. off the international Gold Standard) and economic systems: fighting surplus crops by a game of cash benefits to farmers who agreed to limit their outputs of staple crops (*Agricultural Adjustment Act*), regulating industry through a self-imposed “fair competition” codes and controlling of labour force use in industry (*National Industrial Recovery Act*). A set of social and economic steps were taken to relieve unemployment, as for instance the Tennessee Valley Authority program.

³ On March 4, 1937, Franklin Delano Roosevelt started his second term in the office of President of the United States of America.

⁴ The U.S. Constitution (still in force, with several amendments) was adopted in 1787.

Both that attitude and that prediction are denied by those of us who still believe in democracy – that is, by the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world and the overwhelming majority of the people of the world.

And the denial is based on two reasons eternally right. The first reason is that modern men and women will not tamely commit to one man or one group the permanent conduct of their government. Eventually they will insist, not only on the right to choose who shall govern them, but also upon the periodic reconsideration of that choice by the free exercise of the ballot.

And the second reason is that the state of world affairs brought about by those new forms of government threatens civilisation. Armaments and deficits pile up together. Trade barriers multiply and merchant ships are threatened on the high seas. Fear spreads throughout the world – fear of aggression, fear of invasion, fear of revolution, fear of death.”

Could a man with such great responsibilities give a more admirable lesson to humanity?

Romania can only be saved from the dangers which threaten her by carrying out this lesson to the letter: by a democratic internal policy and, outside, by a policy of defence of all her frontiers and by Pacts of mutual assistance with her neighbours.

SOUTH AMERICA

Since 1920, that is to say, since the creation of the League of Nations, Romania has been bound to the States of South America by a close co-operation.

The international activity of these States is characterised by their political disinterestedness.

Is it realised that, each year, these American States send their delegates to Geneva? Why do these Delegates make voyages of two weeks or more?

In their own interests? No.

I can conjure up a very significant picture of the collaboration of South American States in Geneva when I recall my late friend, de Villegas¹, former Chilean Ambassador, one of the three rapporteurs of the Committee presided over by Sir Austen Chamberlain, on the question of optants,² when I think of the torture he must have endured because of the qualms of conscience he felt on hearing the Apponyi³-Titulesco oratorical contests before the Council of the League, when I remember the work he must have done in order to understand Romanian land reform⁴, and the details of its execution, in each Transylvanian village where a Hungarian magnate resided, and when I think of all the Romanian names he had to memorise.

The delegates of South America come to Geneva for an ideal, that of collective security. And when Geneva makes no progress, the States of South America complete the

¹ Echiburú Enrique Villegas.

² Nicolae Titulescu made a decisive contribution to the settlement of the optants question, debated at various international forums, over 1922–1930. About 500 Hungarian landowners of Transylvania, who had opted for Hungarian citizenship (on the grounds of the stipulations of the Treaty of Trianon), were expropriated under the Land Reform of 1921. Resenting the loss of land, they addressed themselves first to Romanian courts of law, then to the Ambassadors Conference in Paris (1922) and the Council of the League of Nations, maintaining the illegal nature of the expropriation in the light of the Trianon Peace Treaty provisions, as well as unequal implementation of the expropriation law, detrimental to the Hungarian landowners. Optants were claiming, as well, a special indemnification for all lost land. As of April 1923, when the issue was put forward at the League of Nations Council, and, until its settlement in 1930, Nicolae Titulescu defended firmly and wisely Romania's rights and achieved within several memorable debates, having Count Apponyi as opponent, some thoroughgoing analyses of the disputed issues. Eventually, the differences would be settled completely under The Hague Agreements (1930), alongside with the settlement of the war duties and reparations. His main interventions took place on April 20 and 23, 1923, May 27, 1923, July 5, 1923, September 5, 1925, July 2, 1927, September 17 and 19, 1927, March 8, 9 and 12, 1928. Basically, Nicolae Titulescu advocated in his interventions: full compatibility between 1921 expropriations and the provisions of the Trianon Peace Treaty, the Statute of Minorities included; full equal treatment in the implementation of the Land reform; the Romanian State's sovereign right to proceed to expropriation; the positive role of the Land reform in Maintaining and strengthening the country's socioeconomic structure and in defending social order in a whole European region.

³ Count Albert Apponyi.

⁴ The Law on the completion of Land reform in the Old Kingdom was passed on July 17, 1921. According to the expropriation norms established by the Alexandru Averescu Government, a total of 6,008,098 ha were expropriated, of which 3,998,753 were arable land (all over Romania), Transylvania included. On July 30, was passed the Law on the completion of the Land Reform in Transylvania, the Banate, Crişana and Maramureş.

work of organising peace by Pacts of their own, such as the Saavedra Lamas Pact¹ and the Pan-American Pact².

Before I discuss these Pacts, I would like to point out two characteristic elements of the co-operation of the South American States in Geneva.

a) Their presence gives the League of Nations its character of universality.

The United States of America being absent, and other non-European States with the exception of China having either their mother countries in Europe or European territories together with territories in other Continents, without the States of South America, the League of Nations would be a European League with interests extending to other Continents, rather than a universal League of Nations.

b) On no question have the States of South America and Romania failed to express similar opinions, and this without any previous consultation.

I do not believe in race from the biological point of view. What I have found as a result of my collaboration with Central and Southern American States enables me to say that, if by race is meant a certain mentality, it may be said that the mentality of South Americans and ours are identical, with the only difference that the South American is more silent than the Romanian.

When a Romanian is called upon to collaborate with South Americans, the fraternity of spirit which unites them shows immediately and solid bonds of friendship are created between them.

That is why, when I was Minister for Foreign Affairs, I set up five Legations in Central and South America: in Mexico³, Venezuela⁴, Brazil⁵, Argentine⁶ and Chile⁷.

If we were not able to do more¹, it was because our budget did not permit it. However, the States of Central and South America should understand the gesture of

¹ The Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, recorded by diplomatic literature as the "Saavedra Lamas Pact" after the name of the Argentinean Foreign Minister who initiated it, was signed by the Argentine, the United States of Brazil, Chile, the United States of Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay, at Rio de Janeiro on October 10, 1933. Meant to complete the stipulations of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, a convention formally renouncing war, signed in Paris, on August 27, 1928, the Saavedra Lamas Pact provided for the organization of a permanent system of conciliation for the settlement of international conflicts. On the line of the general efforts meant to prevent war, the Argentinean Government's initiative to conclude this Pact to which were all peace-loving states called to adhere, irrespective of geographical location or other discriminations, aimed at contributing to strengthening antirevisionist policies in South America and in Europe, as well as to expanding the framework of an as close as possible collaboration in peace-related matters between the states of the two continents. The Little Entente member-states adhered to this Treaty on December 12, 1934.

² It was signed in Buenos Aires, on December 23, 1936, by Argentina, Paraguay, Honduras, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Perú, Salvador, Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Panamá, the United States of America, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Haiti, Cuba.

³ On October 1, 1935, Dimitrie Drăghicescu was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania at Mexico City.

⁴ On January 1, 1936, Alexandru Cretzianu was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania at Caracas.

⁵ On December 31, 1927, Caius Brediceanu was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania at Rio de Janeiro.

⁶ On March 26, 1928, Caius Brediceanu was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania at Buenos Aires (with residence in Rio de Janeiro).

⁷ On October 1, 1935, Nicolae Dianu was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania at Santiago de Chile.

Romania as a tribute to all of them. This tribute should be appreciated not according to its extent, but taking into account the intention which gave rise to it.

In his capacity of Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine, M. Saavedra Lamas² signed the Pact of Rio de Janeiro on October 10th, 1933, Brazil being represented by M. de Mello Franco³, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

This Pact is of close interest to Romania because the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente both adhered to it, with certain reservations made necessary by the European situation.

In Article 1 of the Pact, the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that they condemn wars of aggression between themselves or against other States, and that the settlement of disputes or conflicts of any kind which may arise between them shall never be reached except by the pacific means provided by international law.

Article 2 provides that, between the High Contracting Parties, territorial questions shall not be solved by violence, and that they will not recognise any territorial settlement if it is not reached by pacific means, nor the validity of any occupation or acquisition of territories which may be accomplished by the use of arms.

Article 3 of the Pact deals with the common efforts to be made by the High Contracting Parties in case of violation of Articles 1 or 2.

In Article 4, the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the procedure of conciliation provided in the Pact any conflicts specially mentioned, and any others which may arise in the course of their relations with each other, with the exception of the reservations contained in Article 5.

Article 5 enumerates various precise reservations which may alone may be made when the Pact has been signed, ratified, or adhered to.

In Article 6, in the absence of a Permanent Conciliation Commission or any other international body entrusted with the same functions in virtue of former Treaties still in force, the High Contracting Parties undertake to submit their disputes to the enquiry and study of a Commission of Conciliation, the composition of which is described.

In Article 7, jurisdiction is given to tribunals and Supreme Courts of Justice in order that, in conformity with the internal legislation of each State, they should interpret the constitution, the Treaties, or the general principles of common law as a last or single instance, on all matters coming within their respective jurisdictions.

It is important to note that, in the Saavedra Lamas Treaty, internal law is thus placed on a higher footing than international law, which is contrary to the European idea.

According to the latter, internal laws, and even the constitution, are mere facts dominated by international treaties and the justice created by them.

The negotiations for the adherence of the Little Entente to the above-mentioned Pact took place in Geneva between Ambassador Cantilo⁴ and myself, in my capacity of Acting President of the Little Entente. Here is the text of the Note I sent to His Excellency Ambassador Cantilo on December 12th, 1934:

“Geneva, December 12th, 1934

¹ Nicolae Titulescu failed to mention the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and Uruguay. On October 1, 1935, Alexandru Buzdugan was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania at Montevideo (with residence in Buenos Aires).

² Carlos Saavedra Lamas.

³ Afranio de Mello Franco.

⁴ José Maria Cantilo.

Your Excellency,

In my capacity of President of the Little Entente, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the three Governments of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) have decided to adhere to the Pact of Rio de Janeiro – called the Carlos Saavedra Lamas Pact – under the following conditions, which are indivisibly linked with their adherence:

1) This adherence shall in no way affect former undertakings, nor involve any substitution or alteration therein, in particular, those resulting from the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the Treaties of London of July 3rd and 4th, 1933, the Treaties of Alliance, the adherence to the Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, etc., etc., which all remain in force, without either extension or restriction arising out of the present adherence.

2) The three States of the Little Entente being members of the League of Nations, it follows that, apart from the Covenant of the League of Nations, the procedure of conciliation provided in the Pact of Rio de Janeiro can only apply after having been approved by all the States concerned in each particular case.

This reservation is in strict conformity with Article 5 of the Pact of Rio de Janeiro.

According to the constitutional provisions of each of the three States, and by application of Article 5 of the Pact of Rio de Janeiro, we also wish to state expressly that no case coming within the internal jurisdiction of each of the three States can afterwards be brought before any international body whatsoever for a fresh judicial decision or conciliation.

3) This adherence does not imply in any way that the States of the Little Entente, directly or indirectly, recognise the existence of any territorial dispute, or of any change in their view that there can be no territorial disputes whatsoever in the present state of the frontiers. Neither does it involve any extension or substitution in the obligations undertaken by them under the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor the acceptance of any conciliation or juridical or arbitral solution with regard to the questions which were reserved by the three States at the time they adhered to the Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. This applies, in particular, to any question of substance which may, directly or indirectly, lead to a discussion of the present territorial integrity and sovereign rights of these States, including those of ports and lines of communication.

I would ask Your Excellency to be good enough to transmit the above communication to the Government of the Argentine Republic, and to express our conviction that the co-operation of the States of the Little Entente and of those of South America, under the above-mentioned conditions, cannot fail to constitute a fresh element of rapprochement, and a factor in the consolidation of peace.

I have the honour to be Your Excellency's most obedient Servant,

(signed) N. Titulesco,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Romania
Acting President of the Little Entente"

A few days later, M. Cantilo communicated to me the following telegram:

“Buenos Aires, December 17th, 1937

Ambassador Cantilo,
Rome.

Your Excellency may inform M. Titulesco that we are in full agreement with the proposed reservations, and that our Government receives with great pleasure the adherence of these countries, obtained through the help of M. Titulesco's eminent personality. He may rest assured that this bond, which was created for noble pacific ends, will be followed by other agreements strengthening our friendly relations in all respects, to our mutual advantage.

In sending you my greetings, I wish to thank you for your successful negotiation.

Saavedra Lamas”

To the Saavedra Lamas Treaty, we should add the Conventions adopted by the Inter-American Conference for the maintenance of Peace, held in Buenos Aires from December 1st to December 23rd, 1936. According to a unanimous decision of the Conference, these resolutions were formally communicated by the President of the Inter-American Conference, M. Saavedra Lamas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, to the League of Nations.

These Conventions include the following:

Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace;

Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies;

Inter-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation;

Convention to co-ordinate, extend and assure the fulfilment of the existing Treaties between the American States;

Convention on the Pan-American highway;

Convention for the promotion of inter-American cultural relations;

Convention on interchange of publications;

Convention concerning artistic exhibitions;

Convention concerning peaceful orientation of public instruction;

Convention concerning facilities for educational and publicity films;

And the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference for the maintenance of Peace.

It may be of interest to mention some provisions of the above-mentioned Conventions.

*Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation
and Re-establishment of Peace*

Article I of this Convention provides:

“In the event that the peace of the American Republics is menaced, and in order to co-ordinate efforts to prevent war, any of the Governments of the American Republics signatory to the Treaty of Paris of 1928 or to the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 1933, or to both, whether or not a member of other peace organisations, shall consult with the other Governments of the

American Republics, which, in such event, shall consult together for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful co-operation.”

Article II provides:

“In the event of war, or a virtual state of war between American States, the Governments of the American Republics represented at this Conference shall undertake without delay the necessary mutual consultations, in order to exchange views and to seek, within the obligations resulting from the pacts above mentioned and from the standards of international morality, a method of peaceful collaboration; and, in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of American Republics, such consultation shall also take place to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory States, if they so desire, may eventually co-operate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American Continent.”

In Article III, “it is agreed that any question regarding the interpretation of the present Convention, which it is not been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, shall be submitted to the procedure of conciliation provided by existing agreements, or to arbitration or to judicial settlement.”

In addition to this, Article IV of the Convention lays down a procedure of ratification.

Article V provides:

“The present Convention shall remain in effect indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year’s notice, after the expiration of which period the Convention shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounces it but shall remain in effect for the remaining signatory States. Denunciations shall be addressed to the Government of the Argentine Republic, which shall transmit them to the other contracting States.”

In an additional Protocol to the Convention, the American States, including the United States, affirm the fundamental principle of American international law that: “No State has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”

Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies

Article I of this Treaty provides:

“The High Contracting Parties bind themselves to establish permanent bilateral mixed commissions composed of representatives of the signatory Governments which shall in fact be constituted, at the request of any of them, and such party shall give notice of such request to the other signatory Governments.”

Article II provides:

“The duty of the aforementioned commissions shall be to study, with the primary object of eliminating them, as far as possible, the causes of future difficulties or controversies; and to propose additional or detailed lawful measures which it might be convenient to take in order to promote, as far as possible, the due and regular application of Treaties in force between the respective parties, and also to promote the development of increasingly good relations in all ways between the two countries dealt with in each case.”

Article III provides:

“After each meeting of any of the said preventive Commissions a minute shall be drawn up and signed by its members, setting out the considerations and decisions thereof, and such minute shall be transmitted to the governments represented in the Commissions.”

*Convention to co-ordinate, extend and assure the fulfilment of
the existing Treaties between the American States*

Articles 1 to 6 of this Convention recall the Treaties which already bind the American States;

The Treaty to avoid and prevent conflicts between the American States, signed at Santiago, May 3rd, 1923 (known as the Gondra Treaty¹);

The Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on August 28th, 1928 (known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris);

The General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, signed at Washington, January 5th, 1929;

The General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, signed at Washington, January 5th, 1929;

The Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro, October 10th, 1933 (known as the Saavedra Lamas Treaty).

It is important to note that, in Article 6 of this Convention, “*Without prejudice to the universal principles of neutrality provided for in the case of an international war outside of America and without affecting the duties contracted by those American States Members of the League of Nations*, the High Contracting Parties reaffirm their loyalty to the principles enunciated in the five Agreements referred to.”

*Convention concerning peaceful orientation
of public instruction*

I would like to stress the following provision, contained in Article I:

“The High Contracting Parties agree to organise in their public educational establishments, the teaching of the principles of pacific settlement of international disputes and the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, as well as the practical applications of these principles.”

Article II of the Convention provides:

“The High Contracting Parties agree to prepare, through their administrative authorities on public education, text-books or manuals of instruction adapted to all school grades, including the training of teaching staff, in order to promote understanding, mutual respect, and the importance of

¹ Starting 1889, since Pan-American Conferences gathered regularly, the Main concern of Latin American States was to create an efficient diplomatic instrument for the prevention and pacific settlement of conflicts on the American Continent. Among such instruments, one of the major was the “Treaty for the Pacific Settlement of Conflicts between American States,” signed at the Fifth Pan-American Conference, held in Santiago de Chile on May 3, 1923, known as the “Gondra Treaty”, after the name of the Paraguayan politician Manuel Gondra.

international co-operation. Persons in charge of instruction shall teach in accordance with the principles expressed therein.”

*

When South American States are mentioned, it is impossible not to think of a great number of important statesmen. I shall not be able to mention them all. I shall take four of them, and fulfil a pious duty with regard to the fifth.

I shall begin with M. Alexander Alvarez, a great jurist and diplomat, who created American International law and promoted its codification.

M. Guerrero¹, President of the tenth ordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, thanks to his legal knowledge and his objectivity, was elected a Member of the Permanent Court of International Justice and became its President.

Then M. de Mello Franco, the representative of Brazil to the League of Nations, today unfortunately absent from Geneva.

The merits of M. de Mello Franco on the international stage are so great that, through my intermediary, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Romania proposed his candidature for the Nobel Prize in a detailed memorandum dealing with his activities.

M. Saavedra Lamas, President of the seventeenth ordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, by his constructive mind and his exceptional qualities, has made Argentine the centre from which radiates international law, which is the only weapon against war.

Finally, I cannot bring the subject to a close without completing my reference to some important American statesmen by recalling the personality of my friend, Aguero y Bethancourt².

Because of the love he bore his country and Romania, of the valuable services rendered by him to Romania in Geneva, and of his extremely important contribution to the cause of Peace, I may say that the death of M. Aguero y Bethancourt was an irreparable loss for Cuba, for the League of Nations and for Romania.

As far as I am concerned, I owe him my intimate contact with the representatives of South America.

And as, with me, heart and mind remember alike, Aguero y Bethancourt is always inseparable from my memories of the League of Nations.

¹ José Gustavo Guerrero.

² Aristide de Aguero y Bethancourt.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND OTHER STATES

It would be impossible for me to discuss in detail the relations between Romania and every State in the world.

A thought from Romania for each of them is the only way of conciliating the friendship we profess for them all with the necessity of not unduly prolonging my statement.

With regard to the relations¹ between Romania and *AUSTRIA*, I consider that the two countries should make common efforts in order to render their present relations more cordial and more intimate.

In the past, Vienna's influence on Romania was very great. For many Romanians, Vienna was like a nearer Paris.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the two questions might have a detrimental influence on the relations between the Little Entente and Austria: the question of the Hapsburgs² and the Anschluss³.

On several occasions, the Little Entente has made its views on both points quite clear. We need not, therefore, deal with it at any length.

It could not consider the restoration of the Hapsburgs as an internal problem for Austria or Hungary, as some Austrian and Hungarian political leaders would have it.

On the other hand, the Anschluss would involve such a change in the present territorial situation of Central Europe that, in my opinion, it is a problem which goes beyond the Little Entente and affects the whole of Europe.

I shall merely add that the procedure followed by Austria in connection with her rearmament has not been such as to improve her relations with the Little Entente¹.

¹ From August 15, 1916 to December 5, 1920, Romania has no diplomatic representatives in Vienna. Her first post-war representative, as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Vienna, was Nicolae B. Cantacuzino, appointed to this office in September 2, 1920.

² On November 12, 1918, Austria proclaims itself a republic. The question of restoring the Austro-Hungarian monarchy under Otto of Hapsburg was periodically in the focus of European political circles, but approached more closely after Hitler's ascent to power in Germany. Taking the Hapsburgs restoration as a real menace to their territorial integrity, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia pronounced themselves categorically against their coming back to power, either by speaking up their stand within multilateral bodies (the Permanent Council of the Little Entente sessions: Bucharest – June 18–20, 1934; Belgrade – October 19, 1934; Bled – August 29–30, 1935; Belgrade – May 8, 1936, etc.), or by approaching the diplomatic chanceries in Paris, London, Rome and Berlin. Nicolae Titulescu was particularly active, putting forth convincing arguments that denounced the political and social threats posed by the Hapsburgs' restoration. Nicolae Titulescu offered arguments against the institution of a regency in Austria, represented by Prince Stahrenberg, considering that it paves the way for the Hapsburg monarchic régime.

³ Anschluss (from German *anschiessen*: to join). A policy of overrunning and liquidating Austria as a state, prompted by German imperialism after World War I. One of the first official attempts at implementing this policy was the launching, on March 25, 1931, of the projected Austro-German customs union, presented as an economic arrangement, but, actually, a first step towards Anschluss and aimed at the creation of a German Hinterland in the Danubian Basin. Hitler's advent to power in Germany (January 1933) spurred the German and Austrian reactionary circles' efforts for the achievement of the Anschluss.

It is none the less true that we all wish for an Austrian Austria. The States of the Little Entente, therefore, view favourably the earnest efforts of Chancellor Schuschnigg² for the maintenance of Austria's political independence against pressure from two sides.

As far as *HUNGARY* and *BULGARIA* are concerned, these two countries should note that nothing divides us from them. It is they who hold themselves aloof from us, with their constant grievances in connection with Revision and Minorities.

If Hungary and Bulgaria took the trouble to give closer study to my formula on the *spiritualisation of frontiers*,³ they would obtain much more substantial results than by their continuous complaints.

And, since I wish Romania to have a very clear relationship with these two countries, I speak my mind quite frankly to them:

a) From the point of view of Revision, these States will never receive a square inch of Romanian territory;

b) As far as Minorities are concerned, Romania is clearly opposed to making a régime of some Romanian citizens an object of international negotiations. We shall apply to the letter our obligations under the Minorities Treaty⁴. Anything which goes beyond the Minorities Treaty, even if we applied it in the past, will today meet with a categorical refusal.

¹ At the French-British-Italian Conference of Stresa (April 12–14, 1935) which examined the aftermaths of Germany's denouncing the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles (March 16, 1935), the participants adopted (April 14, 1935), upon a proposal advanced by Benito Mussolini, a resolution recommending the solution of Austrian, Bulgarian and Hungarian requests regarding the recognition of equal rights in matters of armaments, by negotiations between the states concerned and within the scope of general and regional security guarantees. The Little Entente and Balkan Entente member-states declared against the "recommendations" of the Stresa Conference, which could be interpreted as an approval given by the Three Great Powers to those states to arm themselves, and against the procedure adopted that reminded one of the Four-Power Pact.

² Kurt Eduard von Schuschnigg.

³ Before evoking the "spiritualization of frontiers", Nicolae Titulescu advocated and actioned for the building up of national unity and the Maintenance of territorial integrity, for the consolidation of the country's independence and sovereignty. The "spiritualization of frontiers" has never meant for him a reducing to a secondary importance the defence of those frontiers, and so much the more, a renunciation to the need for their firm defence. Titulescu's whole political discourse attests to the fact that by this phrase, the Romanian statesman and diplomat understood a rejection of any expressions of autarchy, isolationism, and exclusivism, that he meant cooperation on an equal footing, in which the inalienable rights of each and every one are preserved and observed. The beginning of this century, but especially the post World War I years, have stood, for us others Romanians, under the sign of coming back to the Mother Country of the territories snatched violently by the neighbouring empires, of regaining Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina, of consolidating the rights over these lands that have since ever been Romanian, of defending the frontiers sanctified by the blood shed by so many millions of martyr-heroes, of defending them at the East, at the West, at the South, everywhere and for ever. Titulescu never played with words. This is Titulescu's lesson, a lesson he learnt from his illustrious forefathers, whose oeuvre he understood to continue and consolidate. Any attempt at attributing him other meanings would be not only a misunderstanding or an effort to discredit him, but the backing of certain interests which have nothing in common with those of the Romanian people.

⁴ The Minorities Treaty between the principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, and Romania, on the other, was signed in Paris on December 9, 1919. On behalf of Romania, it was signed by General Constantin Coandă, former President of the Council of Ministers (1918).

In these circumstances, I am in favour of forming the Danubian States into an economic system¹ such as President Tardieu proposed in 1933, and for which President Hodza² is now most usefully striving.

However, I hope that we will not be misunderstood: we bring to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria such important economic assets that we cannot accept the idea that we would be the principal beneficiaries of the Danubian Confederation. We will never, for any reason whatsoever, concede anything on the ground of Revision or Minorities in order to realise it.

With regard to *SWITZERLAND*, with whom we have the most excellent relations³, I do not think I can add anything to what I already said at the opening meeting of the Montreux Conference⁴ on June 22nd, 1936:

“In the international life of today, Switzerland plays a part which only those who are closely connected with her can truly appreciate.

It is on Swiss soil that we statesmen, coming from so many countries of the world, try to construct this home of humanity, in which each of our countries should find its place, without losing its personality, in order to create the great universal harmony. This may be an ambitious dream, but it is also such an active reality that no disillusion should discourage us, for the light of tomorrow is so strong in us that it shines over our thoughts and our hearts.

It is on Swiss soil that, for more than sixteen years, we have been called upon to follow the course of events which might endanger the peace of the world, so much so that, having felt the keenest political emotions of our life in the midst of the Swiss Confederation, we are inclined to consider ourselves as her citizens by right.

Finally, it is on Swiss soil that we are called upon to learn to organise and strengthen this second loyalty which must uphold and discipline the loyalty we

¹ The idea of a Danubian Confederation was born in France, immediately after the Peace of Versailles. Romania, like other nation-states in Central Europe, opposed the project, which caused its failure. In March 1932, French premier André Tardieu – with a view to counteract Germany’s expansionist plan in Central Europe and to strengthen the French influence in that region – mapped out a plan for the creation of the Danubian Economic Union, which provided that the Danubian riparian states had to give up the most favoured nation clause and set preferential tariffs in their trade relations. The Little Entente States accepted, as a matter of principle, such a plan, but expressed numerous reserves. Nevertheless, on political and economic grounds they sought some ways to getting to an understanding with Austria and Hungary. Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia expressed the following claims: negotiations should be conducted directly between the Danubian countries, without the immixture of the great powers; the economic union should be based on preferential agreements on a contingent fee basis, without the creation of a customs union; the economic union should not be directed against Germany or Italy; liberty to sell to third parties the commodities the Danubian Economic Union cannot absorb; mutual respect of the interests of the Little Entente States. The Tardieu Plan, which reiterated the French Plan of the 1920 Danubian Confederation, was discussed in a larger framework, at the Lausanne Conference (July 16–19, 1932). The Italian and German governments opposed such a plan, and so did Austria and Hungary; Great Britain waited in expectation, wishing to ensure for herself an arbitration role. Practically, the Conference of Lausanne marks the failure of the Tardieu Plan.

² Milan Hodža.

³ Romania has established diplomatic relations with Switzerland in 1911. On June 16, 1911, N.B. Cantacuzino presented his credentials as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania at Bern. Romania’s Legation in Bern was created in October 1916.

⁴ The Conference of Montreux on the Black Sea Straits Régime took place between June 22 and July 20, 1936.

owe to our countries and which I shall call 'patriotism for the international community.' This is a conception which is about to make a sensational appearance as a real and constructive force or which, if past miseries have not been sufficient to prepare its coming, should indicate by its very absence that the future is only made of darkness and that the human race must still suffer, not in order to progress, but to deserve the trust we had placed in it and actually to become what we thought it had already become.

Federalism or anarchy! That is the great lesson we have learned on Swiss soil."

BELGIUM has strong and old-established bonds¹ of friendship with us. Before the War, our ambition was to become the Belgium of the East.

With her possessions in the Congo and through her policy, Belgium has attained an exceptional position: she keeps her neutrality, that is to say, she intervenes in favour of no one, and, notwithstanding this, her own neutrality is guaranteed by Great Britain and France². In such circumstances, it is easy to understand how she remains neutral. It is in order to promote such a policy that His Majesty King Leopold III has worked, as well as the Prime Minister, M. van Zeeland³, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Spaak⁴, with their unsurpassable skill.

To the guarantee given by France and England, was recently added that of Germany⁵; the guarantee of Italy is expected.

If all prejudice is set aside, it is, in reality, easy to understand that Belgium did not want to provoke Germany by her Treaties of alliance, because we see that, even without these Treaties, Great Britain and France maintain their obligations to defend her, with no equivalent counterpart.

Belgium's geographical situation has made possible this unparalleled international position.

As to the intervention of England and France should Belgium be attacked, let us speak frankly: Great Britain and France defend themselves by defending Belgium. However, the comprehensive spirit which they have shown in the question should be recognised. Instead of quarrelling, a new situation was reached by friendly, almost fraternal, negotiations.

By accepting her election to a semi-permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations, Belgium gave proof that she was not neglecting her international duties.

This acceptance of such a position in the League of Nations should convince us that the assertions of those who pretend that a fresh political orientation is hidden under the new edifice of neutrality do not correspond to the facts.

¹ Romania has established diplomatic relations with Belgium in 1880. Romania's first diplomatic representative in Belgium was Mihai Mitileneu, appointed on April 17, 1880, with the rank of minister resident. Belgium created its Legation in Bucharest on November 18, 1883.

² The Rhineland Guarantees Pact, adopted at the International Conference of Locarno, attended by Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, Poland (October 5–16, 1925), provided the inviolability of the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers.

³ Paul van Zeeland.

⁴ Paul Henri Charles Spaak.

⁵ On October 13, 1937, Germany recognized the inviolability and integrity of Belgium.

Our geographical and political situation is different from that of Belgium, and those who believe that Romania could have the same policy as Belgium are completely devoid of any political judgment.

Who would be willing to guarantee Romania, without Romania guaranteeing them?

I would certainly not refuse a serious guarantee to all our neighbours, provided such a guarantee is not merely a pretext to separate us from France and Great Britain, but, between an isolated Romania and a Romania covered by Pacts of mutual assistance on all her frontiers, I prefer the second.

We entertain very good relations¹ with the *NETHERLANDS*. We must not forget that they constitute an Empire, with only the mother-country in Europe. They have a surface of 8,108,000 square miles – including their possessions – and a population of 68,393,000 also including other possessions. The life of Holland is extremely well organised, and her geographical neutrality, which can be enforced by flooding her territory in case of invasion, was adopted on her own free will, and imposed on all by the strength of her national genius. All the above-mentioned factors greatly enhance the value of the country, not only in peace time, but also in the event of a future war and the preparation of the New Peace which would follow.

PORTUGAL is, for us Romanians, a country we love and appreciate, not only because we worked hand-in-hand in the League of Nations, and always, without exception, in agreement, but also because, under the wise guidance of its great Prime Minister, Salazar², it has been able to enforce respect for its national interests as it understood them, by great and small alike.

SPAIN is today the object of a fratricidal struggle³. We hope this struggle will cease as soon as possible. To this end, it is necessary that foreign volunteers should leave Spanish soil as quickly as possible, so that a real policy of non-intervention may be scrupulously carried out. “Spain to the Spaniards” is our motto. By this we mean, Spain to the kind of Spaniards she chooses to have. We have no preference for either side.

It is, however, sad and disquieting to find that today Spain has become a basis of operations for those who want to have a privileged position in the Mediterranean. The Nyon Conference has clearly shown the intention of France and Great Britain to transform the Mediterranean into a *condominium*, and not a sea belonging to a single Power.

I am glad to see that Italy has accepted to play the political part in the Mediterranean which devolved upon her by the Nyon Agreement⁴.

Spain will be still dearer to Romania when the civil war has come to an end, because of the sufferings she will have endured.

Passing to *DENMARK*, *NORWAY* and *SWEDEN*, I can declare without fear of denial that these three countries are amongst the staunchest supporters of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Their security being assured – completely, in the case of Norway

¹ Romania established diplomatic relations with The Netherlands in February 1880. On July 25, 1898, Ion N. Papiniu was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania in The Hague.

² Antonio de Oliveira Salazar.

³ The Civil War in Spain lasted between July 1936–March 1939.

⁴ Over September 10–14, 1937, Nyon (Switzerland) hosted the Conference on the freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean, which examined and adopted the Nyon Agreement, signed by Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey and the U.S.S.R.

and Sweden, and almost completely, in the case of Denmark – they see in the League of Nations, not an ideal which may be forgotten in the ante-chamber, but a fact before which everyone must bow.

Hence the great moral authority of these States in international life.

In fact, in seeking a moral authority in inverse ratio to the number of square miles and inhabitants, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland must always be cited.

Holland and Belgium have to be excepted from this rule, in spite of their great authority, because of their extensive territories in other parts of the world.

My aim has been to give my country similar international authority, through the rectitude of her political judgment and her tenacity with regard to the positions she openly occupies.

FINLAND and the *Baltic States: LATVIA, ESTONIA* and *LITHUANIA*, have important common interests with Romania because of their geographical situation. These countries, through the degree of civilisation they have attained, are prime elements in the international community.

That is why I wanted to create a Legation in the capitals of each of these States: not only in Helsingfors, but also in Tallin¹, Riga² and Kovno³, to which should be added the Legations I had already set up in Norway⁴ and Denmark⁵, when I was Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Legation in Sweden was already in existence.

Romania must have close relations with all the nations of the earth.

A Legation is barely a visiting card to start relations. The running expenses of these Legations do not in any way represent the figures which are given to public opinion by partial propaganda which desires our absence, so that others may work alone everywhere. They only amount to modest sums, easily borne by the budget of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Passing now to the British Dominions, it is surprising to find how close are the bonds uniting Romania to some of them.

I do not refer to the perfect collaboration between Romania and the Dominions in the League of Nations.

INDIA, for example, with her special status, whether represented by H.R.H the Maharajah of Kapurthala⁶, by H.R.H. the Aga Khan⁷, or by another Maharajah, has always been at Romania's side at the most difficult times.

One point of interest is that, after the War, it was a British Dominion – *CANADA* – which granted Romania the first loan for the purchase of foodstuffs, because the occupation of Romania left us so poor that we had to import flour. Canada granted us a loan of 25 million dollars.

¹ On October 1, 1935, Gheorghe Davidescu was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Tallin.

² The Romanian Legation in Riga was opened under Law No. 3809 of December 31, 1927.

³ Romania's first diplomatic representative in Lithuania was Constantin Vălimărescu, appointed, on December 16, 1935, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

⁴ In 1922, Romania's Legation in Norway as well as other legations were closed on economic grounds. On March 29, 1934, Nicolae Titulescu proposed the reopening of Romania's Legation in Oslo. D. Juraşcu was appointed on April 5, 1934, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania in Oslo.

⁵ At Nicolae Titulescu's proposal, on June 20, 1934, Gheorghe Assan was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania in Copenhagen.

⁶ Jagatjit Singh Bahadur, Maharajah of Kapurthala.

⁷ Aga Khan (Aga Sultan Sir Mohamed Shah).

In 1922, I was asked by Vintila Bratiano to negotiate with the Canadian Government with a view to including this loan in the consolidation of Treasury Bonds. The Canadian Government accepted this proposal.

That is why, at the end of 1925 and the beginning of 1926, when I went to America to consolidate our War debts, I considered it my duty to visit the Canadian Government and thank them for the help they had given to Romania.

Another interesting fact is that, in later years, the person who supported me most in the Council of the League – and this in terms of the greatest praise – was the representative of *SOUTH AFRICA*, Mr. te Water¹, President of the fourteenth Assembly of the League of Nations.

I have great pleasure in recollecting my collaboration with the representatives of the other Dominions *AUSTRALIA* and *NEW ZEALAND*, as well as with the *IRISH FREE STATE*.

Passing from the British Empire to Asia, and beginning with *IRAN* (Persia), I may say it was soon plain to me that the Government of Iran and myself were in complete agreement as to the identity of our common interests².

As a result of conversations which took place in Geneva, the Government of Iran made to me the following communication: “We want to organise diplomatic representation in the Balkans. If Romania has a Permanent Legation in Teheran, the Government of Iran will set up a Permanent Legation in Bucharest, to serve for all the Balkan States. If the Romanian Government does not create a Permanent Legation in Teheran, then the Government of Iran will have its permanent Legation in another Balkan State and the Iranian Minister in that State will represent our country in Bucharest.”

With the authorisation of His Majesty the King, and that of the Romanian Government, I replied that we accepted the first proposal: a Permanent Legation of Iran in Bucharest, to serve for all the Balkan States.

The creation of our Legation in Teheran was not without its utility. On several occasions, we were informed by our Minister in Teheran of Iran’s desire to organise direct connections between the Mouths of the Danube and Iran, through the Black Sea. Romania would thus have reaped the benefit of important traffic. We were also asked from Teheran to make offers for the construction of railways, and the sale of railway engines and carriages, etc. I transmitted all these requests to the competent authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not to be held responsible for the attitude they adopted.

I want to congratulate *TURKEY* on her agreement with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan.

M. Tewfik Rüstü Aras had known for a long time that I wanted to conclude a similar agreement as a prolongation of the Balkan Pact.

However, as I have mentioned the prolongation of the Balkan Pact, I see a country which, through its geographical position is the path of the latter. That country is *EGYPT*. On March 20th, 1937, I had the honour to state this view to His Majesty King

¹ Charles Theodore te Water.

² On October 1, 1935, the opening of Romania’s Legation in Teheran was decided by royal decree. Grigore Constantinescu was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Teheran, and, in this capacity, he presented his credentials on May 10, 1936.

Farouk¹. And, while on the subject of His Majesty, I should like to renew my respectful wishes for a long, prosperous and glorious reign, on the occasion of his recent coronation.

Our relations with Egypt might be improved and intensified to the advantage of both countries.

I claim the honour of having, as early as 1927, in my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, transformed our representation in Egypt into a regular Legation².

Romania must not forget that her foreign policy is not constituted only by her relations with France, England, Italy, Germany and the U.S.S.R., but also by her relations with the Balkan States and with countries in the vicinity of these regions. I shall not cite the Members of the Balkan Entente, but, apart from Egypt and Iran, I cannot refrain from mentioning *IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, ARABIA* and other States.

With regard to *ARABIA*, I must say that, when faced with the armed attacks of Great Britain on Basra and Gaza in 1914 and 1915, the Government of the Turkish Sultan allowed the people of Arabia to organise its national defence in case Turkey were obliged to abandon Arabian territory.

Prince Habib Lotfallah, then Assistant Governor-General of the Vilayet of Beirut, undertook the command of this National Defence.

Its organisation was as follows:

a) Organisation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia as a Republic, having Baghdad as its capital;

b) Organisation of the Arabian Peninsula as a Federation, under the rule of His Majesty Hussein the First³, then Sherif of Mecca, with Mecca as its capital.

Great Britain and her Allies, seeing that Turkey had declared a Holy War against the Allied Powers, entered into secret negotiations with His Majesty Hussein the First, and signed with him the treaty called the *MacMahon*⁴-*Hussein Treaty*, which clearly defines the frontiers of the new Kingdom of Arabia, as follows: The Taurus⁵ in the North, Iran (Persia) in the East, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in the South, and the Egyptian frontier and the Mediterranean in the West – in other words, the natural frontiers of the Kingdom of Arabia.

This Treaty brought the Committee of National Defence to end, and united all Arabians without exception around His Majesty Hussein the First. This movement succeeded in dealing a moral blow to the Central Powers.

After the War, the young Kingdom of Arabia was partitioned into several States which were placed, directly or indirectly, under British and French mandates.

The question of the British mandate over Palestine is of great interest: it involves, not only the creation of a National Home for the Jews which certain European countries want to get rid of, but also the political part which Palestine and Arabia could play in the future in order to facilitate the policy of France and Great Britain in these regions.

¹ Farouk I.

² Romania's Legation in Cairo was re-created under Law No. 3809 of December 31, 1927. Filip Lahovary was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Cairo.

³ Husayn ibn Ali.

⁴ Arthur Henry MacMahon.

⁵ Taurus (Turkish = Toros). Mountain chain, in the Anatolia Plateau, between the Aegean Sea and the Armenian Tableland (1500 km long). It is formed of Western Taurus (Lycian), Central Toros (Cilician and Anti-Taurus) and the Eastern Taurus (Armenian Taurus).

Those who have read the masterly pages of the statement made by the Right Honourable W. Ormsby-Gore¹, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Permanent Mandates Commission at its extraordinary session held at Geneva from July 30th to August 18th, 1937, as well as the declaration made by Mr. Eden at the Council meeting held on Tuesday, September 14th, 1937, will realise once more that it is Great Britain's sincerity which, above all, accounts for her greatness.

The Right Honourable W. Ormsby-Gore, when recalled the history of the seventeen years during which Great Britain exercised a mandate over Palestine, never hesitated to state that he pleaded guilty.

In 1936, disturbances² broke out in Palestine. Jewish nationalism came into such a violent contact with Arab nationalism that the British Parliament immediately appointed a Commission to study the causes of these disturbances and suggest the most appropriate means to bring them to an end.

The report of the Commission was studied by the United Kingdom Government. The recommendations contained in it were approved by the Cabinet and are set out in a short "Statement of Policy" published as "Command Paper 5513".

The definite conclusions of the Government are as follows:

"1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom... have considered the unanimous report of the Palestine Royal Commission. They find themselves in general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Commission.

2. As is fully recognised by the Commissioners in their historical survey, His Majesty's Government and their predecessors, since the obligations of the mandate were accepted, have taken the view, which the tenor of the mandate itself implies, that their obligations to Arabs and Jews respectively were not incompatible, on the assumption that in the process of time the two races would adjust their national aspirations as to render possible the establishment of a single commonwealth under a unitary Government.

3. In spite of many discouraging experiences during the seventeen years, His Majesty's Government have based their policy on expectation, and have taken every opportunity of encouraging co-operation between Arabs and Jews. In the light of experience and of arguments adduced by the Commission, they are driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock. His Majesty's Government propose to advise His Majesty accordingly.

4. His Majesty's Government therefore propose to take such steps as are necessary and appropriate, having regard to their existing treaty obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations and other international instruments, to obtain freedom to give effect to a scheme of partition, which they earnestly hope that it may be possible to secure an effective measure of consent on the part of the communities concerned."

¹ William George Arthur of Harlech (W. Ormsby Gore).

² 1936-1939 witnessed in fact a general anti-British uprising of the Arab population in Palestine, which turned into a guerrilla war.

The aim of the British Government is the termination of the mandate in respect of Trans-Jordan and the greater part of Palestine, with a view to the creation of two new independent sovereign States – the one Arab and the other Jewish – and the reservation of certain places in Palestine, some permanently, others possibly only temporarily, under British mandate, such mandate involving modifications of the existing one.

At the outset, His Majesty's Government made clear to the Mandates Commission that they were not tied, and had not committed themselves in detail to the particular scheme of partition briefly outlined in the Royal Commission's report.

Therefore, the British Government only communicated a provisional plan of partition to the Mandates Commission.

The Right Honourable W. Ormsby-Gore stated that, in the course of the last seventeen years, the gulf between Jews and Arabs had widened. The real aim of the Jews was to establish in Palestine a Jewish civilisation which, to use their own words, would be as Jewish as England is English.

Equally, the Arabs of Palestine want to preserve their civilisation, their ancient manner of life, their manners and customs, and they do not want to be diluted either by British ideas or by Jewish ideas.

To the Jew, Palestine is "Eretz Israel" – the land of Israel – and he calls it that.

To the Arabs, Palestine is an Arab country, part of a new renascent Arab world that for four centuries has been dominated by the Turks and is now a young nation again, divided into separate administrations, but with one object in view: to revive once again the glories of Arab mediaeval civilisation.

What renders the question still more difficult is that, for the Arabs, there are too many Jews in Palestine already, whereas the Jews want the whole of Palestine and some of them want Trans-Jordan as well, as a National Home for the Jewish people throughout the world.

From the point of view of the Jew, the Arab belongs to a backward people, to what they would call a different and lower civilisation.

From the point of view of the Arab, with his aristocratic ideas, the Jew is called by the name of "Yahoudi", which is a term of contempt.

The Right Honourable W. Ormsby-Gore said:

"The belief that, because both races are alleged to have descended originally from Abraham, they would be able to assimilate their civilisation in this century and become again one people has been shown by the experience of the last seventeen years to be ill-founded, and the policy based upon it has been a failure. We plead guilty to the charge that we have followed the policy of conciliation to the point of weakness, believing that conciliation and impartial treatment were obligations inherent in the mandate as it now stands."

The Right Honourable W. Ormsby-Gore also declared that he had every reason to believe that quite a number of Jews were prepared to consider a solution by means of partition if, by doing so, they could obtain certain things, but there were some Jews who would probably always feel disappointed by a solution by means of partition and be definitely opposed to it.

As regards the Arabs, he thought it was quite clear that the Trans-Jordan Arabs would welcome anything which implied their unification with their brothers in Palestine and the termination of the mandate for Trans-Jordan.

Without considering the proposal made by the Royal Commission for the partition of Palestine as the expression of final views, but rather as a statement of views which should be subjected to our critical judgment, it is useful to ascertain the main lines of this proposal.

The Jewish State would have a corridor under British mandate. This corridor would include: Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Then the Jewish State would extend both north and south of this zone, in which Great Britain would have a Permanent Mandate over the Holy Places. The Southern part of the Jewish State would constitute a separate part, the city of Jaffa remaining Arab. This area, south of Jaffa, contains some of the most cherished and most firmly established Jewish colonies: Rishon-le-Siyon and Rehoboth.

With regard to the western frontier of Palestine, although Acre is Arab, M. W. Ormsby-Gore stresses the fact that the Jews only have a restricted area for possible agricultural settlement, and already own nearly all the land between Haifa and Acre.

With regard to Haifa, the representative of the United Kingdom tells us that it is the commercial capital of Palestine; it has the one really good harbour in the country, and is the terminus of the pipeline from Iraq.

As it is a port of Trans-Jordan, it is perfectly clear that a special régime would have to be established in Haifa, with all its inevitable complications in regards to Customs, etc.

As to British enclaves, two would be permanent and two temporary.

The permanent enclaves would consist of:

- a) Jerusalem and a considerable area round Jerusalem, and
- b) the Nazareth enclave in the middle of the Jewish State. The Right Honourable Ormsby-Gore believed there were almost no Jews in Nazareth: it is a purely Christian town, and is quite as much a Holy Place from the Christian point of view as Bethlehem or Jerusalem itself.

Moreover, in order to carry out the duty of guarding the Holy Places, Great Britain asks for the region between Jerusalem and the sea, including Ramle and Lydda, if only because they happen to be the present cantonments and headquarters of the British Troops and Air Force.

Finally, the representative of the United Kingdom, foreseeing a long period of antagonism between Arabs and Jews, dealt with the defence of the proposed New Jewish and Arab States.

It was obvious that, at any rate for a period, the League would expect Great Britain, the former mandatory Power, to retain forces in the country to guarantee whatever settlement was finally approved by the League.

He was convinced that, taking Iraq as an example, similar provisions would have to be inserted in the Treaties between the United Kingdom, the Jewish State and the Arab State.

These provisions imply the necessity of consultation in case there is a risk of rupture with one of the contracting Parties.

Notwithstanding this, should either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in a war, the other High Contracting Party, subject always to provisions similar

to those contained in Article 9 of the Anglo-Iraqi¹ Treaty should immediately come to its aid in the capacity of an ally.

Similarly, the representative of Great Britain dealt with the question of Minorities in the future regime of Palestine under the partition scheme. He envisaged provisions which would go beyond those which are made in the ordinary Minorities Treaties operating under League auspices in many countries in Europe.

Finally, the representative of the United Kingdom thought that any scheme of partition should involve the conferring of a permanent mandate on Great Britain for the safeguarding of what are called the "Holy Places." These Holy Places include more particularly Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, which are Christian; but they also include the Haram-esh-Sharif, a famous Mohammedan Holy Place, and the Wailing Wall, outside the Haram, a Jewish shrine for all time.

In connection with the administration of the Holy Places, the United Kingdom has always endeavoured to maintain the *status quo*, i.e., the existing rights of the various Christian churches over Christian Holy Places, of the Moslem over their Holy Places, and the Jews over theirs.

At the ninety-eighth session of the Council, and more particularly at its meeting on Tuesday, September 14th, 1937, Mr. Eden gave a summary of the preliminary statement made by the Right Honourable W. Ormsby-Gore before the Mandate Commission.

M. Delbos, while not wishing to anticipate the moment when the Council would have a draft resolution before it on the Palestine question, was anxious at once to express the French Government's appreciation of the candour, fairness and impartiality of the attitude taken up by the mandatory Power in presence of the difficulties it was encountering in the application of its mandate.

Why should not the Palestine and Arabian question be settled according to the British proposal – of course, with all the modifications which experience will render necessary?

I am of the opinion that the British proposal, as outlined by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Eden, according to the report of the Royal Commission, is the only reasonable solution to the difficulties created by the antagonism between Jewish and Arab nationalisms which developed during the latter years.

Even though the proposal be only a preliminary one, the principle of partition of Palestine should be considered as definitely adopted.

More particularly now that many nations no longer allow Jews to live on their territories, the Jewish National Home must be large enough to answer, as far as possible, the needs in view of which it was created, and those of justice.

On the other hand, we should not alienate the goodwill of the Moslem world.

When the map of the world is examined, it may be seen that, starting from the Atlantic, that is to say, beginning with Spanish Morocco, and passing through French Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya (Tripoli and Syrenaïca) to Egypt, Arabia, Iraq, Iran and India, not to mention various other regions, there is a population of over 260 millions of Moslems.

¹ The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed on June 30, 1930. It ended the British mandate, but Great Britain Maintained her troops and the right to place military bases on the Iraqi territory.

An Arab State, based on race not on religion, the ally of Great Britain, in the manner contemplated by the latter, could play an important international part, and more particularly the part of Buffer State between East and West.

The fact that the Right Honourable W. Ormsby-Gore asked for a permanent British mandate, not only over the Holy Places – first and foremost, over Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, which are Christian – but also over Haram-esh-Sharif, a Moslem Holy Place, and the Wailing Wall, a Jewish Holy Place, is, for me, a symbol. Great Britain wants to substitute harmony between nations for political quarrels.

States would fail in their elementary duty towards the international community if they did not give their support to such a scheme.

If we pass from Arabia to *CHINA* and *JAPAN*, we find that both nations are equally the friends of Romania. They have an ancient civilisation. Their history and their code of honour in private life are both exceptional. These two nations – Japan, until she withdrew from the League of Nations – had such ability for carrying out the important international duties which were entrusted to them, that they are worthy of our special consideration.

Unfortunately, the Sino-Japanese war, which began in September 1931, has recently – and tragically – flared up again¹.

Romania has given her views on the Sino-Japanese conflict in the statement which I had the honour to make on March 7th, 1932, to the General Committee of the extraordinary session of the Assembly, convened on the request of the Chinese Government, in conformity with Article 15 of the Covenant.

Actually, these views were inspired by an equal sympathy towards both Parties, and were based on the six following principles:

- a) Immediate and final cessation of all hostilities;
- b) Necessity of concluding a military armistice as soon as possible – without any political conditions;
- c) Necessity of protecting persons, whatever their nationality, and property;
- d) Necessity of not infringing on the territorial integrity of one of the Parties;
- e) Necessity of basing future negotiations on a scrupulous respect of Treaties;
- f) Necessity for the League of Nations to have a single doctrine for all its Members, whatever their geographical situation might be.

Except for the last of these paragraphs, which is no longer applicable since Japan has left the League², I believe that the principles I outlined in 1932 still hold good in the present case. They are similar to those enunciated by the delegates of various Governments at the Nine Power Conference³ (“Pacific Conference”) in November 1937.

Japan was invited to participate in that Conference, but she refused the invitation.

Another appeal addressed to her by the Conference itself has met with the same fate.

¹ On July 7, 1937, the Japanese troops attacked the Chinese units stationed at the Marco Polo Bridge, south-west of Beijing. The incident marks the resumption of the Sino-Japanese war. On July 28, 1937, the Japanese troops occupy Beijing.

² On March 27, 1933, Japan leaves the League of Nations.

³ Japan’s new aggression against China caused the summoning in Brussels, on November 3, 1937, of the Conference of Washington Treaty Signatory States (Nine-Power Treaty), signed on February 6, 1922. Japan and Germany refused to participate in the Conference, this being one of the causes of its failure. In fact, on December 15, 1934, Japan had denounced the Washington Treaty.

However, it is extremely important to find the correlation which exists between the present Sino-Japanese war and Italy's signature¹ of the Pact against Communism, already signed by Germany and Japan last year.

Italy's signature does not constitute an accession. It is a signature by which she becomes an original party to what may be called the "Triplice" of November 6th, 1937.

It would be premature to form an exact opinion as to the repercussions of the Agreement. There is, however, some cause for anxiety in the fact that, under the guise of fighting Communism, the signatories of the Pact of November 6th recognise each other's right to intervene in the internal affairs of other States. Another very important point which should be noted is that – although it is directed against Communism – the Pact is chiefly against Great Britain and France.

Indeed, it would be difficult to see how Italy could lend her assistance to an attack against the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, it is easy to realise how any one of these three Powers, Germany, Japan and Italy, can threaten the interests of France and Great Britain, more particularly in their colonies and possessions.

However careful may be our judgment on the new Triplice, it is none the less true that its formation, at the very moment when the Spanish problem has become much more acute and when Japan is at war with China, is not likely to contribute to the consolidation of existing Peace.

¹ On November 25, 1936, Germany and Japan sign in Berlin the Anti-Komintern Pact, declaring as its principal aim the fight against communist domination. On November 6, 1937, Italy joins the Anti-Komintern Pact, which marks the creation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis.

THE EUROPEAN DANUBE COMMISSION

When I saw that, as a result of the Montreux Conference, Turkey managed to get rid of the Régime of the Straits, I thought: ‘the hour has come for Romania, too, to escape from the international régime of restriction constituted by the European Danube Commission.’”

I must confess that I did not find, in the Government to which I belonged, the comprehension and support which I expected. Before raising the question by means of diplomatic notes, I tried to prepare international public opinion by an appropriate statement, which was published in the issue of July 30th, 1936, of the newspaper “Le Temps”.

I informed my Government of this intention by stating that I wanted to seize a suitable opportunity to carry out the wishes of late John and Vintila Bratiano.

Let me quote a few passages from a most interesting study in which science and experience are associated with a very terse style: *The Mouths of the Danube*¹, by M. Grégoire C. Vasilescu, Chief Engineer, Assistant Director of the Romanian Maritime Service, former Engineer of the European Danube Commission.

“In my observations on the technical and economic activity of the European Danube Commission, I have divided the activity of the Commission into four periods:

The first period, extending from 1856 to 1907, represents half a century of useful activity of the Commission and of prosperous navigation in the mouths of the Danube.

The second period comprises the stormy interval between 1907 and 1921, during which Danubian trade was reduced on account of the Balkan War and the World War. Throughout the period, the European Commission shone by its complete absence of technical activity, notwithstanding the warnings given to it. The Commission was suppressed by the Treaty of Bucharest and reinstituted by the Treaty of Versailles.

The third period, from 1921 to 1930, was one during which the dykes of Sulina were extended. This raised great hopes for the future of navigation in the mouths of the Danube, but, later, these hopes vanished like dreams.

Finally, the last period, from 1931 to the present day, has been one during which the European Danube Commission has lost all technical orientation. It is terrorised by the urgent necessity of a new outlet to the sea and by the financial crisis through which it is struggling; it clings to all suggestions made to it, adopts sometimes the Sulina Arm, and sometimes the St. George Arm, as the future navigable waterway and, in the end, keeps the Sulina mouth for the present by the continuous extension of the dykes into the sea.”

Engineer Grégoire C. Vasilescu had had the kindness to add:

¹ Reference is made to the work *Gurile Dunării*, Bucharest, 1936. Eng. Grigore C. Vasilescu wrote a long list of works on this subject.

“We hope that the technical and financial facts, which we state in all objectivity in the present volume, *will lead, without any trace of doubt, to the mature conclusions of M. N. Titulesco.*”

He also added that the technical and financial incompetence of the European Danube Commission “would lead the Romanian Government to prompt and drastic action, *on the lines indicated by M. Titulesco* in order to save our economic interests and our national dignity before it is too late.”

What are these conclusions of mine, mentioned by this author?

First of all, I must say that I have only come to them after studying the technical side of the question and after agreement with my great friend, Minister Contzesco¹.

I said: I reached an agreement with Minister Contzesco, because, a few years before, he was of another opinion, and because I would have proposed nothing had it not been in agreement with him.

Indeed, everyone does not yet sufficiently appreciate the services rendered to Romania by Minister Contzesco.

When I was interviewed by one of the correspondents of the newspaper “Le Temps”, who asked me if I had raised the question of suppressing the European Danube Commission at the Montreux Conference, I replied clearly and truthfully as follows:

“This question can only be dealt with by diplomatic note sent to the Foreign Ministries concerned, when the Royal Romanian Government thinks fit to raise it officially.

It would, however, be useless hypocrisy to hide from international public opinion the main lines of our future action and the feelings of Romania.

In order to understand the question completely, it must be remembered that there are two Danube commissions. One called the International Commission, set up by Peace Treaties, has its headquarters in Vienna. The other, called the European Commission, set up by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, has its headquarters in Galatzi.

It is the suppression of the second of these Commissions which Romania deems necessary because, as will be seen, it constitutes the most incredible anachronism, the most inadmissible foreign territorial control, the international body least fitted for the tasks with a view to which it was created.

Romania does not deny the international character of the Danube. Except for the functions which are within territorial competence and which should be handed over to the Romanian State, the International Danube Commission might extend its competence as far as the mouths of the river.

We are not asking for revision. As I said in my opening speech at the Montreux Conference, I shall always oppose any territorial revision, but I shall study any requests for revision which do not touch upon the territory and which are made in legal form. M. Litvinoff went still further. Not only did he repudiate territorial revision, but also non-territorial revisions which would be contrary to the interests of peace. It seems to me that the restoration to Romania of the

¹ Constantin M. Contzescu.

territorial attributes of any sovereign State is an act which serves the cause of peace.

Strictly speaking, the question which we intend to raise is not one of revision of Treaties: it is the question of the unification of the Danube Régime, since no other international river in the world is under the control of two Commissions.

The Danube flows through, *inter alia*, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Romania. I do not think it is asking too much if I claim equal treatment with Austrians, Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Yugoslavs with regard to the Régime of the Danube. None of my fellow-countrymen could accept anything so contrary to our dignity as restrictions on Romania's sovereignty with regard to the Danube simply because, in the past, no one dared impose any servitude on the Austro-Hungarian Empire (today represented by the above-mentioned States) because it was a Great Power, whereas almost one hundred years ago we had to accept the conditions laid down by the self-same Great Power in order to be authorised to open our eyes to the light of day as a national State.

Let us get closer to the facts, from the technical, moral and political points of view.

For many years now, the European Danube Commission has been struggling with the gravest and most hopeless financial difficulties. Having lived, for a long time, on a scale which no longer tallies with the yield of navigation dues, these dues had to be considerably increased as soon as works which had been neglected or stopped during the War were resumed. The technical work necessitated by the continuous silting up devoured such huge sums that these were no longer covered by the yield of the dues. It has become impossible to provide for the service of successive loans, granted either by the four Governments out of public funds or by private banks. The extraordinary and growing diminution of maritime traffic, which gives a true picture of the European economic disorder and stagnation, accentuates from day to day the helpless position in which the European Danube Commission finds itself. In addition to this hopeless situation, the silting up resulting from the regular and unavoidable alluvial deposits, which are registered every year, makes it necessary for the Commission to act quickly in order not to lose in a flash the efforts of years.

It has become increasingly difficult to get help from Governments, except the Romanian Government which, being more particularly concerned with the carrying out of the necessary work, and having its vital economic interests threatened, is always ready to make the heaviest sacrifices to avoid the risk of having outlets of the country to the sea blocked by an obstruction which is always threatening and always possible.

In these circumstances, the Romanian Government should neither neglect nor fear to proclaim openly that it has no intention of allowing the destruction of Romania's only important fluvial outlet to the Black Sea, which is the keystone of her economic life.

Passing to moral and political considerations, they are so numerous that an enumeration of them can only be descriptive but not exhaustive.

The Commission was set up in order to provide 'for the work to be carried out at the mouths of the river and in neighbouring reaches.' But, together with these technical duties, the commission had administrative functions with regard to navigation. And since technical regulation involves the repression of offences, it was an easy step to the creation of a new legal system.

The Commission's staff is recruited from foreign or Romanian nationals, who are exclusively under the orders of the Commission. An agent of the Commission is harbour master for the Port of Sulina, declared to be an international harbour, and another is chief inspector of navigation for all the river as far as Braila.

These two agents – harbour master and inspector of navigation – have not only administrative competence, but much more: they have judicial competence in their respective provinces.

Alone or with the help of their subordinates, they take cognizance of offences, write reports thereon, summon witnesses, try the case in first instance, and give their decision in the name of the European Commission.

There is an appeal from these decisions to the European Commission, which is, at the same time, a court of appeal and a court of cassation. But they cannot be challenged before local tribunals.

Moreover, the two agents of the Commission, who have penal competence and can condemn either the captain or the pilot of a ship, or both, to a fine, have also the extraordinary and unique right *to include in the fine the amount of the damage caused to installations and apparatus belonging to the Commission.*

In other words, the agents of the European Commission are, at the same time, judges and parties in the case.

To this must be added all the concessions which were insisted upon by the European Commission: exemption from stamp duties, from fiscal duty in the banks, from taxes for work actually done in connection with the upkeep of roads, from Customs duties on all imports made in the name of the Commission, of its members and of its officials; inviolability of the domiciles of its officials, personal inviolability of its agents, exemption from postal, telegraphic and telephonic charges – in short, exemption and always exemption.

I would add that the Powers represented on the European Commission have the right to have guardships which can, in case of need, provide military guarantee for the execution of decisions.

The European Commission even goes so far as to have its own internal civil code. It regulates the order of succession, with regard to the distribution of pension benefits in favour of its agents who have resigned or died, between husband and wife and other heirs, in direct or indirect line.

And all these prerogatives are exercised on the territory of the sovereign State of Romania.

Romania will always remain very grateful to the international body which, for several decades, ensured her economic development sheltered from European political quarrels.

I ask, however, if the situation of the new Romania, arising out of her sacrifices during the Great War and out of the Peace Treaties, is really compatible

with the regime created with a view to the Danubian Principalities as they existed in 1856.

Is it possible to consider that Romanian justice, which works admirably for twenty million inhabitants, is incapable of giving an impartial guarantee for the rights of a few hundred ships?

Can the present tendency to consider the sovereignty of States as an actual fact, which has benefited many States, leave Romania indifferent to such a regime of servitude and to a foreign control of the kind exercised by the European Commission?

It would be misjudging Romanians not to understand that, whereas they have always been ready to bring their contribution to the international community, whatever sacrifices may have been entailed thereby, equality of rights and of dignity is, for them today, an absolute dogma.

That is why the Romanian Government intends to begin by legal means, that is to say, by notes sent to the Governments concerned, with a view to the suppression of the European Commission.

In acting in this manner, the Royal Romanian Government makes no attempt at revision, because, in accordance with Article 7 of the 1921 Convention on the Statute of the Danube, the three Governments of France, the United Kingdom and Italy, as well as the Romanian Government, may put an end to the powers of the European Commission by concluding an agreement to this effect.

The Royal Romanian Government entertains the hope that the three above-mentioned governments will show the same spirit of comprehension as they have shown on so many occasions with regard to other countries.

Of course, it is only on the territorial State, i.e. Romania, which can recover the sovereign territorial rights of which it is deprived in favour of the Commission. For the rest, the International Danube Commission, which now has its headquarters in Vienna, might have its *present competence extended*.

In this way, the States now represented on the European Commission would remain members of the International Danube Commission in Vienna on the same footing as all the riparian States of the Danube, thus finding themselves in a situation to which, to speak frankly and fairly, they should have no objection."

It was in those terms that I spoke as Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 30th.

On August 29th, 1936, I ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs.

What has M. G. Tataresco's Government done along the lines I had indicated – lines which express *the very substance* of the programme of the former Liberal Party?

Nothing!

During the same period, Egypt threw off her yoke¹ and freed herself from the capitulations régime.

Today, Romania is the only country in Europe which has a capitulations régime².

However, there is another fact which is still more serious.

While I was fighting for the suppression of the European Danube Commission, some States did their best to become members of the Commission. Great Britain

¹ The régime of capitulations in Egypt was liquidated on May 3, 1937.

² Convention or act by which a state grants special privileges and rights (tax exemption, the right to be judged by the consuls of the country of origin, etc.) for the citizens of another state living on its territory.

informed our Ministry of Foreign Affairs that when Germany became a Member of the League of Nations she would put forwards the candidature of that country to her former seat on the European Danube Commission. She also informed us that, at the same time as Germany's candidature, she would also propose Greece.

The U.S.S.R. acted in a similar manner, and asked me, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, for a seat on the European Danube Commission. I refused, explaining that I was asking for the suppression of the Commission.

Finally Poland made a similar request to the Royal Romanian Government.

The extension of the European Danube Commission by the admission of new members – *an obvious solution if the Commission is not immediately suppressed* – would be fatal to Romania.

In view of the Commission's right to have French, British, Italian, German, etc. guardships in the mouths of the Danube to enforce its decisions, I consider Romania's independence to be seriously endangered.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Since the signature of the Peace Treaty and the creation of the League of Nations¹, whether as Permanent Delegate² in Geneva of the different Governments which succeeded one another from 1920 to 1936, or as Minister for Foreign Affairs in various Ministries, such as those of John I.C. Bratiano, Vintila Bratiano, Maniu, Duca and Tataresco, I have based Romania's foreign policy on the League of Nations.

What does that mean?

It means that, for seventeen years, Romania has been an adept of collective security, of indivisible peace, and of the settlement of disputes of all kinds by the pacific means indicated in the Covenant of the League.

Moreover, I have never based Romania's security on the vague formula of Article 16. For us this is merely a supplement.

I have based Romania's security on Treaties of mutual assistance, with their military annexes, which we have concluded with various States. This explains how the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente came into being. It also explains my desire to conclude pacts of mutual assistance with France and the U.S.S.R., and, were they willing, with Italy and Germany.

I have always considered that the primary factor of our security was the Romanian Army.

I want peace, but I am not a pacifist at all costs.

In 1921, I brought about very drastic financial reforms.

Why? My speeches delivered in 1921 supply the explanation³.

When I was frequently asked why so many taxes were necessary, my invariable reply was: "If we have achieved our national unity, we must also create the necessary instrument for its defence, i.e. the Romanian Army."

If my 1921 reform had remained as I made it, and if the yield from my taxes had been used in the manner indicated by the man who allowed me to make the financial reform as I understood it, and who, for a time, sacrifices his popularity on the altar of the country – to wit, Marshal Averesco – it would be impossible in 1937 to talk about the rearmament of Romania as a present-day problem, but rather as a problem already solved.

I recognise the crisis through which the League of Nations is passing.

I shall speak of the League with such absolute sincerity that my profession of faith in its permanent destinies must be considered as equally sincere.

¹ An international organization created by the resolution of the Paris Peace Conference (1919), based in Geneva. Its activity was governed by The Covenant of the League of Nations, voted by the Paris Peace Conference, on April 28, 1919. It came into force on January 10, 1920, which meant the birth of the Organisation. The League Nations had as founding members 26 states, 4 dominions and India as states that have fought against Germany, and 13 states, neutral in general, that gained the right to adhere to the League of Nations within two months. Romania was one of the founding members of the organization.

² Over 1920–1936, Nicolae Titulescu was always present (exception being made by the years 1922 and 1928) at the ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the League of Nations Assembly and Council.

³ On June 10, 1921, Nicolae Titulescu, in his capacity of Minister of Finances, advances to the Chamber of Deputies, in an ample speech, the draft fiscal reform of direct contributions, aiming at achieving a unitary taxation system.

First of all, what is the League of Nations?

It is not a Super-State, but a juxtaposition of States. When the Member States are not willing to do their duty the League cannot be expected to work miracles.

Imagine Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and other States meeting, discussing international questions, and being unwilling to fulfil their Treaty obligations.

If they do not meet in Geneva, the thing is called: the failure of England, France, Italy, Germany, etc.

If they meet in Geneva, then the situation becomes more serious, and there is talk of the failure of the League.

Is this differential treatment fair?

Have we not had many Commissions and Conferences outside the League, where many Great Powers were represented, and which have known failure after failure?

Why not use the same resounding phrases to express the blunders as are used to describe the blunders of the League?

It is because the League of Nations is not only an ideal, but also the result of a contract, and where is a contract, there is a responsibility.

Let us now proceed to an objective criticism.

The League of Nations has many weak points.

Let us have the courage to point them out, especially as I am convinced that the crisis of the League is due to men, and not to texts.

In the first instance, we must connect the crisis of the League with the disappearance of the great team of men who understood the spirit on which it was necessary to work in this great international institution.

Briand¹, Chamberlain, Stresemann and Scialoja² are dead. Dr. Edouard Benes has had to leave Geneva because of his election to the presidency of the Czechoslovak Republic. Similarly, MM. de Mello Franco and Fernandes³ have had to leave Geneva because of the withdrawal of Brazil from the League in 1926, arising out of the fact that she was not granted a semi-permanent seat on the Council.

Sir Cecil Hurst⁴ and M. Guerrero have also left Geneva, on account of their election as Judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice, of which the last-named became President.

In the second instance, there may be a connection between the crisis of the League and departure from the Secretariat of some extremely valuable elements.

I am greatly preoccupied by the reform of the Secretariat of the League of Nations. *It is a question to which I give much thought.*

In the third instance, the crisis of the League of Nations must be connected with the fact that the latter has even lost the necessary authority for punishing, within its own precincts, the violators of international law.

There is war in Manchuria. At a stretch, it is possible to understand that the Great Powers are not prepared to send troops to Asia.

There is a war in Ethiopia. At a stretch, it is possible to understand that the Great Powers are not prepared to send troops to Africa.

¹ Aristide Briand.

² Vittorio Scialoja.

³ Raúl Fernandes.

⁴ Cecil J. Hurst.

But one day a country repudiates a Treaty.

It is possible that, when the interests of that country are evoked before the Council, in virtue of the repudiated Treaty, the representative of the country in question should leave the Council table and go and smoke a cigarette in the lobbies, and that the Council, at a loss what to do, should adjourn the question so that afterwards, the representative of the country repudiating the Treaty returns to his seat and judges other countries on the basis of the same Treaty, repudiated by his country, which is still binding on others?

How far will this ostrich policy be carried? Until we fall to the bottom of the pit, from which nobody will be able to haul us out.

I have no hesitation in mentioning these things here, for I have said them openly in the League Council.

Here is an extract from one of my speeches, delivered to the Coordination Committee for Sanctions on October 19th, 1935. I quote here from the Minutes of the League:

“There was unfortunately an opinion which was gaining more and more ground, and which the League’s oldest supporters found it more and more difficult to combat. It was said that there were countries at Geneva which won a position for themselves by the use of their fists, while other countries did not secure the position to which they aspired in spite of their demonstrations of loyalty repeated throughout fifteen years. It was said that the League drew no distinction between sinners and the virtuous. But it was a certainty that no religion could last if it did not offer both a heaven and a hell. If men were always sure of gaining paradise, they might be equally sure that their religion would never be observed.”

And I quote another passage from the same speech:

“I, the Foreign Minister of a country that is one of the Latin Nations, a country that has profound affection for Italy, am asked to go before the public in my country and defend the sanctions as contemplated at Geneva, without being able to offer consolation that those who do not apply the Covenant will not be more favourably placed. How can I be asked to go to Romania and say: ‘You must lose everything Geneva asks you to lose. As for Hungary, she will lose nothing.’ ‘Why?’ I shall be asked. ‘Because Romania is a Member of the League and is faithfully applying the Covenant.’ ‘But why do we apply it if there is no risk?’ Romanians are logical people and their answer will be: ‘If the Covenant is not enforced, why do we remain in the League?’

I am emboldened to speak so freely at Geneva itself, because I am a veteran of the League. Never have I been heard to express myself so passionately on questions that directly affect my country. But this time international justice is at stake.

Romanians will accept any hardship, but they will never accept injustice.”

The British French and Soviet Delegations approved this mode of speech.

It is interesting to note the terms used by Mr. te Water, Delegate of South Africa.

I quote:

“Mr. te WATER (Union of South Africa) felt that the passion with which M. Titulesco had approached this subject was fully justified. He found it difficult

to speak with patience and restraint in the face of defaulting fellow-Members of the League, and he believed he was not alone in that feeling.”

How can this situation be remedied?

For remedied it will be, the League of Nations being an organisation with powerful supporters.

First of all, there is France, who has based all her foreign policy on the League. All her treaties of alliance and of friendship are within the framework of the Covenant of the League. Should the latter come to be destroyed, the present security of France, based on international treaties inherent in the Covenant, would also be destroyed.

Then there is Great Britain, who needs the League of Nations to intervene in European affairs. Great Britain is a vast Empire, comparable to a body whose limbs stretch over the four quarters of the globe, but whose head is a few minutes' flight from the continental frontier. This renders it impossible for her, at the present time, to follow a policy of isolation, which is proved by her published treaties of alliance with France and Belgium.

Great Britain could not intervene on the Continent according to the idea of alliance. Her public opinion would not understand such action. Her action must be based on the legitimate defence of her vital interests, and on the necessity of fighting for the maintenance of international law. Geneva being the place where international law is proclaimed, Great Britain cannot be absent from that town.

Finally, even the United States of America, which remain aloof from the League, would regard its disappearance with disfavour. Indeed, not only would they not realise why our Continent has not achieved its unity under the form of the United States of Europe, but they would never understand the disappearance of the bonds, still so slender, now connecting European States, and whose aim is the realisation of the ideal which is the very *raison d'être* of the American people.

As for the nations that are said to be “with limited interests,” my opinion is that, were the League of Nations to disappear, they would be the first to suffer.

It may be that Geneva justice is not perfect; it may be that the help given by Geneva is still weak and inefficient; it may be that recent failures have diminished the power of attraction of the great ideal constituted by the League.

All the same, as long as the League exists, the injustice suffered by a State can be announced to the world, with a view to provoking the reaction entailed by the necessary reparations.

Without the League, all these so-called secondary States would be placed as victims in padded boxes, and their shrieks would go unheard.

It is necessary to take immediate action in order that the League may cease to be a moral academy, a brotherhood of technicians, and may become capable of fulfilling its chief mission as a political institution: *the prevention of war*.

The great mistake of those who want the League to continue is that they do nothing, or are content with procedures which are insignificant in appearance, but which, if not followed closely and with comprehension, may weaken still further the force of the obligatory bonds now binding various States.

May I point out by what methods we should strive to reach our goal?

a) The maintenance of the Covenant of the League of Nations in its present form;

b) The maintenance of economic sanctions with universal application; for, if this application was no longer universal, what bonds would still unite the States Members of the League?

c) The abolition of the 1921 resolutions, which have no legal value, since the amendment on which they are based never came into force. It was these resolutions which caused the failure of sanctions in 1935, the League of Nations having applied sanctions gradually and not *in globo*.

d) The signature, outside the Covenant of the League of Nations, of agreements for regional military mutual assistance, with a view to the application of Article 16, Article 15, paragraph 7, and Article 17.

e) The development of a system of preventive measures which will allow either an increasingly rare application of Article 16, or the application of the sanctions provided by Article 16 before a State has been deemed to have violated the Covenant. In other words, the development of the preventive system as it was outlined in the reports drafted by M. de Brouckère, Lord Cecil and myself, and approved by the Council of the League in 1927, making Article 16 of the Covenant a prolongation of Articles 10 and 11;

f) The declaration in advance, and in good time, of the policy each State Member of the League will follow in case any State becomes the victim of aggression.

These methods constitute the best way of bringing the world out of the ideological chaos in which it is living, because, first of all, they mean the re-affirmation and strict organisation of the legal order out of which this chaos was born. This will give rise to a state of order and will also mean the maintenance of peace, which is an indispensable condition of the creation of the new legal order, towards which we are led by our instinctive tendency to replace that which is good by that which is better.

*

Before dealing with the international situation, I still have to deal with two questions of special interest for some States, and, in particular, for Romania: Minorities and Revision.

MINORITIES

Minorities raise a vital question for Romania, even more dangerous than Revision. One might say that Revision is a question which is only raised exceptionally, while Minorities are an everyday question.

Revision unites the Romanian nation in a common front against the enemy; the question of Minorities can disintegrate the Romanian nation, because international bodies are called upon to frame the law of Minorities and thus the law of Minorities may override that of Majorities.

The question of Minorities may also disintegrate the Romanian nation because all Minorities, with only a few exceptions, work under the guidance of the States to which they are united by racial ties.

He who has his eyes fixed on Budapest, Vienna, Berlin and Moscow, is to my mind, a member of the minority.

He who has his eyes fixed only on Bucharest is, to my mind, a Romanian.

Besides, the international control of Minorities is a source of great difficulties and should exactly coincide with what we undertook to accept, and no more.

With regard to the international control of Minorities, the national instinct imposes on Romania an attitude similar to that of Portia who, in defending the victim of Shylock, said:

“Shed thou no blood; nor cut thou less nor more, But just a pound of flesh...”¹

Let us be quite clear on this point:

I am not dealing with the idea of maltreating minorities, nor of violating the international law which we have signed. I am preoccupied with the possibility of having a minority not assimilated to present Romania and working inside the country in accordance with suggestions coming from outside in order to destroy the State which protects it.

I quite understand that minorities must be treated as well as possible, but I view their problem as an internal problem for Romania.

I also understand that members of the minorities should come to an understanding with the Romanian Government in order to obtain the best possible conditions of life.

I do not understand why the question of Minorities should be made an international one, overstepping the limits of the Minorities Treaty. We will immediately see what those limits are.

I cannot admit that, at the present time, foreign States may be so bold as to imagine that Minorities may become an object of international negotiations. I lived through the time when the Peace Treaties were first applied and when such a question would have been considered as a mental aberration.

It may be objected: Have you not, yourself, concluded an agreement on Minorities between Romania and Yugoslavia?² Yes, but the two countries mutually

¹ William Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, Act IV, Scene I.

² Romania and Yugoslavia signed, on January 30, in Belgrade, a Convention settling the question of minorities and the indigenoussness of persons who following delimitations have lost their nationality of origin.

recognised their frontiers and undertook to shed their blood were those frontiers to be violated.

When other countries give up revisionism and assume obligations similar to those of Yugoslavia, a new situation will be created. *And, even then, knowing how powerful are the mental reservations of some people, I would hesitate.*

Today, I repeat, the instinct of self-preservation dictates to Romania only the respect of the rights of Minorities as established in Minorities Treaties.

If direct agreements, compatible with Romanian interests, can intervene between the Romanian Government and Minorities, these agreements will have to be respected.

When Romanians constituted a Minority in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was their Statute a subject for discussion between the Emperor Francis Joseph and King Carol I? No! The minority Romanians of Transylvania limited themselves to making a complaint to the Emperor. The persecutions and prosecutions which followed the presentation of this famous Memorandum are well known.

Could we, today, allow any discussion, with Budapest or other capitals, concerning members of the Magyar or any other Minority, who are all Romanian citizens? This would be laughable if it were not pitiful.

John I.C. Bratiano, with his marvellous national instinct, foresaw the significance of an international control of Minorities and refused it. Blunders were, however, committed in the statement of the Romanian case.

He did not care! Even the sun has its spots.

His collaborators, who had to advise him on the technical form which Romania's refusal should take, are responsible.

John I.C. Bratiano had other preoccupations: he made Greater Romania.

And the chief expert of the great John I.C. Bratiano at the Paris Conference was M. Victor Antonesco. It is strange to note that, as a consequence of the difficult situation in which Romania found herself in the Peace Conference, John I.C. Bratiano took Minister Constantin Diamandi with him as an expert to the Genoa Conference¹.

It is also curious to find that the Liberal Government of John and Vintila Bratiano, in 1927 and 1928, did not include M. Victor Antonesco.

He only became Minister² again in 1933, as a result of certain circumstances which I know full well, since I also played a part in them.

How did John Bratiano present Romania's refusal? As a moral impossibility, because an international control of Minorities violates the principle of equality between sovereign States. France, England and Italy have Minorities, but without international control.

This is perfectly true.

The argument had to be furnished, but should have been accompanied by another. Having received territories, naturally as a consequence of our sacrifices but also following upon the final victories of France and Great Britain, however justified the arguments based on the equality of sovereign States, it was difficult to impose an

¹ The European Economic Conference took place at Genoa between April 10 and May 19, 1922. It was attended by 29 states. On May 2, 1922, the Romanian delegation, headed by Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu presented a memorandum asking the Soviet Government to return the Romanian values deposited in Moscow during WWI.

² Minister of Justice (1933–1935) in the I. G. Duca, Dr. C. Angelescu and Gheorghe Tătărescu cabinets; Minister of Finances (1935–1936); Foreign Minister (1936–1937) in the Gheorghe Tătărescu cabinets.

international servitude on England and France at the time when, by their victory, they had allowed the Romanian armies to extend our national territory.

The way Romania should have presented her refusal follows, in my opinion, from the manner in which the problem was raised in the Peace Conference.

In the original draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations, there was an Article 21 which provided for the protection of Minorities in all countries.

This Article, which was accepted by all the States called upon to sign it, was drafted as follows:

“The High Contracting parties agree that no obstacle shall interfere with their free exercise of any creed, religion or opinion, the practice of which is not incompatible with public order and decency and that, within their respective jurisdictions, no one shall be disturbed in his life, his freedom or his pursuit of happiness because of his adherence to such creed, religion or opinion.”

This Article 21 was deleted from the draft Covenant because it was considered to infringe on the sovereignty of States.

The new States then invoked the principle of equality of sovereignty and declared that they accepted any relevant provisions which States Members of the League of Nations were ready to accept for their own territories, but refused to submit to special clauses.

How did the Peace Conference justify the imposition on certain countries of obligations which it considered incompatible with the normal sovereignty of a State? In a very simple way. It said to States with Minorities: We grant you an increase of territory, *we guarantee you new frontiers*, and it is therefore equitable that we should stipulate under what conditions we can give you such a guarantee.

On May 31st, 1919, when the question of Minorities was discussed, President Clemenceau¹ and President Wilson spoke as follows:

President Clemenceau. – “I do not believe that it is humiliating for Romania to receive *friendly advice* from States such as the United States of America, Great Britain and France; none of these States will want to exercise undue powers in Romania.”

President Wilson. – “In these circumstances, is it unreasonable or unfair that the Great Powers should tell their associates, not speaking as dictators but as friends: We cannot *guarantee* territorial settlements which we do not believe to be fair and we cannot agree to leave in existence any elements of disorder which, in our opinion, would disturb the peace of the world...”

What? Could the United States, for instance, for they are the only Power in whose name I can speak, declare to their people, 3,000 miles away, after having signed these Peace Treaties, that they have established peace in the world, when the Treaties contain elements which do not appear to them to be permanent? That is not possible! And yet these transactions imply, on the part of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Serbia, the hope that, if any of the clauses of the settlement are not observed, *the United States will send their armies and their ships to enforce them.*

I ask my friends Kramar¹, Trumbic² and Bratiano, to rest *assured* that, if we think it is preferable to keep in the Treaty some words which they would like

¹ Georges Benjamin Clemenceau.

to omit, it is not in order to insist on unreasonable conditions, but because we want the Treaty to give us the right to decide *whether these are things we can guarantee.*"

In answer to this, Romania should have said, after mentioning the argument of equality of sovereignty: *"Of course it is understood that the obligations of the Minorities Treaty have, as a counterpart, the security which you offer for the new frontiers. As a counterpart of that security, and only under these conditions, do we accept the Minorities Treaty, and we ask that its drafting should be modified."*

At the time, it would have been easy to obtain those modifications.

As Wilson was unable to induce the United States to accept the Peace Treaty because of the undertakings contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which, according to the United States Republican Party, violated the Monroe Doctrine, the security obligation would have disappeared and, in consequence, the international control of Minorities.

As this method was not followed, from 1919 up to the present day, I have been a witness of a gradual weakening of the security obligation until it practically disappeared, and, in exchange, of a reinforcement and aggravation of obligations towards Minorities.

All this has led me to my present conviction.

When the connection between Minorities and security was set aside through President Wilson's failure, the Minorities Treaty was imposed upon us by the Peace Conference which, *in substance*, told us clearly: "either you receive the new territories together with the obligations towards Minorities, or you get nothing at all."

The Vaida Government of 1919 sent General Coanda³ to Paris, and the latter signed the Minorities Treaty⁴ without changing a single comma. This reason – that is, the acceptance of the Treaty as it stood, after having gone out slamming the doors – explains why the worst of all Minority Treaty is that of Romania.

I need only point out one fact in order to prove this.

In Romania, there is international control, not only of new territories, but also of those of the Old Kingdom.

This is incredible.

The Old Kingdom of Romania was a sovereign State, with which foreigners had no right to meddle. Today, it is subjected to the Minorities Treaty, and any inhabitant of the Old Kingdom has the same right of complaint to Geneva as the inhabitants of Transylvania, the Banat or Bukovina.

I must say that, although, by the Treaty of Recognition of Bessarabia, signed⁵ by the Great Powers in 1920, the Bessarabians received the same rights as all other Members of Minorities, the U.S.S.R. does not care much for the control of minorities on the basis of the 1919 Treaties, and she has made this quite clear to Poland, for she repudiates any foreign control of minorities on her own territory.

There have been complaints from Bessarabians to Geneva, it is true, but they never attained the magnitude and results of Magyar complaints, because the U.S.S.R. did

¹ Karel Krámar.

² Ante Trumbić.

³ Constantin Coandă.

⁴ December 9, 1919.

⁵ October 28, 1920.

not support those Minorities, and did not give them the same help that Hungary affords Members of Hungarian Minorities when they appeal to the League.

John I.C. Bratiano left the Peace Conference with indignation, slamming the doors behind him, and supported by a united Greco-Yugoslav-Romanian front.

Newly created States like Poland and Czechoslovakia adopted another attitude.

Poland signed the Minorities Treaty at Versailles, on June 28th, 1919.

Czechoslovakia signed the same Treaty at Saint-Germain-en-Laye on September 10th, 1919.

France made every possible endeavour – that is to say, every sacrifice – to break the Greco-Serbian-Romanian front, in order to obtain the signature of the Minorities Treaty by one of these three countries with limited interests.

It is easy to forget that, in 1919, Czechoslovakia and Poland were not the powerful States they are today. At that time, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece came first.

I have known the time when, simply because our country was not a newcomer in European life, we always had a place of honour.

How things have changed since then! Yugoslavia has successfully defended her national interests, if not by the method I advocated, then by another, in exchange for her acceptance of the Minorities Treaty.

a) First of all, she, very obviously, asked that the former Serbian territory should not be subject to international control. This was granted very easily, as things were at that time.

b) Yugoslavia solicited, and obtained, a loan of 500 million French Francs, than equivalent to gold Francs.

On the basis of that loan, she realised 1,500 million gold Dinars.

At the rate of 4 Hungarian Crowns to the Dinar, she withdrew her Crowns on the basis of the French loan.

At The Hague Conference¹ in 1929, as a result of the skilful negotiations of my friend Diouritch², this French loan went into the melting-pot of war debts, or, in more elegant terms, fell into oblivion.

If anyone is surprised because the Dinar is always quoted above the Leu, the explanation is to be found in the above-mentioned facts.

Romania exchanged Hungarian and Austrian Crowns against uncovered new issues of Lei. Yugoslavia exchanged her Crowns on the basis of the French loan, without issuing uncovered Dinars.

c) In 1919, Yugoslavia asked for 6 per cent of the amount of Reparations, which she obtained quite easily at the time, the question of reparations not yet being an immediate one.

This being so, Yugoslavia was also able to sign a Minorities Treaty at Saint-Germain-en-Laye on September 10th, 1919.

At that time, all these things took place under the seal of diplomatic secrecy.

Now that twenty years have elapsed, it is possible to mention them openly.

I can quote the source of my information: the great friend of my country and myself, who is now dead, Loucheur¹. He it was who conducted all these negotiations.

¹ The Hague hosts between 6 and 31 August 1929 the first round of the international Conference on War Reparations.

² Djordje Djurić.

Loucheur was possessed of an ardent soul, known only to those who loved him. His devotion to his friends knew no bounds. Loucheur, as I once told him myself, was like a watch-dog: he only loved those who trusted him.

Otherwise, he was sharp and nervous – he, who was essentially a sentimentalist.

One day, at The Hague, when I was explaining to him that it was a great shame to give Romania only one per cent of the total amount of Reparations, he replied: “Do you know what this one per cent represents? It is what remains after all the others have taken their share: France, Belgium, Italy, England, etc.”

I replied: “But Yugoslavia gets more than 5 per cent. I do not contest the heroism of the Yugoslav army, or the splendour of its gesture on the occasion of its retreat to Corfu. But, Yugoslavia being poorer than Romania, she cannot have suffered five times as much as we did. She had neither our cereals nor our oil.”

Loucheur replied: “This 5 per cent is the result of arrangements made with Draskovitch, who, with great foresight, when nobody was thinking of reparations, asked for 6 per cent.”

Loucheur also told me that, during the various Conferences, he had to whittle off a few tenths from this 6 per cent. And to all this he added: “The Romanian one per cent will remain unchanged whatever you do. You will never be able to get an increase, for there is nothing left. All the available assets have already been allocated. Fight for compensations, since Romania only gets one per cent.”

I followed his advice. I put the question of the one per cent to all Conferences, and obtained the cancellation of the Liberation Debt, of the payments for State property – which represented nearly 2,000 million gold Francs – and of the arrangement concerning optants, etc.

However, everything I obtained was also given to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia by way of consequence.

It will be seen that it has been my fate to fight for the Little Entente *en bloc*, even when I was only fighting for Romania.

It is interesting to note the date of the discovery that there was also a question of optants with regard to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It was only at The Hague, when I convinced the Great Powers that, Romania's obligation being limited to the internal expropriation annuity, the régime in Romania would have been one of equality between foreigners and nationals. It was taken that, to my great surprise, the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak files were opened.

In 1930, in a moment of sincerity, a Hungarian Delegate told me: “We made a mistake when we started by Romania in raising the question of optants, because, after all, in Romania expropriations are paid for, although the price paid has been cancelled by the fall of the Leu. It was also a mistake to have you as opponents. We should have begun with Yugoslavia, who purely and simply confiscated Hungarian interests.”

To be fair, I should add that the indemnity of expropriation which has been paid by Yugoslavia since then (and by Czechoslovakia since the beginning) is very much greater than the Romanian expropriation price. Therefore, Romania having expropriated at the lowest price, her optants obtained the highest percentage of the 100 million gold Francs which the Great Powers undertook to pay to Hungary as a result of The Hague

¹ Louis Loucheur.

Agreements. And M. Benes told me, in the past, that, on his percentage, he anticipated savings which he would pay into the Romanian and Yugoslav accounts.

It is none the less true that, from 1923 to 1930, when international public opinion was roused against Romania because of the optants question, there were Hungarian lands which had been confiscated by the Yugoslav Government, and concerning which Hungary said nothing.

At the present time, with the chaos caused by the question of Reparations, The Hague arrangements have sunk into oblivion.

Romania can be at ease as far as optants are concerned, because, at the time arrangements were signed, I made the following statement, which is referred to in the Minutes we all signed:

“It is understood that, for the total discharge of her obligations to the Agrarian Fund, Romania has no obligations other than that of paying the annuities laid down in paragraph (a) of Article 9 of Agreement No. III.” (i.e., nothing besides the internal expropriation annuities).

The Chairman (M. Loucheur) on behalf of the Conference, stated that he agreed.”

Draskovitch's arrangement with Loucheur preyed on my mind for a long time. One day I went with my friend Voja Marinkovitch, former Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, to the Belgrade Cemetery to place, as always when I was in the capital, a wreath on the grave of his brother, Paja Marinkovitch¹, thanks to whom I appreciate and love the Yugoslavs. Now, when I go to Belgrade, I place two wreaths, for Voja Marinkovitch is also dead.

All of a sudden, I saw the monument of a young man, standing.

I asked Marinkovitch who it was.

He replied: “Draskovitch”.

Immediately, the whole question as explained by Loucheur came to my mind and, in my turn, I related it to Marinkovitch.

He answered: “That is not true” in such a tone that I understood that, as a Yugoslav, he was unwilling to talk about it.

I then changed the conversation and asked: “Of what illness did Draskovitch die? He seems to have been very young.”

Marinkovitch replied significantly: “He did not die of illness; he was shot as an enemy of the nation.”

I then understood what I understood still better at a later date, that, if public opinion is not kept informed of all the torments one suffers in defence of one's country, it is possible to be, at the same time, a martyr and an enemy of the nation.

Today, Romania has a Minorities Treaty which she cannot repudiate unilaterally, because it is bound up with the important increases of territory conceded under the Peace Treaty.

However, its application should be limited to what the Treaty actually is, and not to what others would wish it to be. For that reason, Romania should not follow the path taken by others. She should follow a course of her own: the application of Minorities Treaties as they were signed, without the procedure of Minorities, which Parliament did not ratify, but which has been applied in the past because everyone submitted to it.

¹ Pavle (Paja) Marinković.

An interesting point should be mentioned here.

Poland had two Minorities Treaties in 1934, when she repudiated one of them: the first, a bilateral Treaty, signed in respect of Upper Silesia, on May 15th, 1922, with the State of her chief minority, Germany; the second, a general Treaty, which applied to the other Minorities.

It was the second which Poland repudiated.

The other having expired, negotiations with Germany concerning the Minorities led to a joint declaration on minorities.

In the Polish-German declaration the two Governments recognise the importance of the treatment of minorities from the point of view of their good mutual relations. They admit that a minority will be all the more happy and satisfied with its position if the minority of the other country is similarly treated.

Five principles were laid down by Germany and Poland at the time:

1) Germany and Poland undertake to make no attempt to absorb their respective minorities.

2) Each minority will be free to use its own language in personal and economic relations, as well as in the press and public meetings.

3) Each minority is entitled to group its members in economic and cultural associations.

4) It has the right to have religious schools.

5) The representative of a minority should not be hindered in the choice or exercise of their profession. They enjoy the same rights as the majority in connection with the acquisition of any kind of property, including real estate.

German political circles point out that the Polish-German declaration cannot be connected with international obligations in the sphere of protection of minorities. They also underline the fact that in 1934 Poland had denounced the International Statute of Minorities. These circles once again contrast the method of direct negotiations with the methods followed by the League of Nations which, according to them, are doomed to failure.

Romania has only the same general Treaty as Poland. It is not a bilateral agreement, and it would be regrettable if it were, because, if we meddled with Hungarian affairs for the sake of 100,000 Romanians, Hungary would meddle with ours for the sake of a few hundred thousand Magyars.

Hungarian, German and other Minorities are organised on the basis of this general Treaty.

In my opinion, it would be very unfortunate for my country either to repudiate it unilaterally or to transform it into a bilateral Treaty.

There is no need to fear that Treaty too much; its obligations are so serious for our international controllers that they would not intervene so easily in these questions which, because of the manner in which they are raised, are a mask for revision, if they were not covered, in the eyes of the world, by a procedure arising out of practice but not ratified by Parliament.

This declaration in no way alters my opinion that, even if there were no Minorities Treaty, we would be in duty bound to assume the same obligations. As a matter of fact, these obligations are contained in the Romanian Constitution itself. Besides, generally speaking, when a State defends its Minorities, it is defending its own interests.

As early as March 15th, 1929, in the lecture I gave at the Diplomatic Academy, I said that, besides the legal right of Minorities, a procedure had sprung up, a sort of praetorian right, a right *ex gratia*, which could not function without the constant consent of countries with Minority obligations.

In this connection, it is important to distinguish between what is legal and what is not; between what the will of the parties cannot change even by repudiation, because the undertakings have been given for ever, and what cannot be applied without constant recourse to the will of the parties; between what exists in virtue of the law and what fails when the consent of one of the parties is withdrawn.

Above all, let us try to state clearly what is the positive law of Minorities, in other words, their subjective rights, what are the instruments which gave it the character of international law, and what is the *objective international guarantee* which has been provided in case the subjective rights should be violated.

What are the subjective rights of Minorities? They are as follows:

- a) The protection of their life and of their freedom.
- b) The free practice of their religion.
- c) The acquisition of the nationality of the country, either for reasons of residence or indigenous to that country at the time the Treaty came into force, or, again, for reasons of birth in the territory of the country.
- d) Equality before the law and enjoyment of the same civil and political rights, in particular as regards admission to public functions.
- e) Free use of the mother tongue in private or commercial relations, in the practice of religion, in the Press, for publications and in public meetings, as well as before the Courts.
- f) An equal right with that of other nationals of the country to maintain charitable, religious or educational institutions at their own expense.
- g) In districts where the Minority constitutes a considerable portion of the population, the teaching in State primary schools shall be given in the language of the Minority and an equitable share of the amounts allowed by the State or Municipal budgets with a view to education, religion or charity, shall be allocated to the Minority.

Add to these general rights various special rights conceded to some Minorities expressly named: the Jewish Minorities, the Valachs of the Pind¹, Mount Athos, the Sicule and Saxon communities of Transylvania, the Ruthenes south of the Carpathians, and you will have the whole collection of the subjective rights of Minorities.

What are the diplomatic instruments which gave to these various prerogatives a character of positive international law? They are of various kinds, but on the whole they may be classified as follows:

First of all, there are special Treaties called Minorities Treaties, signed in Paris, during the Peace Conference, by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece.

Then there are special chapters in the Peace Treaties, ensuring the protection of Minorities in Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

There are also declarations made to the same effect, before the Council of the League of Nations, by Albania, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania.

¹ Pindus. Mountain range in W Greece, stretching from NW (from the frontier with Albania) to SW, close to the Gulf of Corinth.

Finally, there are Conventions for the same purpose, in particular, the German-Polish Convention for Upper Silesia, dated May 15th, 1922, which also contains a special contractual procedure distinct from the rules of common law, and the Convention concerning the territory of Memel, dated May 5th, 1924.

The enumeration of the subjective rights of Minorities may have seemed long; that of the instruments which embody them may have appeared tiresome, but the international guarantee, the positive charter of Minorities, the contractual provisions which take this subject out of national internal law to place it in the sphere of international law, are, all of them, contained in the following text which you will find in all Treaties or declarations relating to Minorities.

I quote those provisions from the Minorities Treaty signed on December 9th, 1919, by general Coanda, Delegate of President Vaida-Voevod, on behalf of Romania.

“Whereas under Treaties to which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are parties large accessions of territory are being and will be made to the Kingdom of Romania, and

Whereas Romania desires of her own free will to give full guarantees of liberty and justice to all inhabitants both of the Old Kingdom of Romania and of the territory added thereto, to whatever race, language or religion they may belong, and

Have, after examining the question together, agreed to conclude the present Treaty.”

Article 1.

“Romania undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this Chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.”

Article 12.

“Romania agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Romania agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Romania further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Romanian Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Romania hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party

thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 14 of the Covenant."

This is one of the points for which a remedy might have been sought by means of negotiations if, after having slammed the doors of the Peace Conference, we had agreed to negotiate: we would not then have received an ultimatum.

That a single State should be able to haul Romania before the Permanent Court of International Justice on a question of Minorities is a very serious thing which should give much food for thought to Romanian legislators.

On the other hand, we must recognise that the international guarantee of obligations towards Minorities has not the extent nor the precision which might make international control unbearable.

Some members of a Minority make a complaint in the form of a petition sent to Geneva. Shall the representative of a given State, on the basis of a mere petition, without any enquiry taking place, become prosecutor for humanity against Romania? It would be difficult to believe that such a thing could happen. Indeed, one should not forget that the problem of Minorities is a problem between Romania, or any other State with Minority obligations, and the League of Nations, and not a case for litigation between Romania and the Minority. Anyhow, it is not a case for litigation between Romania and the State with which the Minority has racial ties.

May I be permitted to show how the members of the Council of the League of Nations themselves found, either that the Minorities Treaty was a provision in favour of a third party, or that the burden thrown on the Council was too heavy.

I shall quote a passage from the Report of Signor Tittoni¹, dated October 22nd, 1920, which gives an interpretation of the international guarantee and which is generally considered as the fundamental charter in this matter. Tittoni said:

"It may be useful, at the outset, to give a clear definition of the term 'League of Nations guarantee'. It seems evident that this provision means above all that the clauses concerning Minorities are intangible, i.e. that they cannot be altered in such a way as to endanger existing rights in any way without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations."

On October 22nd, 1920, when M. Tittoni's report was under discussion, Lord Balfour, then Mr. Balfour², made the following statement, which is to be found in the Minutes of the Council meeting:

"*Mr. Balfour* asked if the Council had not a legal right to refuse to accept the guarantee for the protection of Minorities, and if it could not consequently make reservations with regard to the procedure to be followed by the Council in providing for their protection.

The general opinion of the Council was that it could, legally, refuse to guarantee the rights of Minorities but that, in practice, this was impossible, and could only have the most deplorable consequences, as the Treaties had been accepted by the parties concerned with the utmost difficulty and it was necessary to avoid further reducing their authority.

Mr. Balfour asked that his remarks should be inserted in the Minutes."

¹ Tommaso Tittoni.

² Arthur James of Balfour.

At the same meeting of the Council on October 22nd, 1920, Mr. Balfour underlined the thankless and difficult tasks laid upon the Council with regard to Minorities, and said:

“If it were necessary to protect a Minority, one of the members of the Council would have to take upon himself the duty of accusing the State which had not fulfilled its undertakings.”

And M. Tittoni answered:

“It is true that the task entrusted to the Council is far from being a pleasant one, but the Council could scarcely refuse to accept it.”

Three days later, M. Hymans¹ declared that he had been struck by the observations made by Mr. Balfour in the course of the previous meeting concerning the difficult situation in which would be placed a State member of the Council which accused another State of having violated Minority Treaties. M. Hymans therefore suggested that, in order to make this task less thankless all Minority petitions should be dealt with by a Committee of Three.

The Council decided to carry this proposal into effect, as follows:

“With a view to assisting Members of the Council in the exercise of their rights and duties as regards the protection of Minorities, *it is desirable* that the President and two Members appointed by him in each case should proceed to consider any petition or communication addressed to the League of Nations with regard to an infraction, or danger of infraction, of the clauses of the Treaties for the protection of Minorities. This enquiry would be held as soon as the petition or communication in question had been brought to the notice of the Members of the Council.”

I should like to point out, however, that, from that time onwards, we emerged from the sphere of law and entered that of grave; from that time, we left the regime of legality and entered that of desirability; from that time, we entered the realm of practice, which was never ratified by Parliament or the Sovereign, and can therefore be denounced at any moment.

M. Hymans' proposal of 1920 was completed by the Resolutions of June 27th, 1921, September 5th, 1923, and June 13th, 1929, from which I extract the most interesting points:

1. – Transmission of receivable petitions to the Government concerned for possible observations, and communications of these petitions and observations to Members of the Council, for information.
2. – Every receivable petition, and the observations thereon, to be dealt with by the Members of the Council, through a Committee composed of the President of the Council and two, or, exceptionally, four other Members appointed by the President (Minorities Committee).

The Committee decides if, in its opinion, the question submitted to it:

- a) should not give rise to any action;
- b) can be settled by the Committee without any formal decision, *through non-official negotiations* with Government concerned;
- c) should be referred by its members to the Council.

¹ Paul Hymans.

3. – Yearly publication, in the *Official Journal* of Statistics relating to the League's activity with regard to the protection of Minorities, of the number of decisions taken with regard to their receivability; the number of Committees constituted, and the number of meetings held by them for the examination of receivable petitions; and the number of petitions the examination of which was closed.

4. – Finally, the Committee of Three will take into consideration the possibility of publishing, with the *consent of the Government concerned*, the result of the examination of questions submitted to it.

It will easily be seen from the foregoing how cleverly the Council proceeded when it had to take a decision on the subject of Minorities: a State with Minority obligations must suffer tortures from the Committee of Three, instead of appearing directly before the Council.

Romania has not many Minority cases. They were dealt with in the past by Ministers Comnène and Antoniadé.

On two occasions, however, I myself took part in Minority discussions; on the question of Hungarian settlers, from beginning to end, and on the question of Ciuc, at the crucial moment.

These cases were settled in favour of Romania.

Nobody knows the ordeal I went through during those private meetings of the Committee of Three.

And yet my judges for these questions – in particular, with regard to the question of Hungarian colonists – were men like Sir Austen Chamberlain, M. Uden, Delegate of Sweden, and His Excellency de Mello Franco, Delegate of Brazil. For the second question, I had to deal with the Representatives of Japan, Great Britain, Norway – all men of very high standing.

But the rack on which the delegate of a country with Minority obligations is stretched in the Committee of Three is not mentioned in any treaty.

Does anybody know the meaning of *non-official negotiations* between the Committee of Three and the various Governments?

It is a permanent menace that the country you represent will be hauled up before the Council, after having thrown your cards on the table in the desire to convince the Committee of Three.

One day, after a repartee of mine, Sir Austen Chamberlain put up his monocle and, in a very grave voice, said: "My friend, if you continue like this, you will be heading straight for the precipice." I immediately replied: "I prefer to run over it myself, rather than be pushed over by you." Sir Austen laughed.

Another time, having been asked to leave the room in which the Committee of Three was sitting, while we were waiting to be called again, my friend Comnène said to me, with emotion: "We are just like old Brătianu¹ and Kogălniceanu² at the doors of the Berlin Conference in 1878." My answer was: "Don't say that, for Brătianu and Kogălniceanu were not even able to open their mouths in Berlin, while we are killing them by talking all the time."

¹ Ion C. Brătianu.

² Mihail K. Kogălniceanu.

And parallel to these threats – called *non-official negotiations* – some officials of the Minorities Section were plainly to be seen leaving the room in which the Committee of Three was sitting, in order to go into the lobbies and question the Minority concerned, *which always has Delegates in Geneva*, to find out how to answer the arguments brought forward behind closed doors. These officials could be seen whispering into the ears of the Committee of Three the answer that had been given in the lobbies; and, finally, the Committee of Three gave voice to the objection raised by the Minorities themselves, just when the arguments put forwards appeared to be irrefutable.

The procedure of the Committee of Three, which was not provided in the Minorities Treaty, as a consequence of the development given to it by the Minorities Section, replaces litigation between a country and the League Council by direct litigation between the country and its Minorities.

I could not fail to devote such thought to such a system, and, in fact, I have recently changed my mind about it.

Seeing that certain States which repudiated the Minorities Treaty not only were not published, but were even re-elected to the Council, I thought, in September 1935, that, with the authority conferred upon me by the election of Romania to the Council by 50 votes out of 52, it was incumbent upon me to end these excesses of procedure with regard to Minorities by a thoroughly Romanian method which had occurred to me in the course of my reflections.

On September 28th, 1935, I told the Director of the Minorities Section, my friend M. de Azcarate,¹ now Spanish Ambassador in London, that Romania would cease to accept the Minorities procedure, which had not been ratified by Parliament, *but that she would respect the Treaty of December 9th, 1919 to the letter.*

M. de Azcarate informed the Secretary-General, M. Avenol², of our conversation, and the latter asked me, *inter alia*, to give him a written statement.

Following upon this communication, I called on M. Avenol and told him that I was defending Romanian interests in accordance with my own ideas, and not with the advice of my friends, even the best and most intelligent of them.

M. Avenol replied: “If that is the case, you run the risk of having to appear before the Council.”

I answered: “That is true, but I shall make a speech before the Council, and I should like you to be the first person to hear it. I shall say: ‘Gentlemen, it is true I did not submit to the procedure established with regard to Minorities, which is not legally binding, but merely desirable.’ I would, however, ask you to take note of the fact that I have not repudiated the Minorities Treaty itself, and that Romania is ready to apply it also in the future. But if, by some misconception, you saw in our gesture a repudiation of the Minorities Treaty, which would be most unfair, I would inform you that gesture was not made in order to escape our obligations under the Treaty, but to bring back to it those who no longer want to have anything to do with it. In any case, I ask for sanctions to be applied to me, and especially those sanctions which have been applied to countries which considered the Minorities Treaties to be incompatible with their sovereignty: to wit, a semi-permanent seat on the Council, and a seat on all League Committees.”

¹ Pablo de Azcarate y Flores.

² Joseph Avenol.

Since then, although I do not necessarily mean that it was in consequence, I have never heard any more about Minorities. The League of Nations sent us papers. I gave instructions that no reply should be made, and, from 1935 to 1936, Romania was never called upon to appear before the Council in connection with Minorities.

All this is in strict conformity with the attitude I adopted in the lecture on Minorities which I gave at the International Diplomatic Academy in Paris on March 15th, 1929.

I said at the time:

“I think the position of countries with Minority obligations could be summed up as follows:

What is the issue?

Is it the execution of our present obligations? We reply: Let us measure those obligations.

Is it the carrying out of some improvements within the framework of our present obligations? We reply: Let us discuss those improvements.

Is it the *extension* of our present obligations? Then we are obliged to reply: Let us share them.

Is it the formulation of the Minorities' problem in its proper sphere, which is a moral one, and not one of coercion? Then we answer: You may be sure, we shall do anything which may be dictated by morality, humanity and general interest.

What, then, are the rights of Minorities, scientifically speaking? They are human and positive, but regional rights. This definition involves the necessity of a choice: either the rights of minorities are positive and permanent rights, but with a tendency to universality, or they are temporary rights, for safeguarding the rights of man until the time comes when all interests are harmoniously conciliated.

The obligations of States towards Minorities must be universal – whether they are considered as a matter of rights or as a matter of morality. *The conception of positive right with a perpetual regional character is inadmissible. The rights of Minorities cannot remain for ever the rights of the vanquished and of newcomers!*

We do not care whether universality is realised on the basis of law or on that of morality. Both are equally satisfactory to us. I do not even say that a choice should be made immediately. But we must have a guiding principle for the future. I do not know what it will be. But I do know what it should not be. The consolidation of States would only be weakened by an extension of present obligations, whatever form that extension might take or whatever method might be followed to bring it about, if it is affected only a few States without any prospect of other States accepting those obligations or of their ever coming to an end, however favourably the Minorities might be treated and whatever efforts might be made to grant their most exacting claims.

The interests of peace can only be served by an ideal and that ideal must be based on justice and not on international servitude.

That is why I say: Let us scrupulously carry out our present duty. Let us start from the existing situation.

Let us carry out fully our present obligations, under the auspices of the League of Nations. Let Minorities be treated favourably, but also the States to which they belong. Let us seek, with the help of the League of Nations, the moral elements which could bring nearer to each other men now separated only by language, religion or race.

And, when the goal set by the Treaties has been reached, let us draw up a wide programme of our moral duties towards men as such. We will thus have deserved well of our respective countries. We will also have overcome more easily difficulties which seem to divide us today, since morality is the same for all and one man is equal to another, wherever he may happen to be.”

*

What a painful surprise it was to me to learn that my successor, M. Victor Antonesco, did not continue my policy with regard to Minorities, and again began to answer the Committee of Three.

Since then, there has been a rain of petitions from the Minorities.

I hold M.V. Antonesco, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, certain officials of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and our present Representative¹ to the League responsible for this régime of capitulation.

M. Victor Antonesco, because, between my line of action – which was the result of long experience – and the advice of mere officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he chose the latter.

As for our Representative in Geneva, who was obliged to follow a policy of making himself agreeable, because of the novelty of the surroundings in which he suddenly found himself in his capacity as Permanent Delegate of Romania in Geneva, he, in his desire to please the Secretariat, could not help yielding to the pressure it brought to bear upon him.

This change of policy has seriously endangered our interests with regard to Minority questions.

Besides, as there are no more complaints to the League of Yugoslav or Bulgarian Minorities, in consequence of the Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and as, in consequence of the Greco-Turkish Treaty of Alliance, there are no more Turkish or Greek Minorities appealing to Geneva, if the Minorities procedure had not been resuscitated for Romania, one might have questioned the right of existence of the Minorities Direction, in view of the small scope of its activities.

Hence the genesis of the pressure brought to bear on the Romanian Legation in Geneva.

As long as M. Antoniadé was Minister in Geneva, this pressure met with adamant resistance. M. Antoniadé does not have to please in order to assert himself. With the present Representative of Romania in Geneva, things could not have happened differently.

As Romania leaves the Council next September, who can restore to her position she had won in 1935 with regard to Minorities?

¹ Gheorghe Crutzescu.

What historical responsibility is hidden behind the communiqués of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the explanations given of its policy!

It is we ourselves, and not History, who will have to shoulder the consequences, and that in the immediate future.

The moment is already at hand.

REVISION

Revision of frontiers is a question which the ulterior interpretation of treaties has transformed into a real sword of Damocles for some countries in Central Europe, amongst them Romania.

I say “the ulterior interpretation of treaties” because as shown by authoritative documents, the Covenant does not provide for territorial revision but only for the revision of clauses which have become inapplicable.

In fact, Article 19 says:

“The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”

Territorial clauses are therefore excluded since, as they have already been applied in the past, it is impossible to talk of revision with regard to them for reasons of their inapplicability.

I know that, where revision is concerned, it is thought that it might apply not only to treaties which have become inapplicable but also to international situations the maintenance of which might endanger the peace of the world.

To this I reply:

Article 19 has no connection whatever with the first ideas of Wilson, who at the beginning wanted to make a super-State of the League of Nations, and of revisionism one of the commandments of that super-State, but who, later on, reduced his ideal to something more modest: to wit, recommendations of the League of Nations in connection with modifications of frontiers.

However, neither of these two schemes of Wilson's became a basis for discussion at the Peace Conference, which is confirmed by his collaborators: Colonel House,¹ Lansing² and Miller³.

As a basis of discussion, the Conference took Hurst-Miller scheme, which only mentions territorial integrity, without saying a word about frontiers.

Article 19 has another origin.

Great discussions took place at the Peace Conference with regard to the obligation to register treaties with the League of Nations in order to give them validity.

Who would control the compatibility of a treaty with the Covenant of the League of Nations?

Wilson said: “Nobody, public opinion is enough.”

Professor Larnaude, President Orlando⁴, M. Batalha-Reis⁵ and M. Vesnitch⁶, Serbian delegate, replied that the control of public opinion was not sufficient and that there should be a controlling body: the Council of the League of Nations.

¹ Edward Mandell House.

² Robert Lansing.

³ David Hunter Miller.

⁴ Vittorio Emanuele Orlando.

⁵ Jaime Batalha Reis.

⁶ Milenko Vesnić.

It was then that Venizelos¹ and Lord Robert Cecil established a connection between the obligation to register treaties and the control of their compatibility with the Covenant of the League of Nations. They too proposed that this control should be exercised by the Council of the League.

On the 11th February 1919, Wilson opened the discussion on Lord Cecil's amendment, called the *British amendment*, which was drafted as follows:

“The Assembly of Delegates shall have the duty of superintending the periodical revision of obsolete treaties and of international relations the maintenance of which might endanger the peace of the world.”

Article 19 is therefore the obvious conclusion of the discussions at the Peace Conference with regard to the control of treaties which were contrary to the Covenant, and thus became obsolete.

Only spurious scientists connected revisionism with the first ideas of Wilson, which were never discussed by the Peace Conference; it was only through the invidious propaganda of some people and the passivity of others that Article 19 became the basis of revision, whereas, in fact, it only provides for an examination of treaties which have become inapplicable and a control of the compatibility between certain international relations and the principles of the Covenant.

I would like to add that a translating error has found its way into Article 19: inapplicable treaties are put on the same footing as international situations, thanks to the words “*nouvel examen*” and “*ainsi que*”. The English text – and thank Heaven, it is well known that Article 19 was the work of Anglo-Saxons – uses the words “*reconsideration* of inapplicable Treaties and *consideration* of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world”.

The English text therefore provides for the possibility of a re-examination of treaties which become inapplicable because of their incompatibility with the principles of the Covenant and the possibility of a consideration of international situations the maintenance of which might endanger the peace of the world: “*To reconsider or consider*”.

Moreover, and in order to end the discussion, I would say that even those who recognise that the revision of treaties might be based on the reconsideration of serious situations admit that unanimity is necessary of an invitation to revision.

Some people say: “*majority is enough*,” with regard to an invitation to study the revision of a treaty; but these are only a small number and plead *pro domo*; others say: “*unanimity without the parties*,” finally the greater number ask for “*unanimity including the parties*”.

In the opinion of everybody without exception, revision properly so-called needs the assent of both parties. Nothing could be more normal, as a contract can only arise out of the mutual consent of two wills; it can therefore only be undone by the same kind of agreement.

On June 7th, 1923, I obtained from France, permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations – M. Paul-Boncour being at the time Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs – a note giving the official interpretation of Article 19 which permanently binds France and which ran as follows:

¹ Eleutherios Venizelos.

a) an invitation with a view to revision can only be made by application of Article 19, that is to say, by the Assembly of the League of Nations and not by a Directorate or a small Committee;

b) for the application of Article 19, that is, for the invitation addressed to the parties with a view to discussing revision, unanimity including the parties is necessary.

These are legal quibblings, however, meant for those who fish in troubled waters.

Since the creation of the League of Nations until the present day, I have seen nothing but disguised attempts at a revision of frontiers.

What was Lord Rothermere's famous campaign, which, I willingly recognize, was inspired by a sentiment of justice, if not an attempt to convince public opinion that the Peace Treaties were lacking in moral foundation?

What was the case of the optants, if not an attempt at revision, through the creation of isolated groups of Hungarians in the midst of Romanian peasant masses, in order that the latter might think: "Life is better as a Hungarian than as a Romanian, since even today, when Hungary has been vanquished, she still commands."

One day I asked Count Apponyi: "Is it not true that behind the case of the optants is hidden the question of Transylvania?"

Count Apponyi, with the loyalty of a gentleman, replied: "Yes, that is true."

That attempt also failed after long and painful struggles.

What was the Four-Power Pact, if not the creation of a Directorate the aim of which was the revision of the frontiers of the Little Entente and of Poland?

We managed to make this Treaty innocuous for us.

What is today, for some people, the reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations, if not a fresh attempt at revision by means of easier conditions of application of Article 19 and the weakening of the bonds which exist between States Members of the League of Nations, in order to arrive at the universality of the League?

Universality, yes, I desire it with all my heart.

But if, in order to achieve it, the price to be paid is the destruction of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the disappearance of its guiding spirit, I prefer to postpone the problem of universality and await a better opportunity.

Every time the question of revision has been raised, not only against Romania but also against the Little Entente, I have represented their interests, I have received blows, but I have also given many.

The documents will show in what spirit of disdain for the most sacred interests of Romania my successors worked in Geneva with regard to the question of revision after I left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Before reaching those sad pages of the political history of Romania, I shall have a few facts to mention and a sentiment to express.

I begin by the latter.

I have read the books of Professor Sofronie.¹

I have read the memorandum of a young professor, M.M. Antonescu², a member of M. Georges Bratiano's¹ party, on the question of revision, which memorandum was presented to the Permanent Conference of International Studies in 1937.

¹ George Sofronie.

² Mihai A. Antonescu.

I have been very much interested in these works, and they have given me great satisfaction.

Those two young professors will give long life and great fame to which is a projection of the interior towards the exterior, a projection of well-understood national interests outside the frontiers, and not an ordering about the interior by foreign countries.

On the subject of revision, Romania should always bring out the following facts:

1. If it is remembered that the British Empire, the United States of North America, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, the Scandinavian States, the Baltic States, the States of the Little Entente, the States of the Balkan Entente and the U.S.S.R., whose present policy is not directed towards revision, are not asking for any change of frontiers, the conclusion is reached that, for the immense majority of States, revision of frontiers does not constitute a problem.

2. If, on the other hand, it is remembered that the present policy of Germany with regard to Poland and that of Italy and Bulgaria with regard to Yugoslavia are not compatible with a revision of the Polish and Yugoslav frontiers, the conclusion is reached that the only revisionist State today is Hungary.

As revision may bring about a war, and as a war could not be localised, revision therefore means a world war in favour of Hungary.

I have the warmest sympathy for President Hodza's plan for Central Europe.

I may be permitted to say, however, that if, for some time past, frontiers have no longer been mentioned, in exchange there is much talk about minorities.

In my opinion this policy of some Central and Eastern European States is a policy which proceeds by stages: today, minorities with regard to which it is easy to gain the sympathy of others; tomorrow, revision.

I repeat: to discuss the minorities question with Hungary is equivalent to ourselves placing blindfolded the dynamite which will blow up the Romanian State.

The Hungarian minority, and all minorities in general, should be treated as well as possible, but in virtue of the dictates of our conscience and not because of external compulsion.

Romanian public opinion should not be misled by saying that if, today, the question of minorities were settled by an agreement with Hungary, the revision of frontiers would, as a result, no longer arise. That is not true, and, in the interests of Romania, full light should be thrown on the subject.

3. To return to the frontiers of the countries of Central Europe; I note that they were not fixed by the parties concerned but by eminent American and English experts.

These experts made a very detailed study in each case, before fixing the frontiers. They worked so well that they themselves say now that, if a frontier were to be modified in order to remedy an injustice, the new injustice created would be greater than that which it was thought to remedy.

4. When the frontiers of a country are being fixed, it is impossible not to give rise to some dissatisfaction.

Today, those who have lost some territory complain; tomorrow, those who would lose territory would complain.

On the subject of frontiers we hear a long complaint, a kind of *moto perpetuo*, which time alone can bring to an end.

¹ Gheorghe I. Brătianu.

What are some so-called historical rights? Thefts of territory consecrated by time.

Indeed our present frontiers, if they remain, as I hope they will, will be at least international decisions consecrated by time.

In order to modify a small lease, the consent of both parties concerned must be obtained; it follows that, for the application of Article 19, the consent of the two parties is equally necessary. And since the country which is asked to part with some territory will never give its consent, I would like to ask a question:

Is it wise to open a public discussion on the basis of Article 19, which will arouse national feeling, when it is known beforehand that no result will be reached?

These words should not be interpreted as proof of a backward mind, insensible to justice and equity. But justice and equity are too often confused abroad with the thesis put forward by Hungarian propaganda.

I would like our point of view to be seriously taken into consideration.

The act of justice called "the partition of the Hapsburg Empire" was carried out thanks to the British, at the head of whom were W. Steed, Seton Watson, and many others.

Barely eight years had elapsed since the signature of the Peace Treaties when Lord Rothermere, under the pretext of justice, took the Hungarian cause of treaty revision into his powerful hands, that is to say, the partial reconstitution of the former Hapsburg Empire.

Has the pre-war period ever been witness of exchanges of territory of the kind which would be involved by revision?

If Hungary had not found powerful protectors outside her frontiers, we should already have reached agreement with her, and the Danubian Confederation would have been formed long ago.

Hungary says: "If territories are not given back to us, at least in part, there will be a war, because pacific means will have shown their inefficiency."

And other countries, frightened by the spectre of war, reply: "No, no war, revision only."

When, in order to defend our frontiers, only eight years after they have been traced, we reply: "Anybody who believes he can take a square inch of land from us will start a war," we hear in reply: "How is this? The application of Article 19 of the Covenant would constitute for you a cause of war?"

And this starts a series of criticisms the end of which is not yet in sight.

We never said that the application of Article 19 would bring war, but that such application could not take place without our consent and that we would never give that consent.

Those who always talk of justice and equity must realise that Romania only obtained her new frontiers after having had 800,000 killed and two-thirds of her territory occupied by the enemy.

Whoever reads the Treaty of Bucharest¹, which was imposed upon us by the Central Powers and which we signed but did not ratify, having been abandoned by the armies of Old Russia, will understand that justice and equity are on our side.

¹ May 7, 1918.

What we ask for is enough time to prove that the national unity of the Central European States is not artificial but, on the contrary, constitutes such a solid basis for Europe that the slightest attempt to shake it would cause war to break out.

These things are so clear to me that I think the real solution of the evils created by frontiers is not revision, which means moving those evils from one spot to another, but the destruction of frontiers by the disappearance of the obstacles which they present to the movement of goods and men, in other words, *the constant and progressive spiritualisation* of what a frontier represents.

These principles have always guided my defence of Romania against the new aspect taken by revision: the reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Already, in the meeting of the Council on Friday, June 26th, 1936, I said to my friend, the representative of Chile¹:

“I consider that any State is entitled to ask either the Council or the Assembly that the question which interests it should be studied. I have therefore the deepest respect for the opinion of the Chilean Government, which thinks that we should study the reforms of the Covenant.

May I be permitted, however, also to respect the opinion of my own Government and to say frankly to my colleague and friend, the representative of Chile, that, if he had come before us with concrete texts which, from the outset, limited the reform in question, I would have read them, I could have formed an opinion, I might have said “Yes” or “No”; in any case, I, as well as the whole of international public opinion, would have appreciated the issues at stake in Geneva.

However, the honourable representative of Chile asks us to study the reform of the Covenant in its entirety.

Gentlemen, do you realise the scope of such a proposal?

From the moment we decide that the 25 Articles, in virtue of which we sit, are no more than dying provisions which can be replaced by provisions which none of us knows, the League of Nations will be dead and we shall have no more authority.

And at what time is the League of Nations asked itself to declare that its authority exists no longer?

At the time when everybody agrees that the situation is doubtful, that all efforts should be made in order to prevent war from breaking out, that this solution is preferable to that in order to maintain peace.

In other words, you disarm the League of Nations at the very moment when it is called upon to fulfil the task with a view to which it was set up.”

On July 4th, 1936, in the General Committee of the sixteenth ordinary session of the Assembly, I made a statement which appears as follows in the minutes:

“M. *Titulesco* asked that, in the draft resolution concerning the reform of the Covenant, the words ‘and not to weaken them’ should be added after the words ‘increase and guarantees.’

President *Van Zeeland* did not think the addition of these words changed the meaning of the text, and suggested that they should be accepted.

¹ Manuel Rivas Vincuña.

M. *Motta* (Switzerland) (résumé) did not share the views of M. Titulesco. A repetition was never necessary, because it was a repetition.

Mr. *Eden* (United Kingdom) suggested, in order to clear up the situation, that M. Titulesco's amendment should be accepted, together with the amendment which had been previously proposed by M. de Madariaga.

M. *Titulesco* (résumé) said that he could not agree with his colleagues in this respect. He would agree to reform the provisions on security, but he could not accept M. de Madariaga's amendment.

M. *Spaak* (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium) said (résumé) that he thought the word 'increase' could not be interpreted in several ways. It could only have one meaning.

M. *Titulesco* said that, in those circumstances, he would not insist on his amendment if it was shown in the minutes that the General Committee was unanimous in recognising that delegations were ready not to weaken but to increase the efficiency of guarantees.

On the proposal of the president, it was so decided."

Why do I quote all this?

In order to show that I was defending, inch by inch, the interests of Romania.

As soon as I ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Romanian delegation gave up the whole thing en bloc.

It was extremely painful for me to become aware of this.

Let us, however, continue to quote the minutes of the 3rd and 4th July, 1936, of the General Committee of the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, which did the work of a Drafting Committee:

"M. *Titulesco* (résumé) emphasised that the point was a very delicate one. It was indeed necessary to do something to interpret the Covenant in the manner which seemed to him to be the most likely to permit a reform.

If, however, the door was opened wide to a general study of the Covenant and of its reform, the most varied proposals would put forward and all sorts of contradictions would be met with, so that it would be impossible to obtain even the minimum of agreements which existed at present. They would therefore have to restrict the scope of the proposals by asking the Drafting Sub-Committee to mention expressly Articles 11 and 16, to which M. Delbos had alluded that day in the plenary meeting.

Mr. *Eden* (résumé) thought that it would be preferable to limit themselves to a text which might be generally accepted.

M. *Delbos* (Minister for Foreign Affairs of France) (résumé) said that he naturally preferred the text of Column A and agreed with the observations of M. Titulesco, at the same time accepting his suggestions for modifications. He continued by saying: 'It is true that we are contemplating a reform of the Covenant, but there are several kinds of reform. Some strengthen and some weaken. If the door is opened wide to all suggestions without restriction, we are taking a dangerous path. I think it would be regrettable to plan a complete recasting of the Covenant in a vague and platonic form'.

M. *Motta* (résumé), like Mr. Eden, preferred the text of Column C, which seemed to him to show greater consideration for the Governments.

M. de Graeff¹ (Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands) (résumé) agreed with Mr. Eden and M. Motta, and point out that, if the texts of Columns A and B were to be submitted to the Assembly, he would be obliged to vote against them.

M. de Velics² (Hungary) agreed with M. de Graeff and M. Motta. The text adopted should take into account all the anxieties expressed on that point by the speakers in the plenary meeting of the Assembly. Such was not the case with the drafts in Columns A and B. On the other hand, Column C seemed to him to cover a general study by the Governments of the Covenant considered as an indivisible whole, and that was exactly the intention of some Delegations.”

Does not the whole game concealed behind this diplomatic language appear quite clearly?

I wanted a restricted study of the Covenant which should not extend to Article 19, and Hungary wanted a general study of the Covenant in order that the study of Article 19 should come within its scope, that is to say the revision of revision.

I should like to point out that, so long as I was in the League of Nations, Article 19 was never mentioned. The only talk was of the total or partial reform of the Covenant. At least diplomatic language did not dot its i's.

It was then that I made the following speech, quoted *in extenso* from the minutes:

“M. Titulesco (Romania) was in complete disagreement with Mr. Eden, M. Motta, M. de Graeff and M. de Velics. His conviction was based on lengthy meditations and on a clear realisation of the interests of the League of Nations. Mr. Eden had said that the world was expecting a general study of the working of the League. If it was raised in such general terms, the problem became appalling, and M. Titulesco was very much afraid of formula C, which was too vague. He believed that it was indispensable to limit the reform of the League of Nations to a few points. When the question was raised by the Chilean representative in the Council, he already made a very clear statement in the name of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. Those States were ready to examine concrete and limited proposals but not to embark on a vague and general recasting of the Covenant. M. Titulesco wished to state that, if a discussion on the very basis of the League of Nations was authorised, neither the Little Entente nor the Balkan Entente would accept the suggestion. The five States represented by M. Titulesco had worked out a doctrine, which he summarised as follows:

- a) No weakening of the Covenant.
- b) It was indispensable to maintain the universal character of the first paragraph of Article 16 on economic sanctions. If that universal character was suppressed, nothing remained to bind the Members of the League of Nations.
- c) The resolutions of October 1921 should be done away with because, in M. Titulesco's opinion, if sanctions had failed, it was because they had been applied by stages and not *in globo*.
- d) Finally, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente recognised that paragraph 2 of Article 16 did not oblige all nations to take up arms in favour of

¹ Jonkheer Andries Cornelis Dirk de Graeff.

² Velics de Laszlofalva.

any country. They believed that military assistance should be based on regional agreements.

M. Titulesco did not, of course, suggest that points of such precision should be inserted in the formula by which the Governments would be invited to make suggestions with regard to the reform of the Covenant, but, if the invitation was already drafted in a manner contrary to the ideas which he had expressed, the five States of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente would answer with a final and categorical No.

What M. Titulesco wanted was that the task of the future Advisory Commission should be clearly defined, and it was in that sense that he made his appeal. He did not feel that there would be any State in the Assembly which, after the recent failure of the League of Nations, would wish to destroy the League completely under the guise of re-organisation. If reforms were desired on any special points, M. Titulesco was ready to accept a formula guaranteeing that they would not end in chaos.

It had just been decided to say that certain circumstances had prevented the complete application of the Covenant. Consequently, it was not the Covenant which was wrong but the way in which men had applied it. It would therefore be illogical in a further paragraph, to ask for a complete recasting of the instrument.

In conclusion, M. Titulesco wished to state most emphatically that, if the door was opened wide to reforms, without any restrictions, Romania and the States sharing her views would vote against.

M. Litvinoff (U.S.S.R.) completely agreed with M. Titulesco's observations. It should not be forgotten that, when they embarked upon a general re-organisation of the League of Nations, they ran a certain risk of destroying the last shreds of authority of that institution. Since it was necessary for it to continue to live, even if agreement could not be reached on its reform, it might be that the League of Nations would continue to exist in its present form. If a text as general in its terms as that of Column C were accepted, the League of Nations would already be destroyed. Such an acceptance would show a complete lack of psychological sense, if it took place at the very moment when they were endeavouring to obtain the adherence of new Members or the return of those who had left the League.

The *President* believed he could sum up the discussion by recording the agreement of members of the General Committee on the following points: on the one hand, something should already have been done at the next Assembly in order to strengthen the League of Nations, *but the principles and bases of the Covenant should not be touched.* That, he thought, was the idea of the staunch supporters of the texts in Columns C and D.

In the second place, it was important not to give too precise indications to Government, *but they must fix simple limits and state clearly that some elements would not be touched upon.*

The President believed that on those bases the Drafting Committee would be able to submit a draft on which discussion would be resumed."

I believe that there could be no more formal consecration of the thesis I have put forward. The minutes end with these words of mine:

“M. Titulesco observed that the text of the resolution had a close connection with the drafting of the preamble and that, on that point also, it would be necessary to wait for the preliminary text which was going to be prepared by the drafting Sub-Committee.”

On August 29th, 1936, I ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs.

When, after my serious illness, my health was restored to me, even if only imperfectly, my thoughts were always directed to anything which could affect Romanian interests. Thus, even as an ordinary private individual, I have not ceased for one moment to follow international questions very closely and, more particularly, Romanian questions.

Having learned from the Press that, from September 14th to 17th, 1936, a Committee (on which Romania was represented) for studying the application of the principles of the Covenant was meeting in Geneva, I immediately asked in Geneva for the minutes of those meetings.

I read them with avidity.

I must confess, however, that on reading them I felt very sad.

First of all, I noted that all the Articles of the Covenant are on the agenda for study; some of them, which form category I, are to be studied at once; the others are reserved for later study and form category II. And the worst is that Article 19, on Revision, is being studied in category I, that is, in the category of urgent questions, without the Romanian delegate having uttered a single word.

What! I fought so hard in July 1936 in the General Committee, as evidenced by the above-mentioned minutes, on questions which had a distant connection with revision, and when the question of revision itself comes up for discussion, that is, in other words, when an attempt is being made to facilitate the conditions for revision, the Romanian delegate does not say a word and, as a Member of the Committee, does not oppose his veto!

Let us proceed in orderly fashion.

The study of Articles, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, and 22 of the Covenant was commenced.

Therefore the only Articles which remained outside the scope of this study were:

Article 2, which states that the League of Nations is composed of a Council and an Assembly;

Articles 6 and 7, which deal with the General Secretariat of the League of Nations;

Article 9, on the appointment of a technical commission to advise the Council on the execution of Articles 1 and 8, and on military, naval and air questions generally;

Article 17, which deals with the disputes between a State Member of the League and a non-Member State;

Article 20, which recognises that the Covenant of the League of Nations abrogates all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof;

Article 23, which deals with fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children, with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition, and with international measures for the prevention and control of disease;

Article 24, which mentions the International Bureaux to be placed under the direction of the League of Nations;

Article 25, which purports to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations;

Finally, Article 26, the last Article of the Covenant, which deals with the procedure to be followed for amending it.

Therefore, anything political in the Covenant of the League of Nations is now being studied by a Committee of the League of Nations, which has already appointed its rapporteurs.

Romania has not rapporteur on any question.

However, to study does not mean to accept, and I reserve to Romania all the rights which are necessary for the defence of her interests. Those who favour revision must not think they have won, thanks to an error on the part of the Romanian representative; they still have to deal with me.

Because of the attitude of Romania, I telephoned to Minister Pella¹ and told him: "You were present in July 1936 when I was endeavouring to limit the study of the Covenant of the League of Nations and to prevent the question of revision being touched upon, even lightly. How could you allow revision to be accepted as a subject for study, and why did you not make use of Romania's veto in order to prevent the machinery from working?"

M. Pella replied the following letter, dated from Geneva, December 19th, 1936:

"Following on our telephone conversation, I would like to inform you that I have made a new reservation and did all which was humanly possible in order that Romania should adhere, on the question of Revision, to the views you had expressed in June last (which, in reality was July). Unfortunately, I could not do more. This can be simply explained. I was representing Romania on the Council and in the afternoon of December 16th the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey asked me to see him and I had a long conversation with him.

On that day, on the question of the modification of the Covenant, Romania was represented on the Council by Counsellor Georges Crutzesco, who raised no objection to the inscription of Article 19 among the questions which were to be discussed by the Committee.

At the next meeting, I went into the Committee and immediately made, in the name of Romania, all reservations on the inscription of Article 19 in the category of study.

When I saw that you were not satisfied with the reservation made, I managed, when I spoke for the second time, to make a second reservation in the following terms:

'M. Pella reiterated the most express reservations as to any decision which the Committee has taken or may take, and which directly or indirectly might affect in any way the principles, the procedure and the present interpretation of Article 19.'

I fully understand that you cannot be satisfied with the vote of the 16th December 1936, but I could not do more after such a vote had been taken in the course of a meeting where I did not represent Romania on the Committee for the modification of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Yours very sincerely,
(signed) V.V. Pella"

¹ Vespasian V. Pella.

How could I be satisfied, all M. Pella's reservations having taken place after the affirmative vote of the present Permanent Delegate of Romania in Geneva?

M. Stelian Popesco has created an anti-revisionist League and, above all, a museum which has a very great value for the defence of our national interests. But in Geneva, where the interests of Romania are threatened all the time, these interests are defended in the manner I have described.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF THE WORLD

It would be impossible not to draw from all the foregoing facts what are my conclusions with regard to the maintenance of the present peace – that is to say, not to mention the possibility of a future war, even if only affected Europe, would necessarily assume a world character, because of the bonds existing between our Continent and all the others.

Here we must make a distinction between the maintenance of the present peace and victory in a future war.

I am certain that Victory will be on the side of France, England, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, even if the latter only give Europe a moral support.

I am not sure that, after the policy which has been followed, peace will not once again be shaken.

What I want is not a second victory, but the maintenance of peace as it exists today.

Now, I fear a future European war – and, more particularly, one in the near future.

There is only one cause for the latter: the attitude of those who, in spite of their interest in the maintenance of the present order of things, remained passive when faced with the creation of a “New Bloc”¹ and I allowed the division of Europe into two war camps.

What is still more serious is that the passivity of the Powers interested in the maintenance of the present peace with regard to the new bloc has gone so far as to create impunity for all violators of international law, provided they are States of the new bloc. We want the friendship of the States composing this “New Bloc.” Still more, I want many of their claims to be dealt with equitably, which seems reasonable.

All the same, it is none-the-less true that it was impunity for the first violation of international law which was the cause of the following violations, and the basis of the feeling of the heads of the “New Bloc,” that nothing would happen to them, whatever they did.

From the end of 1924, until now, the policy of Europe has been like a great game of poker, in which some of the players could not summon up enough courage to tell the others to throw their cards on the table, and were constantly paying up in order to avoid rupture.

In consequence, today, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to get it out of the head of the poker player in question that the game is not going to continue indefinitely in the same way.

I am far from thinking that bellicose intentions should be attributed to the New Bloc, or to any given State, but the public opinion of countries having known the diplomatic success constituted by the lack of sanctions, and who can pride themselves on saying: “We can do as we please, without anybody preventing us” will not be easily

¹ The German-Italian collaboration treaty was signed on October 25, 1936 (“Berlin-Rome Axis”). On November 25, 1936, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. Italy adhered to the Pact on November 6, 1937, the “Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis” being thus constituted.

slowed down by their respective Governments, even if, at a given moment, the latter were to realise the danger of continuing the system practised in the past. These Governments are obliged to say: "We would rather have war" – that is to say: "Let the world perish after us, rather than that we should be disqualified in the eyes of those who deify us."

Whether or not they will be vanquished in a new war is another question, but it is certain that this series of blunders will be the cause of the new war.

This is all the more true because public opinion of States which will have to react in consequence of a skilful and inconceivable propaganda thinks that war must be avoided at all costs.

Thus, at the present time, we have not only a Europe divided into two camps, but also a Europe, part of which views war without fear, while another part considers it as a catastrophe.

I know it has been said lately that there has been a certain recovery which has produced satisfactory results.

This is perfectly true.

But, before this recovery took place, the surrounding of France, through the abandonment of the zone¹ which was deemed to be demilitarised according to the Treaty of Locarno, and through the occupation of Spain by foreign troops, was allowed to happen without any serious reaction.

A future war, if it breaks out, will affect more particularly regions which are of special interest to certain States: Central Europe.

Whether there is a war, or simply disturbances which will carefully not be called war, how much the efficacy of French action in Central Europe will be impaired after the occupation of the Rhineland and the Spanish question, the sole aim of which is to involve France in Western European questions which did not previously exist as far as she was concerned, and which were recently raised in order to give some States freedom of action such as they had never before enjoyed.

I have been a witness of all this sad period of European political history, and I cannot therefore help a feeling of deep sorrow in describing it.

The slowness with which the Anglo-French Agreement and the Franco-Russian Agreement, was realised, although it might constitute an instrument for preventing war, the leniency shown to certain States in belief that they might be detached from their new attitude and brought back to the path of their former policy, are actions which history will judge severely.

Leniency was considered as weakness, in consequence of which States having claims to put forward found themselves stronger than before.

¹ On March 7, 1936, Germany denounced the Locarno Treaty and sent her troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. Berlin set forth an incompatibility between the Locarno Treaties and the French-Soviet Treaty, concluded on March 2, 1935. This act did not stir a commensurate reaction of the other signatories of the Rhineland Pact. The Council of the League of Nations, gathered in London, in its 91st session (March 14–19, 1936) and confined itself to note the fact, but did not take any step likely to compel the German Government to withdraw its troops from the demilitarized Rhineland. The London agreements reached after consultations and negotiations with Belgium, France, Italy and Great Britain, were submitted for debate to the Council of the League of Nations, which – due to Italy's obstructions and indecision shown by Great Britain and France – failed to adopt any resolution with palpable effects. The Permanent Councils of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente took a firm attitude, expressing, on March 11, 1936, their decision to defend by all possible means the existing treaties, inclusive of the Locarno Treaties.

What was offered in pursuance of the policy of leniency was received as a gift, and immediately after its reception we heard again a good deal of talk about rights.

In Europe, today, we have the Spanish war, which, in view of the important number of volunteers taking part therein, can no longer be called a civil war. Moreover, in Asia, we have the Sino-Japanese war, not to mention the recourse which has been made to arms in other regions.

And yet we continue to speak of peace as of something actually existing, whose disappearance would be tantamount to a catastrophe.

Open your eyes: the catastrophe is here.

The interests of Great Britain and France today are directly threatened by the countries whose friendship we desire.

When one considers this recent past, barely three years old, it is easy to see how the above words are true.

No, these are not the days of loyalty. Those who get the greatest consideration are not those who are faithful. Our epoch belongs to those who act equivocally and thereby rise to the fear of their drifting away. Hence the policy of conciliating them.

The first State which repudiated a Treaty unilaterally – the Minorities Treaty – was Poland. What happened to her? Nothing! Poland has been re-elected to a semi-permanent seat on the Council. She has a seat on all League Committees, and is always certain of the warmest welcome, in Paris as well as in London.

The second State to violate the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles unilaterally was Germany. What happened to her? Nothing, except the honour of the visit of high personages to Berlin and the offer of a Naval Pact¹ by Great Britain, which Germany hastened to sign.

The third State to violate international law, and the easiest law of all to apply, that is, the obligation to state one's case before the Council before having recourse to war, was Italy. What happened to her? At the outset, it was thought that the reaction would be very serious. Sanctions were adopted, not complete sanctions, but part sanctions, gradual and not *in globo*.

Notwithstanding their insufficiency, the sanctions taken against Italy must be considered as the most serious attempt made up to date to restore the authority of international law.

However, what political action took place parallel to sanctions? France and England agreed, in bilateral conversations, to end the war by the partition of the territory of a country unanimously declared by the League of Nations to be the victim of an aggression. The Hoare-Laval Plan could not be applied because it met with such a violent opposition from English public opinion.

This reaction was so strong that Sir Samuel Hoare had to leave the Foreign Office. But he made such a loyal and courageous statement of his policy that, soon afterwards, he came back to the British Cabinet as an important Minister.

¹ The British-German Naval Pact was concluded (by an exchange of letters between Samuel Hoare, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain and the German ambassador at large, Joachim von Ribbentrop) on June 18, 1935, allowing Germany to build its own war fleet, having a registered tonnage worth 35 per cent as compared to the British fleet, and a submarine fleet with a registered tonnage worth 45 per cent of the British one. The Pact – signed shortly after the introduction of the compulsory military service in Germany, on March 16, 1935 – gave free way to Germany's arming, offering the latter the opportunity to acquire the means to promote a policy of force.

Mr. Eden replaced Sir Samuel Hoare.

He was orthodoxy itself with regard to the application of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

But British public opinion had changed in the interval. It wondered why Great Britain should go to war with Italy because of Ethiopia.

Suddenly, Mr. Eden found himself bound hand and foot.

I consider Mr. Eden as one of the most capable men in the realm of international politics, but I have never admired him more than when he had to carry out a policy contrary to that for the furtherance of which he had become Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Italo-Ethiopian conflict rapidly took on the aspect of an Anglo-Italian conflict.

Does one realise the strength which accrued to the New Bloc when Italy could truthfully say, and continues to say: "I wrought my will against the will of Great Britain and the League of Nations?"

Since then, one always hears of the failure of the League of Nations and, consequently, of the reform of the Covenant, although the failure is not due to the Covenant, but to the men who, through the importance of their countries, give a lead to the League of Nations.

As to the failure of Great Britain, there is much less talk about it because it is known that Great Britain never forgets, that anything done against her is always written in her books and that, with her, the hour of settlement will always come.

Chancellor Hitler followed the Italo-Ethiopian conflict very closely. He probably thought: "If independent countries, inhabited by various populations, can be occupied without any risk, why should I not occupy the zone demilitarised according to the Treaty of Locarno, which is a real German land, inhabited by Germans."

Hence the "coup" of March 7th, 1936.

This gave rise to no serious reaction.

It is true that the Sarraut¹ Government, and in particular its eminent Minister for Foreign Affairs, obtained for France a most valuable Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain, since the latter country assumed by anticipation – an inconceivable thing – the obligation to assist France in case of unprovoked aggression.

But these things are important for us, specialists.

Vis-à-vis the masses, we will never have a great success if, on one side of the scales, we place the spectacular action of Chancellor Hitler which led to the re-occupation of the demilitarised zone, and, on the other side, a mere sheet of paper.

Because my love for France is too well known and above all vicissitudes, I shall be frank:

After March 7th, 1936, there were men in Central Europe who thought: "If France does not defend herself, how will she defend us?" To speak bluntly: faith in France has diminished in Central Europe.

I know that this conclusion is wrong and that what makes the splendour of France is her reaction at the eleventh hour.

But I alone do not constitute all Central and Eastern Europe, and others do not think as I do.

¹ Albert Sarraut.

The vacillating foreign policy of some States of Central Europe, which we have witnessed of late, arises from this fact.

And because some Great Powers are specially interested in Central Europe, in order to render France's action in those parts as inefficient as possible, she has been encircled by means of the occupation of the Rhineland and foreign occupation in Spain.

I know that the new régime in pacifist Spain will be hostile to foreigners, because Spain has suffered so much from them.

It is nonetheless true that, thanks to the policy of passivity, France and Great Britain have new preoccupations concerning the occupation of Spain and the Mediterranean.

I do not say that the points of view of those two Great Powers will not prevail in the end.

But there is an interval during which, even if France wishes otherwise, Central Europe will be somewhat aloof from her.

The policy of non-intervention was carried out in a sincerely pacific spirit, but events have borne it every day a little further from the intentions of its authors, thanks to the action of certain States.

I think that we allowed too much time to elapse before starting the action which is now under way.

In any case, the slightest hesitation on this ground would be the last straw.

But what will Romania do in such a future war?

a) Neutrality will be impossible, because of her geographical situation.

b) Our adherence to the Powers of the New Bloc means our defeat and the partition of our territory. France, England and the United States have not helped us to obtain Transylvania and Bessarabia in order that we should let them go at the first opportunity.

c) Our adherence to France, England and Russia and, possibly, to the United States will bring us victory. However, we will again know occupation by the enemy, as in the past, but we also run a great risk of seeing Romania becoming the scene of war operations, on which two formidable armies will come to grips.

Besides, this third hypothesis requires prolonged diplomatic preparations and preliminary treaties with a very clearly defined aim: aid and assistance, and an undertaking not to sign new peace treaties if the present frontiers of Romania are impaired in any way. This policy cannot be the result of hesitation and of compromise with anybody.

CONCLUSIONS

The time has come to conclude.

Romania should understand that the so-called slogans or guiding principles invited after my departure: "*Titulesco's policy is possible without Titulesco: anybody can fill any post provided he is my man; nobody is indispensable or wedded to his job*" are beautiful dreams of the past, but those dreams collapsed before the realities which it took only a few months to create.

The time has now come for the assumption of responsibilities towards the country.

What is the balance sheet of the Tataresco Government from the point of view of foreign policy?

It is made up of a series of such important deficits that I can only register them with dismay when I think of Romanian interests:

a) Disintegration of the Balkan Entente through the unconditional consent given by the Romanian Government to the Bulgaro-Yugoslav agreement.

b) Disintegration of the Little Entente through the unconditional consent given by the Romanian Government to the Italo-Yugoslav agreement.

c) Refusal by the Romanian Government of a single Pact of Alliance between the Little Entente and France.

d) Refusal by the Romanian Government of a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R.

e) Risk of war with Czechoslovakia or Germany if it happens that the undertakings given to Poland have been increased by way of interpretation.

f) Request to the U.S.S.R. for a *de jure* recognition of Bessarabia, without taking into consideration the effects of the vote of the Bessarabian Parliament (Sfatul Țării), nor the effects of the 1920 Treaty nor those of the 1933 Treaty, which defines Romanian control, a request which creates a useless complication with the U.S.S.R.

I repeat that it is not through the blunder of M. Victor Antonesco that Romania will lose Bessarabia. I repeat that I shall be the first to fight for the maintenance of the rights of our forefathers over this province.

g) Refusal to continue my struggle – of which the party of John and Vintila Bratiano made a platform – for the suppression of the European Danube Commission and the restoration to Romania of her sovereign rights on the mouths of the Danube.

h) A return to the procedure followed in the past, that is, the régime of capitulation with regard to minorities.

i) Inscription of revision on the agenda as a subject for study by the League of Nations.

In contrast to this policy of moral and material deficits, with which I myself no longer know how we can cope, I would recall the foreign policy I have pursued as a member of various ministries and, more particularly, since 1932.

When the differences between the two are realised, it will be seen that foreign policy is not like a driverless car which would continue alone on the path it must follow,

and that the personal element plays a much greater part than Romania has been led to believe.

And this is exactly the thesis which was presented by the Tataresco government to the Romanian Parliament in the Committees on Foreign Affairs on December 11th, 1936.

I wanted Romania to have a policy of defence of all her frontiers, a positive policy, a policy which would make Bucharest an international centre, and, above all, a policy of independence.

I wanted to defend our frontiers in the most efficient manner, hence the Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente, the Pact of the Balkan Entente, the action taken with a view to transforming these Ententes into important international units by means of evolution, in order that the enemy of any of us should immediately become the enemy of all the others. This policy has been replaced by one of freedom for each of us and of love without jealousy. Hence my wish to have a Pact of Mutual Assistance with France and the U.S.S.R. The Tataresco Government refused the offer of mutual assistance of France, and on February 6th, 1937, declared in Parliament, through its Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Romania did not intend to negotiate a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R.

I wanted a positive policy which would transform Bucharest into an international centre: hence the legations I created in all Scandinavian States, in all Baltic States and in five Central and South American States, because, if political disinterestedness has a home, that home is to be found in those countries. As they do not feel the torment of the lack of security, they can work for themselves and even more for us in order that anything in human thought and soul which savours of the ideal should not remain static but should take the path of perpetual dynamism.

I wanted a policy of independence for Romania. I can firmly declare that, as long as I was Minister for Foreign Affairs, I never received orders from beyond the frontiers.

In fact, I was even accused of intervening in the affairs of other countries, which was completely untrue, except, of course, when I was asked to do so.

With this end in view, I had to fight, and sometimes to displease some people for a short period.

In my country my opponents call excitability what in reality is only spontaneous movement of my soul towards defence of our national interests, and they accused me of having done harm to the relations between Romania and various States.

Do they realise how tense is the struggle which must be waged with regard to all these problems, in order that Romanian interests should emerge victorious?

When, in the course of an election in the World Conference constituted by the League of Nations, a Minister for Foreign Affairs obtains 50 votes out of the 52 valid voting papers, it means that he has fought, that he may have given as well as received blows, but that, psychologically speaking, he has wounded no one.

Where is Romania that I left?

Today, Romania disappears in the shadow of other countries.

Could there be any more painful discovery for me when my life is so intimately connected with the struggle for the defence of the country on all sides?

Wherever Romania has extended her territory it is possible to find traces of my activity. Beginning with the Treaty of Bucharest signed in 1913 at the end of the Balkan

War which, for my political début, gave me an opportunity of being a member of the Field Commission for the delimitation of the new frontiers of Romania and Bulgaria, and which therefore registered in a concrete form the first increase of our national patrimony since Mircea the Old; continuing with the Treaty of Trianon which I signed as Romanian delegate, and reaching the Treaty of 1920 on Bessarabia from which, by the negotiations I conducted in London, in May 1920, I excluded the right of appeal of the U.S.S.R. to the League of Nations on the question of Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and the frontiers of the latter, my life has been a continuous struggle with the aim of carving out for Romania a place in the life of the world whilst defending her national interests.

Hence my struggle in connection with optants in order to prevent a situation in which Romanian peasants would have had to pay, by means of taxes, the amounts claimed by Hungarian magnates; my struggle in the question of Hungarian colonists, in order that all the provisions of our agrarian reform could be carried out to the letter with or without the assent of Geneva; my struggle in order to bring to an end the litigation which was started against us as a consequence of the occupation of Budapest¹ and which resulted in Romania's being condemned to pay milliards of gold crowns by the Reparations Commission, although in the end she did not pay a single cent because of the action of which I took the initiative; my struggle for many years in the reparations question to obtain compensations for the famous one per cent presented to us by our allies and which was the origin of a great part of Vintila Bratiano's friendship for me; my struggle in order to obtain the best possible conditions for the consolidation of our war debts in Great Britain and in America; my struggle in order to erase from the Pact of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. the words "*existing dispute*" and thus reach the Convention of the definition of aggression and the definition of the territory which, for Romania, became all the territory now under her control; my struggle for the conclusion of a Pact of Assistance with France; my struggle for the conclusion of a Pact of Assistance with the U.S.S.R.; my struggle for the conclusion of a Pact of Assistance with Germany; my struggle for the conclusion of a New Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente; my struggle for the conclusion of the Balkan Pact; my struggle, in conjunction with that of the countries of the Little Entente, for adhesion to the Saavedra-Lamas Pact; and even my present struggle with a view to preventing all this past from being forgotten to the point of being distorted by the opponents of this policy.

¹ On March 21, 1919, the Hungarian Councils (Soviets) Republic was proclaimed. It refused to recognize the right of the Romanian people and of the other nations which separated from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to constitute themselves into nation-states. Therefore, the Government of the Hungarian Soviets Republic, backed by the Government of Soviet Russia, resorted to all means, even menaces and provocations and the use of force, in order to reannex Transylvania to Hungary. The Government of the Hungarian Soviets Republic decreed the general drafting of all men aged between 16 and 42 years, with a view to attack Romania and Czechoslovakia, declaring at the same time, that Hungary is in a state of war "with all the neighbouring countries from which it has something to claim." On the night of July 19/20, 1919, the Hungarian troops launched a fierce attack against the Romanian Army. The real danger of tearing off Transylvania from this country's body and reannexing it to Hungary, determined the Romanian General Staff to proceed to a counteroffensive. On August 3, 1919, the Romanian Army entered Budapest. On October 28, 1919, the Romanian Government decided to withdraw the Romanian Army from Hungary. The intervention of the Romanian Army annihilated a major threat against Romania's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty and eliminated a major factor of risk for the security of Central Europe, whose political configuration was under way of being established by the Paris Peace Conference.

I know what many Romanians think: you will be Minister for Foreign Affairs again, and everything will fall into line once more.

At the present time such an opinion would be wrong.

I do not want to raise any personal questions here; I shall simply deal with political conjunctures and the possibilities for action involved by the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Political conjuncture arises at a given time. The conjunctures of 1936 might come back, but again they might not.

As to power, in the sphere of foreign policy, it is conditional on an element without which no diplomatic work could ever be crowned with effective and lasting success: stability.